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The overnight successes of the movement to end racial
profiling provide new hope in a time when civil rights victories come
grudgingly. Litigation played a groundbreaking role in challenging
police practices and in making racial profiling an issue of national
concern.' However, the same legal work that has helped to create an
opportunity for change has distracted lawyers, advocates, commenta-
tors, and police from focusing on the creation of effective remedies for
racial profiling. 2 The goals of reform efforts remain vague. For
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1. For cases representing the nationwide groundswell of litigation, see
infra notes 7, 85, 87, 98. The most dramatic example of a lawsuit drawing
attention to the racial profiling problem came in State v. Soto, where efforts to
suppress evidence obtained through race-based stops led to revelations that New
Jersey State Police falsified information to hide pervasive racial profiling and to
the admission by the State that police engaged in profiling. 734 A.2d 350 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996).
2. Legal commentary on racial profiling has focused exclusively on defining
liability, without discussion (much less criticism) of current efforts to design re-
medies or proposals for better approaches. One paper compares recent efforts to
use statistics to monitor racial profiling, but admits there is no consensus on how
to interpret such data and does not discuss other aspects of remedies aside from
statistical monitoring. Deborah Ramirez et al., A Resource Guide on Racial Pro-
filing Data Collection Systems: Promising Practices and Lessons Learned 53-56
(2000) (prior, unpublished version, on file with author). Two commentators have
suggested ways to bring in new groups to address the problem, but do not discuss
remedies or how those groups might tackle the problem differently. See Myriam
E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private Citizens
in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1384, 1388 (2000)
(proposing that a law be passed permitting the Justice Department to deputize
private suits against police departments for unconstitutional patterns or
practices); Sean Hecker, Race and Pretextual Traffic Stops: An Expanded Role for
Civilian Review Boards, 28 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 551, 592-604 (1997)
(suggesting that civilian review boards might take on a role in preventing
selective enforcement of traffic laws). An interesting new report by the Police
Executive Research Forum (PERF) provides a comprehensive guide for
departments attempting to address racially biased policing. Lorie Fridell et al.,
Police Executive Res. F., Racially Biased Policing: A Principled Response (2001),
http'//www.inca.net/perf/racial.html [hereinafter PERF Report]. The focus is on
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example, lawyers emphasize using litigation to obtain police data on
the race of people stopped, without a sense of what to do with data
aside from trying to show an Equal Protection violation. This data
takes on the feel of a litmus test where lawyers hope to show inten-
tional discrimination, while police try to avoid being labeled as ra-
cist.4 Sidetracked by this framing of the problem, all sides fail to use
the data to examine the roots of the underlying racial profiling. As
one lawyer said, "Getting at the problem is just much more difficult
than keeping data and putting out a piece of paper that says, 'Don't
do it."5
Despite this narrow approach, an historic shift has already
occurred, with an explosion of information about race and police
stops. For the first time, police across the country voluntarily collect
data based on race.' Several states now require police to collect data.
helping police departments formulate policy, and the report not only provides
useful suggestions and model policies, but also provides an interesting window
into the thinking of reformers within the law enforcement community. Id.
3. For examples of recent lawsuits seeking access to data on traffic stops,
see infra notes 117-18. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (NAACP), the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), and other op-
ponents of racial profiling have focused legislative reform efforts on obtaining
statistics. For example, they supported the proposed Traffic Stops Statistics Act,
a federal bill drafted by Congressman John Conyers (D-MI), which would have
funded a U.S. Department of Justice study of local police traffic statistics on race.
Traffic Stops Statistics Study Act of 1999, H.R. 1443, 106th Cong. (1999). See
Press Release, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP), NAACP Calls on Congress to Enact Bill Allowing Federal Traffic Stop
Statistics (Apr. 14, 1999), http://www.naacp.org/president/releases/archives/1999/
traffic-stop.htm. For a description of collection programs on traffic stop statistics
at the state and local level, see Bureau of Just. Stats., U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Traffic Stop Data Collection Policies for State Police, 1999 (2000),
http'/www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ bjs/pub/asciiltsdcp99.txt. See also David A. Harris, The
Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why "Driving While Black" Matters, 84 Minn.
L. Rev. 265, 277-88 (1999) (reviewing the first comprehensive statistical analysis
of police stops and race in New Jersey, Maryland, and Ohio).
4. For recent cases raising Equal Protection claims, see infra notes 7, 85,
87, 98, and for discussion of police fears of being labeled as racist, see infra notes
143-45 and accompanying text.
5. Lori Montgomery, Racial Profiling in Maryland Defies Definition-or
Solution, Wash. Post, May 16, 2001, at Al (quoting Deborah Jeon, an attorney
with the Maryland ACLU).
6. In response to political pressure or to special commission investigations,
departments have chosen to collect data voluntarily to show that they do not
profile. See infra note 128.
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In the courts, the Justice Department has secured consent decrees
requiring data collection, and plaintiffs have sued to obtain such
information.7 Not only are police talking about race, but in countless
small towns and neighborhoods, these statistics create a new kind of
conversation and struggle about the meaning of race in policing.8
This wellspring of information has not been tapped.9 First,
despite apparent consensus on information gathering as the remedy
of choice, no one agrees on what data to collect. Second, there is no
agreement on what to do with the information once it is collected. For
example, none of the consent decrees or state laws indicate how data
should be analyzed.1 ° As John Lamberth, a premier analyst of traffic
stop statistics, explained, "A lot of places are reporting the data, and
7. Daniels v. City of New York, 198 F.R.D. 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (certifying
class alleging that the Street Crimes Unit of the New York City Police Depart-
ment stopped and frisked tens of thousands of predominantly minority New York-
ers without reasonable suspicion); Settlement Agreement, Wilkins v. Md. State
Police, (D. Md. Jan. 5, 1995) (Civ. No. MJG-93-468) (creating a consent decree
that required both a halt to an alleged practice of racial profiling on 1-95 and the
collection of data on all traffic stops); Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 1999 WL 592187
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 2, 1999) (dismissing case alleging that thousands of traffic stops
throughout Illinois were motivated by race); Robert Jackson, Minorities Win Suit
over Unfair 1-70 Stops, Rocky Mtn. News (Denver), Nov. 10, 1995, at 4A
(discussing settlement in a Colorado case, the terms of which included $800,000
in damages, the abandonment of the program, and a requirement of reasonable
suspicion for traffic stops). For Justice Department consent decrees, see infra
note 162. The ACLU coordinates a 'monumental' national litigation and advocacy
campaign centered on racial profiling. See ACLU, Arrest the Racism: Racial
Profiling in America (describing the ACLU's litigation campaign and legal
hotline), at http//www.aclu.orgprofiling/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2001). See also
Teacher, Three Others Sue LAPD, Alleging Racial Profiling in Stops, L.A. Times,
Feb. 11, 2000, at B8 (describing a federal lawsuit filed by the ACLU on behalf of
five men). For an early discussion of consent decrees, see Debra Livingston, Police
Reform and the Department of Justice: An Essay on Accountability, 2 Buff. Crim.
L. Rev. 815 (1999).
8. See infra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
9. For example, one commentator asks, "How do we tap the private resour-
ces, personal experiences, and community-based motivation that have engineered
the great structural reform efforts of our time, given the constitutional barriers
the Supreme Court has erected over the past two decades?" Gilles, supra note 2,
at 1414.
10. See Ramirez et al., supra note 2, at 54 ("More research is needed to
determine the most useful way to analyze data on stops and searches. By
experimenting with various benchmark comparisons, practical methods can be
designed.").
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then the question becomes, 'What does it mean?' And no one seems to
know."" Many advocates are understandably concerned that because
little thought has been directed towards data collection, these efforts
may be used disingenuously, to give the impression that no racial
profiling takes place, to pin the problem on a few problem officers, or
to postpone real reform. 2 Critics exploit this uncertainty, calling
racial profiling a "myth," that is either based on "worthless" and
incomplete data or the invention of race-baiting crusaders who lack
any understanding of real police work.'3
Part of the difficulty in understanding racial profiling may be
that all of this new information about police stops is being kept from
the public. Few consent decrees, settlements, or state laws require
public disclosure of the data. In addition, most last only a few years.
Unless continuing partnerships with the community develop, any ac-
countability created may vanish. Thus, critics portray these efforts as
empty gestures. Worse, exclusion of outside groups destabilizes these
remedies, as civil rights and community groups protest their exclu-
sion, sue to challenge or intervene in consent decrees, and pass legi-
slation to achieve their goals outside the courtroom. Where interpre-
ting information about police practices involves making value judg-
ments, shutting out the community threatens the legitimacy of the
project.
Despite the limitations of the current approach to racial pro-
filing, recent efforts to craft remedies already suggest the outlines of
an innovative 'experimentalist' approach towards policing." Law-
11. Montgomery, supra note 5 (quoting John Lamberth).
12. See infra note 153 and accompanying text for a discussion of these con-
cerns.
13. George F. Will, Exposing the 'Myth' of Racial Profiling, Wash. Post, Apr.
19, 2001, at A19.
14. The approach in this paper follows the work of Charles Sabel, Susan
Sturm, Malcolm Sparrow, Archon Fung, and others who propose a regulatory re-
gime based on new models of participatory governance. For the central piece
describing how government can adopt flexible, team-based organization to deliver
services emphasizing disclosure of data to the public and the use of rolling stand-
ards to measure progress, see Michael C. Doff & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution
of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 267 (1998).
Susan Sturm's article, Second Generation Employment Discrimination:
A Structural Approach, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 458 (2001) provides a powerful frame-
work for remedying informal patterns of discrimination that goes to the heart of
the problem discussed in this Article. Professor Sturm's piece inspired this
20011
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suits, legislation, and settlements with the Department of Justice
(DOJ) have begun to create such interactive forms of participation
through information-sharing and partnership between police and
outside actors. State laws have convened interdisciplinary groups to
evaluate data from police departments. Informal efforts of police de-
partments have also increasingly led to closer connections with civil
rights groups and the community.
15
Under the proposed approach, police and key actors-inclu-
ding community groups, advocates, or other organizations facing sim-
ilar problems-would hold a series of meetings where they would dis-
cuss the nature of the problem, collaborate in the design of the data
collection process and new traffic stop procedures, implement new
training and supervision, jointly measure progress, and engage in
problem solving using the data collected. This approach makes polic-
ing more flexible and responsive to outsiders and gives police access
to solid information to prevent them from falling back on stereotypes.
The usual defense of racial profiling has been that it helps detect
likely criminals, but these remedies suggest that putting an end to
Article. Sturm shows how workplace problem-solving can reach patterns of
informal bias and exclusion by fostering open, participatory decision-making and
by inviting the expertise and participation of outside stakeholders. Further, the
benefits of this kind of problem solving-because it makes the institution itself
more open to change--extend far beyond remedying the legal violation to
improving creativity and productivity more generally. Sturm shows how bringing
together disparate actors that share a common interest in solving these problems
results in new dynamics and new understandings of what discrimination is and
how to remedy it.
Malcolm Sparrow describes a revolution in management and advocates
broad changes in government enforcement including: information sharing and
collection, participation of outside actors, encouraging compliance, and persis-
tently questioning the nature of the problems faced. Many of these proposals are
incorporated in this Article. Malcolm K Sparrow, Imposing Duties: Government's
Changing Approach to Compliance 44-52 (1994). See also Archon Fung, Street
Level Democracy: Pragmatic Popular Sovereignty in Chicago Schools and Policing
(1999) (describing the role of public participation in community policing in Chica-
go as a model for cooperative problem solving), at http://www.archonfung.net/pa-
pers/SLD99.pdf; Jerome H. Skolnick & James J. Fyfe, Above the Law: Police and
the Use of Force 225 (1993) ("[Clivilian oversight of police ... is grounded in a
democratic theory of representation and participation.").
15. PERF Report, supra note 2, at 99 (recommending minority community
outreach for departments addressing racial bias, and stating that one-third of
departments responding to its survey reported projects or programs aimed at
strengthening relationships with minority communities).
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racial profiling can also help police do their work better.16 In a depar-
ture from problem-oriented policing in the past, the approach also
takes advantage of technological advances in information gathering
and data analysis." While this approach takes the focus off litigation,
its demonstration of the practicality of a remedy for racial profiling
should assist courts in resolving disputes, thereby making voluntary
compliance more palatable.
Part I of this article describes why the racial profiling prob-
lem seems intractable when viewed through the lens of current legal
norms, and suggests a broader approach towards the problem. Part II
evaluates litigation, state laws, and Justice Department consent de-
crees-methods that suggest possibilities for a more comprehensive
remedy. Part III presents an approach that combines data collection
16. Randall Kennedy, though strongly opposing racial profiling and over-
reliance on such statistics, argues that, as a first step, one must concede that
"blacks, particularly young black men, commit a percentage of the nation's street
crime that is strikingly disproportionate to their percentage in the nation's popu-
lation." Randall Kennedy, Race, Crime, and the Law 145 (1997). In fact, race is a
poor proxy for crime, and overreliance on race likely indicates shoddy police work.
See infra note 50.
17. For general discussion of problem-oriented policing, see Mark Harrison
Moore, Problem-Solving and Community Policing, in Modern Policing 99, 123
(Michael Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1992) ("Opening the department to com-
munity-nominated problems often affects the police understanding of their ends
as well as their purposes...."); Sarah E. Waldeck, Cops, Community Policing,
and the Social Norms Approach to Crime Control: Should One Make Us More
Comfortable with the Others?, 34 Ga. L. Rev. 1253, 1254 (2000) ("[Plroblem-
oriented policing... encourages officers to identify relationships between indivi-
dual events and develop solutions to underlying problems."). See generally Her-
man Goldstein, Problem-Oriented Policing (1990) (suggesting strategies that
police can use to identify, analyze, and address effectively the problems that con-
front them, including community mobilization and publishing information); Ron-
ald Goldstock, The Prosecutor as Problem-Solver (Ctr. for Res. in Crime & Just.,
Occasional Papers No. 10, 1991) (calling for a shift in the role of the prosecutor
from mere presenter of evidence to the court to that of controller of crime and
problem-solver); Malcolm K. Sparrow et. al., Beyond 911: A New Era for Policing
(1990) (calling for innovation in organization, strategies, and approaches-
including problem-solving-to make policing more effective); Dan M. Kahan &
Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 Geo.
L.J. 1153 (1998) (discussing the criminal procedure doctrines used to evaluate the
constitutionality of discretionary community policing techniques); Debra Living-
ston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communi-
ties, and the New Policing, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 551 (1997) (arguing for enhanced
political administrative mechanisms to ensure that police discretion benefits the
community).
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with a form of problem-solving that involves several sets of actors, in-
cluding advocates and the community. Looking to build on the
strengths of existing models, this Article turns to two efforts, in Phil-
adelphia and Chicago, that suggest the possibilities for involving
outside participants in designing a system for data collection and in
using that data to solve problems. These efforts show that data can
be evaluated in partnership with key actors, such as community
groups, advocates, or local organizations facing similar problems.
Three features of the proposed approach stand out: 1) departments
take the initial step of setting up a system for information gathering
and data disclosure; 2) they begin an ongoing process of reflection
and problem-solving based on that information; and 3) they open par-
ticipation to outside groups that assist as partners in problem solv-
ing. Finally, this approach suggests ways that lawyers, police, the
community, and other groups can all benefit from creating stronger
ties as they work together to remedy racial profiling.
I. RETHINKING THE RACIAL PROFILING PROBLEM
Advocates and the media have settled upon the term 'racial
profiling' to refer to the disparate treatment of minorities by the po-
lice. While the phrase provides powerful rhetoric and aptly expresses
the underlying problem of racial injustice, it is a slippery concept
that disguises the complex legal and factual issues that surround
race's effect on policing. 8 A debate rages not only over how to define
racial profiling, but over the true meaning of statistics, motives, and
police policy. 9
18. In an example of glossing over the complexity of the problem with great
rhetorical effect, Democratic presidential candidate Bill Bradley openly called for
the next president to issue an executive order banning racial profiling, stating,
"We all know what, 'driving while black' is-it's breathing while black." Editorial,
Profile Precautions, Courier-Journal (Louisville, Ky.), Feb. 10, 2000, at 12A (quo-
ting Bill Bradley). In one sense, we do all know what the problem is-it is a
pattern of unreasonable, race-based stops. But simply banning 'racial profiling,'
even if such a pattern is present, will not provide police with better guidance. A
ban will not root out the causes of profiling, nor will it provide any means to
assure that police will obey the ban. For a discussion of proposals to ban racial
profiling, see infra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 46-49 and accompanying text. This debate continues to
be shaped by current events, including recent international conflicts. Events
following the attacks on September 11, 2001 have not changed the course of the
racial profiling debate, but they have changed its focus for the time being. In so
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Racial profiling traditionally referred to actual written
profiles of suspects, primarily drug courier profiles. 0 Police identified
suspects using a set of factors describing behavior and appearance,
including age, clothing, and often race. The Supreme Court ruled
that under the Fourth Amendment, race could reasonably be
included in a profile, as long as it was only one of several factors
used. 2' Thus, even where profiling is explicit, courts permit the use of
doing, they have created new opportunities for reform. While the recent attacks
have unleashed serious new fears of revived racial profiling, they have also
changed perceptions of police in ways that could expand possibilities for police-
community cooperation. Officers in New York, for example, say the improvement
in relations has been particularly dramatic. Donna De La Cruz, NYC Police
Relations Improving, Associated Press, Oct. 20, 2001.
Evidence suggests progress is being retarded by a new wave of profiling
against Arab-Americans, and that national security is being used to justify a new
erosion of rights. Indeed, for years Arab-Americans have complained of racial
profiling by airlines, dubbing such practices, 'flying while Arab.' Sharon Cohen,
Terror Attacks Revive Concerns About Profiling, Hous. Chron., Oct. 21, 2001, at
19. However, in a move lauded by the ACLU, the federal government has warned
air carriers not to single out passengers. The system that airlines use relies most
heavily on random checks and a focus on prior travel patterns of passengers. Id.
Even if categories like Arab, Middle Eastern, or Muslim could be iden-
tified, the suspects in the recent attack could have been more easily identified
based on neutral criteria, such as inclusion on F.B.I. lists of known Al Qaeda
collaborators, or as passengers paying for one-way tickets with cash. "The four
hijackings that took place on Sept. 11 were not a failure to stop 'Middle Eastern-
looking' passengers from boarding, but a failure to track down known associates
of a terrorist organization; to properly search everyone boarding the planes for
knives and other dangerous objects... the list goes on." Editorial, Arab
Appearance Isn't a Crime, Chi. Trib., Oct. 13, 2001, at 24.
A more serious concern may be the use of profiling in prolonged, secret
federal detentions. The ACLU has complained that the Department of Justice has
refused to release information on hundreds of individuals indefinitely detained.
While there are serious due process and racial profiling concerns, a "veil of
secrecy" prevents the public from even knowing whether violations occur. Mae M.
Cheng, Detentions Raise Legal Concerns; Some Immigrants Held for Long Peri-
ods, Newsday, Oct. 22, 2001, at A23.
20. Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 Yale
L.J. 214, 233-36 (1983) (describing use of such profiles by federal officials).
21. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563 (1976) (permitting
discretion to use "apparent Mexican ancestry" as an indicia of suspicion); United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886-87 (1975) ("The likelihood that any
given person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough to make Mexican
appearance a relevant factor. .. ."); United States v. Collins, 532 F.2d 79, 82 (8th
Cir. 1976) ("[Tlhe color of a person's skin... is an identifying factor
2001]
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race.
Recent racial profiling challenges do not involve the use of
written profiles that include race in a list of factors. Instead, they al-
lege patterns or practices of police stops that are based, at least in
part, on the race or national origin of the subject. Yet to call such
practices 'racial profiling' puts the cart before the horse. Because
plaintiffs must show that race is a factor in the stops, thus enabling a
court to infer that police actually used a racial 'profile.' In order to
show constitutional violations, lawyers and advocates have tried to
demonstrate patterns of racial profiling by obtaining data about
stops. When these figures show stark racial disparity, their message
may be so strong that they cause minorities to feel targeted.2 Yet,
neither Fourth nor Fourteenth Amendment doctrine provides any
guidance as to how much racial disparity is unlawful, nor have any
courts addressed the issue.23 Perhaps trying to pin down these
patterns using statistics is also difficult because of the power of race
to distort basic relationships between people and institutions.
Leaving legal liability aside, each of the major statistical studies of
police stops has raised new questions about the nature of the prob-
lem.2
which... assists the police in narrowing the scope of their identification
procedure.").
Even where race is not explicitly listed, police often rely on loose profiles
to permit race-based stops in practice. The Supreme Court in Whren v. United
States upheld the constitutionality of pretextual stops that could reasonably have
been motivated by factors other than race. 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). See also
David Cole, No Equal Justice 47-52 (1999) (giving examples of drug-courier
profiles, discussing unstated reliance on race, and providing evidence that police
often rely on race without referring to it in written profiles).
22. Perhaps an Equal Protection violation could be premised on the race-
based message that patterns of police stops send. While creative, this approach
would follow voting rights cases, in which it is the message that district lines
send, and not any injury based on actual vote dilution, that constitutes the Equal
Protection harm. For discussion of the expressive nature of the harm in voting
rights cases, based on the statistical singling out of disparate numbers of
minority residents, see Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms,
"Bizarre Districts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances
After Shaw v. Reno, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 483, 506-07 (1993).
23. See infra notes 77-103 and accompanying text.
24. The major reports are the New Jersey Attorney General's Report: St.
Police Rev. Team, Off. Att'y Gen., Interim Report of the State Police Review Team
Regarding Allegations of Racial Profiling (1999), http://www.state.nj.us/lps/intm-
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New Jersey provides a case study of racial profiling, but only
because the state issued a report actually admitting that its police
engaged in racial profiling by stopping starkly disparate numbers of
minority drivers on the New Jersey Turnpike.n Most efforts to
examine racial profiling stop at this stage, presenting a pattern of
apparent discrimination and, based on these aggregate numbers,
attempting to reach a conclusion as to whether police over-use race.
Yet, upon examination, even where the state admits to profiling, the
problem proves far more complex.
First, any definition of racial profiling is confounded by the
motivations of individual actors. New Jersey initially explained the
statistical disparity in its stops as the result of a few 'problem cops'
who singled out minorities and were intentionally racist.26 Yet even
in cases where officers admit to pulling over blacks, because these
stops can be pretextual, officers can always disguise their motiva-
tions by basing stops on a traffic violation. 7 Yet focusing on problem
officers may pin the problem on a few racists to avoid looking at
larger patterns. Problem cops do not explain systemic disparities that
extend over thousands of stops in different precincts or patrols.2
419.pdf [hereinafter New Jersey Report], and the New York Attorney General's
Report: C.R. Bureau, Off. Att'y Gen., The New York City Police Department's
"Stop and Frisk" Practices: A Report to the People of the State of New York from
the Office of the Attorney General (1999), httpJ/www.oag.state.ny.us/press/re-
ports/stop-frisk/stop-frisk.html [hereinafter New York Report], and the monitors'
reports from U.S. Justice Department consent decrees in Pittsburgh, Steu-
benville, and New Jersey. See supra notes 194-96 and accompanying text for
information about the decrees.
25. New Jersey Report, supra note 24, at 26-27 (stating that four of ten
stops were of minorities and eight of ten searches, "the overwhelming majority,"
were of minorities).
26. Id. at 7-8 (initially attributing the problem to the "willful misconduct by
a small number of State Police members" and proposing that an early warning
system be used to "ferret out" officers engaging in misconduct).
27. Then again, outright admissions of individual officers are not so rare.
See Cole, supra note 21, at 36-37 (describing how the Maryland State Police
distributed a memorandum encouraging officers to stop blacks, and recounting
how an officer in Volusia County, Florida, when asking a white man how he was
doing, and receiving an answer, "Not very good," replied, in turn, "Could be
worse-could be black.").
28. New Jersey Report, supra note 24, at 7 (adding that larger de facto
patterns must also be responsible for disparity). See also PERF Report, supra
note 2, at 6-7 ("[Tlhe 'bad apple' analogy is no longer resonating as the only
credible explanation. Increasingly, organizational culture is recognized as the
20011
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Indeed, New Jersey has admitted that a few officers could not be
responsible for these larger patterns.2
Motivations of individual officers also prove important to
understanding the data. New Jersey and other departments have
noted large gaps in their data."0 Officers may not fill out forms or
keep proper records of their stops for a host of reasons. Some may do
so to avoid paper work and save time, some to prevent the appear-
ance of being racist,31 some to seem more successful by recording only
those searches that result in arrests, and some to defend their ac-
tions against potential complaints by adjusting records. Indeed, per-
ceptions may distort data where officers, relying on stereotypes, stop
a driver they believe to be minority, but who is, in fact, white, or vice
versa.32 Racial stereotypes may cut against reality in unpredictable
directions, and biased policing might result in little disparity, just as
neutral policies can significantly impact minorities.
The racial profiling problem is also defined by the way that
race filters perceptions of individual community members. Residents
may be stopped with reasonable suspicion, but still perceive a racial
profiling problem. The way stops are conducted, the manner in which
police talk, the body language police use, cultural differences, the
presence or absence of force, and the number of people watching may
most important factor influencing police behavior.").
29. New Jersey Report, supra note 24, at 7.
30. Id. at 31 (noting "missing data"); infra note 170 (indicating that officers
in New York City often do not record stops). Similarly, Cincinnati has had
persistent problems with inaccurate data collection, in its efforts that were
ordered by the City Council in the wake of riots and a federal lawsuit alleging
racial profiling. The suit is presently in mediation. Kristina Goetz, Profiling
Forms Get Shaky Start, Many Erroneous or Incomplete, Cincinnati Enquirer,
June 17, 2001, at Al (finding that one quarter of the forms studied had mistakes
or missing information, ranging from not reporting the time of the incident to the
race of the driver).
31. David Kocieniewski, Trenton Charges 2 Troopers with Falsifying Race of
Drivers, N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1999, at B1 ("Two state police supervisors said it
was common practice for troopers on the turnpike to jot down the license plate
number of white motorists who were not stopped and use them on the reports of
blacks who were pulled over.").
32. For discussion of this problem, see PERF Report, supra note 2, at 129-
30. A study of this phenomenon would be extremely interesting, but would re-
quire police to state the race of the person stopped before, and then note correc-
tions afterwards.
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all affect the perception that a stop is unjust.' The Supreme Court in
Terry v. Ohio acknowledged the psychological harm that police stops
cause:
Even a limited search.., constitutes a severe, though brief,
intrusion upon cherished personal security, and it must
surely be an annoying, frightening, and perhaps humilia-
ting experience.3'
Following an encounter with law enforcement that seems
motivated by race, or even after hearing of a friend's encounter, resi-
dents may be likely to assume that future interactions will be race-
based. In addition, residents' perceptions will be shaped by what
happens to others in their community, based on conceptions of
"linked fate," or sympathy with the injuries of relatives and friends.35
Statistics may not reflect the psychological effect of the manner in
which stops are conducted or the larger repercussions of stops on the
community. 6
33. Tracey L. Meares, Norms, Legitimacy and Law Enforcement, 79 Or. L.
Rev. 391, 401 (2000) ("[Slome research indicates that police who regularly treat
arrestees with courtesy are more likely than those who do not to be viewed as
legitimate. While police officers may not like to be told to be more polite to
arrestees, this research suggests that law enforcement gains could be achieved
more cheaply than through more instrumental means simply by telling officers to
'be nice.'"). Meares adds, "We should, therefore, expect greater compliance in
communities where police treat arrestees with greater respect than communities
where police do not, even if the former community does not hire any more police
officers." Id.
34. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1968). For a more thorough discussion
of Terry, see infra section II.A.2.
35. On "linked fate," see Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and
Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and Disorder in New York City, 28 Fordham Urb.
L.J. 457, 463 n.24 (2000). See also Ronald Weitzer, Racialized Policing: Residents'
Perceptions in Three Neighborhoods, 34 Law & Soc'y Rev. 129, 150-52 (2000)
(concluding that residents' perceptions of crimes depend upon the neighborhoods
in which they live).
36. Anecdote has helped define the racial profiling problem. See Harris,
supra note 3, at 265-75 (describing stories and interviews with racial profiling
victims); Katheryn Russell, "Driving While Black": Corollary Phenomena and
Collateral Consequences, 40 B.C. L. Rev 717, 720 n.15 (1999) (listing prominent
people stopped because of their race). As Tracey Maclin points out, the racial
profiling debate involves practices that date back to colonial times. Tracey
Macin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 333, 336 (1998)
("Today, police departments across the nation.., continue to target blacks in a
manner reminiscent of the slave patrols of colonial America.").
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To unravel the problem further, racial profiling cases are not
just about individuals, but also concern institutions, beginning with
police departments. In New Jersey, the State quickly realized that
the actions of individual officers could not account for the disparity in
traffic stops. Instead, that disparity was caused by policy failures
that resulted in poor training; a breakdown in supervision, discipline,
and rewards systems; and procedures that gave officers unguided
discretion.37 Informal elements of police culture can also encourage
targeting of minorities. For example, New Jersey noted that profiling
resulted from "informal coaching, tempered by each trooper's own ex-
periences and enforcement priorities, and [was] strongly influenced
by an official policy to reward troopers who find major drug ship-
ments. " ' Additionally, the Soto court cited an "utter failure of the
State Police hierarchy to monitor and control" officers.3 9 Indeed,
training sessions emphasized that Blacks and Hispanics are "mainly
involved in drug trafficking," and stressed that "ethnicity is some-
thing to keep in mind."4 ° The experience in New Jersey bears out that
profiling may result from police being trained to look for suspects
based on racially loaded factors, or from their becoming conditioned
to do so by emulating colleagues.41 Proper training, supervision, and
recruitment of minority officers can address these issues."
37. See infra notes 177-78 and accompanying text (discussing New Jersey's
recognition that the problem includes issues of training, discipline, and policy).
The consent decree in New Jersey calls for elaborate enhanced supervision,
reform of training procedures, and new misconduct procedures. See Consent
Decree, United States v. State of New Jersey, (1999) (Civ. No. 99-5970(MLC)),
http'//www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/jerseysa.htm [hereinaler New Jersey
Decree].
38 New Jersey Report, supra note 24, at 10.
39. State v. Soto, 734 A.2d 350, 361 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div. 1996).
40. Id. at 358.
41. Racial profiling may also result from "unconscious racism" where
officers do not realize that stereotypes affect decisions or that suspicionless stops
convey a racist message to minority victims. See generally Charles R. Lawrence
III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism,
39 Stan. L. Rev. 317 (1987).
42. An excellent series of articles in the New York Times investigated the
connection between police policy and minority recruitment. New York has had
great difficulty recruiting minority officers in part due to the distrust engendered
by its policing strategies. C.J. Chivers, Alienation is a Partner for Black Officers,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 2001, at Al. Boston, on the other hand, has been able to
surmount community distrust and has created a diverse police force. C.J.
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Formal policies can also provide a cover for individual discri-
mination or tacit tolerance of stereotyping. Records indicate that
New Jersey officials knew that vastly disparate numbers of mi-
norities were being stopped, but did not respond because they
thought that they were effectively interdicting drugs. The Turnpike
is, after all, "widely believed to be a major drug corridor."4' 3 A formal
policy of conducting mass pretextual stops may thus play an integral
role in creating an aggressive, 'quality of life' vision of law
enforcement." Police policies that establish incentives to meet arrest
quotas or intercept large drug shipments may also motivate officers.
Courts are willing to ignore the racial dimensions of these policy
choices, and are extremely deferential to police expertise and
discretion in adopting law enforcement strategies. 45
Chivers, From Court Order to Reality: A Diverse Boston Police Force, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 4, 2001, at Al (explaining that Boston, with fourteen percent minority of-
ficers as compared with New York's five percent, hires only city residents, active-
ly recruits minorities, and considers diversity and language skills in promotions).
43. New Jersey Report, supra note 24, at 2. New Jersey knew for over ten
years that far too many minorities were being stopped, but state police officials
were at a loss for what to do. David Kocieniewski & Robert Hanley, An Inside
Story of Racial Bias and Denial, New Jersey Files Reveal Drama Behind
Profiling, N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 2000, at 53. They did not disclose this information
because they were not sure if their conduct was illegal, or whether it was justified
by better drug interdiction. Id. Records released since show that they were
paralyzed, and preferred to simply ignore the problem amidst the conflict:
[Tihe words written by the thousands of people involved-
troopers, civilians, attorneys general and state officials-also
tell an intensely emotional story: one of gung ho troopers who
saw themselves as unappreciated as they risked their lives to
protect New Jersey's minority members from drug violence,
and who sought promotions based on high-visibility drug
arrests; the anger and defensiveness of police commanders who
believed their tactics were unjustly branded as racist; the
outrage of minority troopers ordered to view their own
neighbors as drug suspects; the bewilderment of black and
Hispanic drivers who could not understand why they were
detained by the police simply because of the color of their skin.
Id.
44. See infra note 283 (analyzing the costs and benefits of this 'quality of
life' approach to law enforcement, most avidly adopted in New York City).
45. See infra notes 80-83 and accompanying text. On the other hand, the
court in Soto found disparity in stops so "stark" as to question police policy and
point to an "utter failure" in supervision. Soto, 734 A.2d at 360-61. It noted, "The
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Some police and commentators openly defend policies target-
ing minorities as sound law enforcement, as a good way to catch drug
offenders, and as an "unfortunate byproduct of sound policing."' In-
deed, a conservative reaction against the 'racial profiling crusade' is
underway, with critics openly stating that racial profiling is a "myth"
where police have made the policy choice to pursue aggressive
strategies of enforcement.47 They argue that no data can disprove
that police use race largely out of necessity, because more minorities
commit crime.' George Will writes:
Many individuals and groups specialize in hurling accusa-
tions of racism, and police become vulnerable to such accu-
sations when they concentrate their efforts where crime is.
If that accusation begins to control policing, public safety
will suffer-especially the safety of minorities in violent
and drug-infested neighborhoods.49
Yet very few minorities commit crimes. Stigmatizing an en-
tire race with a general propensity to commit crime, with no effort to
specify the offenses involved, is discriminatory and poor police work.50
eradication of illegal drugs from our State is an obviously worthy goal, but not at
the expense of individual rights." Id. at 361.
46. Michael A. Fletcher, Driven to Extremes: Black Men Take Steps to Avoid
Police Stops, Wash. Post, Mar. 29, 1996, at Al (stating that the Maryland State
Police characterize the disproportionate number of traffic stops of minorities as
"an unfortunate byproduct of sound police policies"). See also Kennedy, supra
note 16, at 138-63 (examining racially selective policing and its justifications).
47. Heather Mac Donald, The Myth of Racial Profiling, City Journal, Spring
2001, at 15. See also Will, supra note 13, at A19 (agreeing with Mac Donald about
the 'myth' of racial profiling).
48. Mac Donald, supra note 47, passim. Mac Donald admits that highway
stops should be "colorblind," but argues that street stops must be racially
disparate in response to high crime in minority neighborhoods, and in response to
demands for enforcement from law-abiding minority residents. Id. at 16, 27. She
downplays substantial community outrage over racial profiling, attributing it to
"anti-racial profiling activists," while ignoring substantial indications that ag-
gressive, indiscriminate, quality-of-life policing does not reduce crime. Id at 27.
Further, residents may really be asking for community policing, rather than
blindly demanding 'more' policing.
49. Will, supra note 13, at A19.
50. Ira Glasser said, "Think about it for a minute. Most players in the NBA
are black. But if you were trying to get a team together, you wouldn't go out in
the street and round up random African Americans." Ira Glasser, ACLU Biennial
Speech (June 1999), cited in David Rudovsky, Law Enforcement by Stereotypes
and Serendipity: Racial Profiling and Stops and Searches Without Cause, 3 U.
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Evaluating data also requires careful examination of whether these
strategies, in fact, even prevent crime and justify harming innocent
minorities. The contention that profiling is poor police work is rein-
forced by studies that consistently show that very few of these mass
pretextual stops result in arrests. In New Jersey, for example, while
vastly disproportionate numbers of minorities were stopped, fewer
than one percent of stops resulted in arrests."' Further, almost all
motorists stopped had violated traffic laws, and both minority and
white drivers violated traffic laws at the same rate. 2
Racial profiling is also practiced in conjunction with other
factors that police rely upon, including class, crime patterns, and
neighborhoods. The pretexts used to defend against accusations of ra-
cial profiling often invoke context. For example, police maintain that
class rather than race is involved in their stops of late-model cars or
targeting of poor neighborhoods."3 In the same vein, police often de-
fend their conduct by arguing that they merely stop people in high
crime neighborhoods-protecting residents and responding to disrup-
tive street activity-or simply respond to calls where suspects are de-
scribed as 'black.' However, police are often accused of relying on
"flimsy" evidence in deciding that certain neighborhoods are crime-
prone.' Regression analysis can be used to help isolate these factors,
Pa. J. Const. L. 296, 313 (2001). For more discussion of the fallacy and harm of
using race as a proxy for crime, see id. at 313-14 nn.100-01; Harris, supra note 3,
at 525.
51. New Jersey Report, supra note 24, at 25-31.
52. Id. at 31; State v. Soto, 734 A.2d 350, 352-55 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1996). On the similar paucity of arrests in New York City, see Fagan & Davies,
supra note 35, at 476, and Jeffrey Fagan et al., Declining Homicide in New York
City: A Tale of Two Trends, 88 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1277 (1998).
53. Scott Bowles, Bans on Racial Profiling Gain Steam, USA Today, June 2,
2000, at 3A (explaining that San Jose Police Captain Rob Davis believes that
socioeconomic factors cause disparate stops-for example, where indigent people
have out-of-repair cars or live in high crime neighborhoods-but that race may
not be a major factor).
54. Johnson, supra note 20, at 222 n.42 (describing the "flimsy" and often
contradictory bases used by police to support assertions that a neighborhood is
"crime prone"). See also Fagan & Davies, supra note 35, at 457 ("Our empirical
evidence suggests that policing is not about disorderly places, nor about
improving the quality of life, but about policing poor people in poor places. This
strategy contradicts the policy rationale derived from Broken Windows theory,
and deviates from the original emphasis on communities by focusing on people.").
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given sufficient data and a willingness to unpack the problem.
Finally, communities and neighborhoods define the problem.
Understanding the racial profiling problem in New Jersey requires a
knowledge of the demographics of the Turnpike driving population.
Therefore, statistics of those stopped must be carefully compared
with the typical driving population, or with that of the surrounding
neighborhood. Many battles over the meaning of statistics erupt over
faulty choices as to the baseline population affected by stops.56 Neigh-
borhood data proved important in New Jersey, where recent informa-
tion shows particular disparities on the southern portion of the New
Jersey Turnpike. 7
The institutional landscape of the community, a critical di-
mension that is often overlooked, will also define the problem. Aside
from the harm to the individuals stopped, racial profiling creates a
perception that police act unjustly. Surveys indicate that most
Americans consider racial profiling a serious problem, and that many
people of color report that they have been stopped because of their
race.' Thus, police departments may find that they need to address
55. See Fagan & Davies, supra note 35, at 479 (describing analysis used in
the study of New York City street stops to show that crime patterns could not
account for racial disparity).
56. See Finn Bullers, Three Chiefs Criticize ACLU's Traffic Study; Race-
Profiling Report Was Flawed, They Say, Kan. City Star, Jan. 13, 2001, at B1. See
also Soto, 734 A.2d at 360
(Statistics may be used to make out a case of targeting
minorities for prosecution of traffic offenses provided the
comparison is between the racial composition of the motorist
population violating the traffic laws and the racial composition
of those arrested for traffic infractions on the relevant roadway
patrolled by the police agency.).
57. Randy Diamond, Profiling Data Troubling in South Jersey; Study Finds
Disparity at Bottom of Turnpike, Record (Trenton), Jan. 11, 2001, at A01 (study
found troopers stopped minorities on the southern end of the New Jersey
Turnpike at a percentage exceeding the percentage of minorities who actually
used the Turnpike).
58. See Leslie Casimir et al., Minority Men: We Are Frisk Targets, N.Y.
Daily News, Mar. 26, 1999, at 34 (reporting in a small survey that eighty-one out
of 100 young minority men in New York City reported being stopped by police);
Richard Morin & Michael H. Cottman, Discrimination's Lingering Sting, Wash.
Post, June 22, 2001, at Al (reporting that, in their survey, nearly four in ten
blacks said they had been unfairly stopped by police because they were black,
including fifty-two percent of black men); Poll Finds Most in U.S. Believe Police
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the perception that they act improperly. For example, in New York
City, police found that community resentment of aggressive policing
badly hurt the morale of officers and made recruitment difficult:
For patrol officers, much of the disenchantment grows from
a painful irony: many of them believe the same aggressive
crackdowns that drastically cut crime and earned them
accolades were stretched too far, that the push to punish
infractions of every variety undercut their discretion and
made them feel unpopular, even despised, in neighborhoods
they helped make safer.59
Courts now feel compelled, out of a sense of responsibility or
in a nod to social reality, to lament the damaged public perception of
the police. The Seventh Circuit, in a recent dismissal of a racial pro-
filing case, was careful to add that "the oft-cited public perception
that race and ethnicity play a role in law enforcement... will no
doubt remain.... How to change public perception and demonstrate
compliance with constitutional requirements is a matter the State of
Illinois may wish to consider."60 Similarly the Second Circuit, after
dismissing claims in Brown v. City of Oneonta, stated, "[W]hile we
disagree as a matter of constitutional law, we are not unmindful of
the impact of this police action on community relations."6 1
In addition, attitudes and relationships between police and
the community may determine how local groups will respond-whe-
ther they protest, sue, engage in dialogue, or support reform. If police
are politically alienated from community institutions, or are racially
or geographically divided, they may have a hard time understanding
Practice "Racial Profiling," Chi. Trib., Dec. 11, 1999, at 15 (describing results of a
Gallup poll in which a majority of all Americans believed that racial profiling is
widespread and three-fourths of young black men said they have been stopped by
police because of their race).
59. Kevin Flynn, Police Feel Scorn on Beat and Pressure from Above, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 26, 2000, at Al (describing how negative public perceptions of police
in New York has led to a wave of early retirements, low morale, and difficulty in
recruitment). Difficulty in recruiting, in part stemming from low morale, is a
nationwide problem for city police departments. See Fox Butterfield, City Police
Work Losing Its Appeal and Its Veterans, N.Y. Times, Jul. 30, 2001, at Al.
60. Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 656 (7th Cir. 2001).
61. Brown v. City of Oneonta, 195 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 1999) (adding,
"[Liaw enforcement officials should always be cognizant of the impressions they
leave on a community, lest distrust of law enforcement undermine its
effectiveness.").
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why residents object to their behavior. It was for this reason that
New Jersey recognized the need for 'outreach.6 2 The police re-
sponse-be it collecting statistics or instituting more structural re-
forms-will depend on how open their relationship is with the
community.
The community is itself a protean entity, where institutions
change with alliances. For example, community groups may help to
bridge the gap for reform on one front, and yet, exacerbate mistrust
and hostility on another front. Police have often reacted angrily to
civil rights groups who they believe use race unfairly, with no
interest in making common cause to benefit the community.'
Thus, while remedial efforts often fail to move beyond the ini-
tial stages-where a troubling pattern of police stops is identified or
problem cops are blamed-the roots of racial profiling run much
deeper. Looking beneath the surface, racial profiling is linked to rela-
tionships between individuals, institutions, stereotypes, perceptions,
shared attitudes, goals, approaches towards law enforcement, and
the community context. While race may best define the problem, it
cannot be isolated. Unfortunately, many police departments have
tried to simply issue a policy barring officers from making stops
"based solely on an individual's race."' As racial profiling extends far
beyond race, and as race distorts relationships beyond that of the of-
ficer and person stopped, the challenge is to design a remedy that
takes account of the multiple dimensions of the racial profiling prob-
lem.
II. CURRENT APPROACHES AND AN EMERGING MODEL
Racial profiling remedies have developed in three areas: 1)
private litigation; 2) state legislation; and 3) Justice Department
consent decrees. In each, recent remedial efforts have begun to
broaden the focus beyond looking at numerical disparity, providing
insights into a more comprehensive approach.
62. See infra note 189 and accompanying text (describing weak attempts to
involve the community in consent decrees).
63. See infra note 145.
64. PERF Report, supra note 2, at 50 (finding that nineteen percent of de-
partments that responded to their survey had adopted new policies on stops,
arrests, and searches, but that the vast majority only prohibited stops solely
based on race).
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A. An Obstacle Course: Private Racial Profiling Suits and
Equal Protection
A legal conclusion that police engage in racial profiling lies at
the end of an obstacle course that litigants have, until recently, rare-
ly completed. Plaintiffs must first allege a pattern or practice of
police behavior that is sufficient to satisfy standing requirements for
injunctive relief. Second, if the complaint alleges a Fourth
Amendment violation, plaintiffs must show that race was,
unreasonably, the only factor on which police relied. Third, to prove
an Equal Protection violation requires a difficult showing of
intentional discrimination, to which police may respond by
demonstrating a compelling state interest.
Tensions in law and theory surrounding racial profiling drive
the remedial strategies of institutions. Courts, unwilling to embrace
more complex remedial goals, have been reluctant to impose
structural remedies on police departments. Although racial profiling
suits have enjoyed some success against all odds, they have not
resulted in remedies. They have imposed discovery costs on defen-
dants-which has forced disclosure about police practices-and
imposed financial and political pressure to settle. This legal obstacle
course has, in turn, affected the remedial strategies of civil rights
lawyers, pushing them in the direction of open-ended remedies
focusing on police data gathering.
1. Initial Obstacles and Opportunities
The initial work of banding together as a community, identi-
fying a problem of racially-motivated stops, and then seeking legal
assistance is a difficult, but potentially transformative, process. Com-
munity mobilization is necessary for successful litigation because
individual suits will not obtain standing for injunctive relief against
police departments. Following City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, plaintiffs
must allege a policy or pattern of police behavior to obtain standing
to pursue injunctive relief.' Lyons also denies standing to plaintiffs
65. 461 U.S. 95 (1983). For cases denying standing, see, for example,
Daniels v. Southfort, 6 F.3d 482, 485 (7th Cir. 1993) (denying standing to plaintiff
who was falsely arrested, whose rental car and dog were seized, and whose home
was unreasonably searched, because even though "injunctive relief is appropriate
in a § 1983 action where there is a persistent pattern of police misconduct," no
pattern had been shown); Curtis v. City of New Haven, 726 F.2d 65, 68-69 (2d
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whose illegal conduct precipitated the encounter, so groups must
search for law-abiding plaintiffs.' To demonstrate liability under §
1983, plaintiffs must then allege, following Monell v. Department of
Social Services, that police engage in a policy, practice, or custom of
stopping persons solely based on race.67 Next, plaintiff must obtain
class certification, though recent decisions indicate that plaintiffs
alleging racial profiling should satisfy Rule 23 certification
requirements.' Finally, plaintiffs face an uphill battle to prove that
police follow a consistent policy of racial profiling. They must
marshal evidence from spotty statistics, thousands of different
encounters, and little pre-discovery access to information about the
activities of police officers.
Because this kind of work requires considerable expertise,
Cir. 1984) (denying standing to challenge police use of mace, where police policy
did not authorize such use and plaintiff did not allege repeated police miscon-
duct). I argue elsewhere that, properly understood, Lyons should not pose a signi-
ficant obstacle in racial profiling cases and can be distinguished where Equal
Protection claims are raised. See Brandon Garrett, Note, Standing While Black:
Distinguishing Lyons in Racial Profiling Cases, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1815 (2000)
(arguing that courts determine whether an individual plaintiff seeking injunctive
relief faces a 'credible threat' of future injury by focusing on whether government
conduct was authorized by a policy, practice, or custom and whether plaintiff was
law-abiding; courts should additionally presume standing where Equal Protection
claims are alleged).
66. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 106-07.
67. 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (holding municipal government liable under §
1983 when injuries are caused pursuant to a policy or custom, whether caused
directly "by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to
represent official policy"). Monell permits liability based on a de facto pattern or
activity, or on a showing of deliberate indifference to unconstitutional conduct. Id.
See also City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989) (holding that deliberate
indifference of authorities and 'failure to train' can be sufficient in a case invol-
ving failure of police to provide medical assistance). For criticism of Monell as
poorly suited to redress lower level police practices, especially given the police
.code of silence," see Myriam E. Gilles, Breaking the Code of Silence: Redis-
covering 'Custom" in Section 1983 Municipal Liability, 80 B.U. L. Rev. 17 (2000).
68. In particular, Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 23 requirements that there be
'questions of law or fact common to the class," Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2), and that
the claims or defenses be "typical," Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3), may present issues.
For the most prominent recent case certifying a class in a racial profiling case
and suggesting that such certification is appropriate, see Daniels v. City of New
York, 198 F.R.D. 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). After a hearing, the Second Circuit
declined to reverse the certification order. See Daniels v. City of New York, 2001
WL 668697, at *1 (2d Cir. June 12, 2001).
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lawsuits have usually been brought by larger, national civil rights
groups-organizations that have been perceived as excluding local
community groups.69 Finding plaintiffs willing to challenge an abu-
sive, and perhaps retaliatory, police department may also raise sensi-
tive ethical issues. Plaintiffs may also be concerned with more imme-
diate needs, favoring cash settlement over a slim chance of obtaining
injunctive relief. Yet, involvement in such efforts often energizes or-
ganizing efforts and creates the opportunity for links between civil
rights and community groups-links that have not been fully ex-
plored. v
69. Lawyers from several of the larger civil rights groups have reported to
the author that given the demands of litigation, spending time meeting with
community groups is far too burdensome. This is especially the case when they
say the remedial concerns of the community are not relevant to the technical
legal issues involved. Then again, they do not solicit community views on whether
litigation itself is most desirable. Despite the difficulties, lines of communication
with the community and mutual dialogue seem essential. For an excellent picture
of lawyers who advocate police reform work, and a description of alternative
approaches inspired by "rebellious lawyering" strategies, see Jessica A. Rose,
Rebellious or Regnant: Police Brutality Lawyering in New York City, 28 Fordham
Urb. L.J. 619, 637 (2000). In particular, Rose describes the attitudes of a civil
rights lawyer pursuing a class action case as focused exclusively on litigation and
reluctant to acknowledge the race, sex, and class issues involved in representing
a minority community and in maintaining a traditional litigation model of
lawyering. Id. at 638-39. Rose points out that the lawyers she interviewed "all
maintain that they are client-centered and are primarily directed by the client in
their strategic decisions. Despite this, the interviews did not reflect efforts on
their part to engage in a dialogue with the clients to develop new, creative re-
sponses to police brutality." Id. at 655.
70. See id. at 622 n.16 (noting the degree to which victims become involved
in community organizing efforts, though certainly not necessarily litigation:
The families of victims and survivors of police brutality who
have become politicized through their experiences are often
consumed with their organizing efforts. For them, this is not
the time for an academic analysis of their experiences-it is a
time for action. It is also difficult to locate or interview
survivors of police brutality who have not been politicized.).
Compare the support that community-based groups provide versus civil rights
groups. Rose interviewed Richie Perez, from the National Congress for Puerto
Rican Rights (NCPRR):
[Wie tell the families from the beginning that we cannot
guarantee you justice, if we reach a working agreement
together, what we can promise you is that you will never
struggle alone. As long as you want to struggle, we will
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Standing rules may provide a formal obstacle to developing
such links. For example, the Center for Constitutional Rights
included a community-based group, the National Center for Puerto-
Rican Rights (NCPRR) as a plaintiff in its class action lawsuit in
New York City. However, NCPRR was dismissed because it failed to
meet organizational standing requirements. 7 Despite this setback,
non-litigation-centered collaboration between lawyers, organizers,
and community groups is increasingly common.72 This collaboration
should be fostered on all sides. As discussed later, the remedy can
consist of the cooperation of these groups.
2. Fourth Amendment Treatment of Race
Fourth Amendment law exhibits a reluctance to address race
outside cases of the most explicit and blatantly racist law en-
forcement. Investigatory street or traffic stops are governed by the
Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment decision in Terry v. Ohio.73
While full arrest requires probable cause that the suspect has com-
mitted a crime, a 'stop and frisk'-in which the officer only asks a
person to submit to a patdown-can be justified only by "reasonable
suspicion."74 The Supreme Court defines reasonable suspicion
expansively, with a level of deference that, according to
commentators, may permit even arbitrary police conduct . A court
struggle with you .... So like with Altagracia Mayi [whose
son, Manuel Mayi, was killed by a racist gang in Queens] and
Iris Baez [whose son, Anthony Baez, was killed with an illegal
chokehold by the police when his football accidentally hit a
police car], we have been together for ten years, we are like
[their] family.
Id. at 644 n. 162 (alteration in original).
71. Nat'l Cong. Puerto Rican Rts. v. City of New York, 75 F. Supp. 2d 154
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding no organizational standing); Daniels v. City of New York,
2001 WL 62893 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2001) (the lawsuit with its new caption after
the removal of NCPRR). See supra note 70 for the services provided by NCPRR.
72. See infra notes 337-39 and accompanying text.
73. 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968) (requiring reasonable suspicion that suspect is
"armed and presently dangerous" in order to perform a 'stop and frisk').
74. Id. at 30.
75. See Carl. J. Schifferle, After Whren v. United States: Applying the Equal
Protection Clause to Racially Discriminatory Enforcement of the Law, 2 Mich. L.
& Pol'y Rev. 159, 167-68 (1997) (arguing that after Whren, Fourth Amendment
law permits almost any pretextual stop); Christopher Hall, Challenging Selective
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asks only whether an officer reasonably "could have" made such a
stop7 6 given "the totality of the circumstances" which is "measured in
objective terms. 7 Showing that race is the 'sole' factor justifying a
stop may therefore be prohibitively difficult.7' As in traditional racial
profiling cases, the stops are constitutional if officers relied upon
other objective criteria supporting suspicion.7 ' For example, the
Court's doctrine permits pretextual stops based on a range of traffic
violations, and has allowed police to rely on other, non-race related
pretexts, such as out-of-state license plates, "nervous" driving, and
operation of late model automobiles."
Enforcement of Traffic Regulations After the Disharmonic Convergence: Whren v.
United States, United States v. Armstrong, and the Evolution of Police
Discretion, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 1083 (1998).
76. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
77. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S 33, 39 (1996).
78. David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why "Driving
While Black" Matters, 84 Minn. L. Rev. 265, 309-10 (1999) (arguing that
Supreme Court decisions allow and encourage racial profiling and suspicionless
stops). Challenges under state law may be more successful where state
constitutions have been interpreted to require more than 'reasonable suspicion' to
justify a 'stop and frisk.' See, e.g., People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 219 (N.Y.
1976) (establishing a four-tiered standard for police stops requiring reasonable
suspicion that a person has committed, or is about to commit, a crime based on
state common law and public policy considerations).
79. E.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (holding
that while Border Patrol officers could use apparent Mexican ancestry as the
basis for inspection at checkpoint stops, where less than reasonable suspicion is
required, they could not rely on appearance to support reasonable suspicion in
roving-patrol stops); United States v. Bautista, 684 F.2d 1286, 1289 (9th Cir.
1982) ("Race or color alone is not a sufficient basis for making an investigatory
stop."); United States v. Garcia, 23 F.3d 1331, 1335 (8th Cir. 1994) (stopping
individuals based on Hispanic appearance does not support reasonable suspicion).
80. E.g., United States v. Jones, 44 F.3d 860, 872 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding
that relying on automobile size, type, and location supports reasonable suspicion);
United States v. Lebrun, 261 F.3d 731, 734 (8th Cir. 2001) (finding that
defendants' "nervous" appearance in conjunction with other factors gave rise to
reasonable suspicion).
Street stop cases can be distinguished from other kinds of Terry stops,
and no cases have yet explicitly held that street stops may be justified even partly
on the basis of race. Stopping innocent people on the street seems different from
stops at the border or stops of suspected drug couriers in airports in which the
transnational setting itself may give police a legitimate suspicion of illegality.
See, e.g., New York Report, supra note 24 ("A search of relevant case law revealed
no holding that, in the context of a street encounter, the civilian's race could
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Given the range of explanations that can support reasonable
suspicion, it is extremely difficult to show that race is unreasonably a
'sole' factor. Courts have deferred to claims that disparity is due to
the fact that disproportionately larger numbers of minorities reside
in high crime neighborhoods. 81 They have also permitted race to be
used as a relevant factor in conducting searches where it forms part
of the description of an individual suspect's identity.82 Some cases ev-
en support use of 'racial incongruity,' justifying police reliance upon
race where a person does not 'fit in' with the predominant racial
make-up of a largely segregated neighborhood.' Since courts give po-
lice justifications considerable deference, plaintiffs will have a hard
time countering them, especially as police have unique control over
the information about stops that could be used to impeach their
motivations .'
3. Equal Protection Approaches
Equal Protection doctrine may enable plaintiffs to avoid ob-
stacles that usually bar Fourth Amendment challenges, but the re-
lationship between the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments remains
unclear. Several recent suits have survived dismissal and have
resulted in certification of classes with Equal Protection claims in-
make an otherwise unsuspicious situation worthy of a 'stop.').
81. E.g., United States v. Magda, 547 F.2d 756, 758 (2d Cir. 1976)
(permitting reliance upon reputation of neighborhood for criminal activity);
United States v. Davis, 458 F.2d 819, 822 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (permitting officer's
suspicion based, in part, on his judgment that a neighborhood had the "highest
crime rate there is"). But see Johnson, supra note 20, at 233-36.
82. E.g., United States v. Ruiz, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1524, 1532 (D. Utah 1997)
("[RIace may be a factor as to probable cause or reasonable suspicion if it matches
a description of an offender or fits the facts relevant to a particular person, place,
or circumstance of the offense.").
83. E.g., State v. Mallory, 337 N.W. 2d 391 (Minn. 1983) (permitting
reliance on race where a black defendant had been stopped in a largely white
neighborhood in which a burglary by a black man had recently been reported);
State v. Dean, 112 Ariz. 437, 439 (1975) ("[Tlhe fact that the person is obviously
out of place in a particular neighborhood is one of several factors that may be
considered by an officer .... ").
84. On the other hand, statistical evidence may show Fourth Amendment
violations independent of unreasonable reliance on race. For example, a study of
traffic stops in New York City indicated that, in their own records, police did not
state reasonable grounds in a high proportion of their stops, suggesting rampant
Fourth Amendment violations. Fagan & Davies, supra note 35, at 481-82, tbl. 3.
[33:41
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tact, so courts will soon have to consider complex issues raised under
the Equal Protection Clause.'
In Whren v. United States, the leading, recent Fourth Amend-
ment decision, the Supreme Court suggested in dicta that the "selec-
tive enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race"
might violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, notwithstanding that reliance on race does not always violate
the Fourth Amendment.' Several commentators have concluded that
racial profiling creates a racial classification deserving strict scruti-
ny, and the few courts that have addressed this argument have
agreed."
85. Rodriguez v. Cal. Highway Patrol, 89 F. Supp. 2d 1131, 1141 (N.D. Cal.
2000) (dismissing defendant's motion to sever plaintiffs and strike class
allegations). In Rodriguez, the Court stated:
Plaintiffs have stated an Equal Protection claim by alleging
that Defendants acted with discriminatory intent and that
Defendants knew about but refused to stop racially
discriminatory practices on the part of their officers and by
alleging the existence of statistical evidence and other facts
which if proved would support an inference of discriminatory
intent.
Id. See Daniels v. City of New York, 198 F.R.D. 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (certifying
class in action charging constitutional violations by the Street Crimes Unit of the
New York City Police Department); Nat'l Cong. Puerto Rican Rts. v. City of New
York, 191 F.R.D. 52 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (reinstating Equal Protection claims in the
class action against the Street Crimes Unit, finding strict scrutiny appropriate at
least for the purpose of a motion to dismiss). See also Wilson v. Tinicum
Township, No. CIV.A. 92-6617, 1993 WL 280205 (E.D. Pa. July 20, 1993)
(certifying class for injunctive relief in racial profiling case alleging both Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendment violations).
Only one court has considered how plaintiffs could make a showing, as
required by Equal Protection doctrine, that either: 1) police engage in intentional
discrimination; or 2) a neutral police policy has been applied in such an
egregiously disparate manner that an inference of intentional discrimination can
be made. Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612 (7th Cir. 2001). The Seventh
Circuit described in detail how statistical evidence could be used to show an
Equal Protection violation. The court found the data before it unreliable because
it was not compared against relevant population data on the highways involved,
but rather against state-wide population data. Id. at 637-45. Evidence of racist
statements made during one stop also was not sufficient. Id. at 646.
86. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
87. Johnson, supra note 20, at 245 (arguing that racial profiling is a racial
classification subject to strict scrutiny and that racial incongruity used as a factor
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Plaintiffs have tried to show intentional racial discrimination
as required by the Supreme Court in Washington v. Davis.' They
cannot generally point to rules that "classif[y] based explicitly on
race,"89 because unlike race-explicit drug courier profiles, police rules
for stopping individuals and ordinances that police enforce are
typically facially neutral. Holding police liable under the Fourteenth
Amendment for an intentional violation creates an odd inconsistency
with Fourth Amendment law. As discussed earlier, under the Fourth
Amendment, police are permitted to use race as a factor, and the
Court does not inquire into the subjective intent of individual offi-
cers. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court has held that
race cannot be a partially "motivating factor" in a state decision.9
Few courts have addressed, much less resolved, the tension between
the Court's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment doctrines, and efforts
to remedy the problem are plagued by this fundamental conflict be-
tween treating the problem as a lack of reasonable suspicion or treat-
ing it as the use of race.9 Are police racist, unreasonable, or some
combination of the two, and can police policies implicate both Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendment norms?
92
in determining probable cause also should be subject to strict scrutiny); Kennedy,
supra note 16, at 160 (urging courts to apply strict scrutiny in race-based police
cases as applied in analogous affirmative action cases: "The Supreme Court has
been exquisitely sensitive to charges that affirmative action unfairly burdens
innocent whites.... By contrast, as we have seen, the Court pays little attention
to the burdens imposed on innocent people of color by race-dependent policing.");
Nat'l Cong. Puerto Rican Rts. v. City of New York, 191 F.R.D. 52 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
(reinstating Equal Protection claims in a racial profiling challenge, stating that
for the purposes of a motion to dismiss, strict scrutiny was adequately alleged);
United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 786 (2d. Cir. 1994) (Newman, J., concurring)
(arguing that although the Fourth Amendment permits pretextual stops,
selective stops based on race can create an Equal Protection violation).
88. 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment requires a showing of a racially discriminatory
purpose).
89. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 213 (1995).
90. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-
66 (1977) ("Davis does not require a plaintiff to prove that the challenged action
rested solely on racially discriminatory purposes .... When there is a proof that a
discriminatory purpose has been a motivating factor in the decision, this judicial
deference is no longer justified.").
91. None of the decisions cited supra in note 85 discuss Equal Protection
claims in any detail, since these claims only had to survive motions to dismiss.
92. Several decisions discussing class certification issues in the context of
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Given the Court's reluctance to interfere with police decision-
making, the Court may not find liability except where police conduct
is explicitly motivated by race. The Supreme Court might follow the
narrow approach taken by the Second Circuit in Brown v. City of
Oneonta, which held that Fourteenth Amendment requirements mir-
ror those of the Fourth Amendment. In other words, in order to show
an Equal Protection violation, plaintiffs must prove that stops were
made "solely on the basis of [the person's] race."93 Such a requirement
is very likely to be a fatal obstacle as race is almost never the sole ba-
sis for stops.' As noted above, police can justify their stops on a num-
ber of pretexts, arguing that they were motivated by a minor traffic
violation, based on actual descriptions of criminal suspects, or rooted
in 'legitimate' racial profiles of the traditional variety. On the other
hand, the Oneonta court sought further evidence of discriminatory
animus from which to infer intent, and cases involving more than one
police sweep might fare better.9"
racial profiling cases suggest that Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims are
deeply consistent and pose the same sorts of issues. See, e.g., Daniels v. City of
New York, 198 F.R.D. 409, 416 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (stating that the proposed
class was not overbroad because it included both Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment claims, and that both kinds of claims were consistent with a theory
of a practice of unlawful police stops).
93. Brown v. City of Oneonta, 195 F.3d 111, 119 (2d Cir. 1999). The Second
Circuit was divided, but declined to reconsider en banc its ruling dismissing
Oneonta. Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 2000). But see United
States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 786 (2d Cir. 1994) (Newman, J., concurring)
(arguing that although the Fourth Amendment permits pretextual stops,
selective stops based on race can create an Equal Protection violation).
94. Most practices termed 'racial profiling' could avoid liability under a
standard in which race must be the 'sole factor;' for example, 'young black men
standing on corners in high crime neighborhoods.' The Oneonta court found that a
police sweep was not based solely on race where police relied upon the "altogether
legitimate basis of a physical description given by the victim of a crime... [which
included] not only race, but also gender and age, as well as the possibility of a cut
on the hand." Oneonta, 195 F.3d at 119 ("The description is not a suspect
classification, but rather a legitimate classification of suspects.").
95. The court found disparate impact from the mere racial make-up of the
town. Its minority population was so small that police could feasibly search the
entire group. Given these facts, the court required "additional evidence of
discriminatory animus... in order to sustain an Equal Protection claim." Id. at
120. Perhaps part of the problem was the unusual facts of the case. It concerned
one incident-albeit a dramatically racialized police sweep-that did not demon-
strate an ongoing pattern of targeting minority residents from which one might
more easily infer animus.
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Perhaps if courts choose to adopt a more flexible Equal Pro-
tection approach they could better accommodate the mixed motive
nature of police discretion. Randall Kennedy argues that courts
should resolve the tension between Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ment requirements by intervening when race is routinely used as a
motivating factor.9 Kennedy's 'routine practice' test is broader than
the Second Circuit's 'sole factor' approach, but still presents courts
with the task of determining what incidence of the use of race would
qualify as 'routine.'97
In egregious cases, plaintiffs may prove a racial disparity so
dramatic that it permits, or requires, an inference of intentional dis-
crimination under either a 'sole factor' or a 'routine practice' test.98
96. Kennedy, supra note 16, at 148-49 (1997) (criticizing courts that permit
race to be used as one factor to determine suspiciousness: "Even if race is only
one of several factors behind a decision, tolerating it at all means tolerating it as
potentially the decisive factor .... Taking race into account in a small, marginal,
even infinitesimal amount still constitutes racial discrimination."). In this view,
"[tihe law should authorize police to engage in racially discriminatory investiga-
tive conduct only in atypical, indeed extraordinary, occasions. "Id. at 161.
97. Even Kennedy acknowledges that strictly limiting racially
discriminatory investigation is unrealistic where courts must determine intent to
discriminate from the motivations of many officers over a pattern of stops. Id. at
148-49. However, courts may reject a 'routine use' standard, because it may
evade the intent requirement by focusing only on discriminatory impact.
98. At the outset, United States v. Armstrong requires plaintiffs, in selective
prosecution cases only, to identify some evidence that similarly situated persons
of another race were treated differently. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S.
456, 465 (1996). The Armstrong approach has been rejected outside the selective
prosecution context, although one court has applied Armstrong in a racial
profiling case. See Oneonta, 195 F.3d at 119 (rejecting Armstrong, though only
narrowly, stating that "it is not necessary to plead the existence of a similarly
situated non-minority group when challenging a law or policy that contains an
express, racial classification"). See also Rodriguez v. Cal. Highway Patrol, 89 F.
Supp. 2d 1131, 1140-41 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (upholding an Equal Protection claim
while distinguishing Armstrong because the case at hand was a civil, rather than
a criminal, matter); Natl Cong. Puerto Rican Rts. v. City of New York, 191 F.R.D.
52 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (rejecting application of selective prosecution doctrine).
The Seventh Circuit, in Chavez v. Ill. State Police, rejected rote appli-
cation of selective prosecution doctrine, but then confused the issue in a strange
way. 251 F.3d 612, 637 (7th Cir. 2001). The court stated that plaintiffs need not
show that no whites were treated the same, but that similarly situated whites
were treated differently. The Armstrong rationale "does not apply with equal
force in the context of a civil racial profiling claim." Id. at 639. Plaintiffs need not
show the impossible by naming individuals who were not stopped; instead they
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Dramatic disparity established an Equal Protection violation in Yick
Wo v. Hopkins,9 and, more recently, in jury selection and voting
rights cases.0 0 Although the Court in McCleskey v. Kemp stated that
"statistical proof normally must present a 'stark' pattern to be accep-
ted as the sole proof of discriminatory intent, ""' such a showing may
be possible. In State v. Soto, plaintiffs presented a New Jersey state
court with "statistical disparities and standard deviations [that were]
indeed stark.""2 Police may deny that stops are racially disparate, or,
need only present statistics showing disparate treatment. Id.
Thus, the Armstrong requirement shades into the Equal Protection
requirements on the merits. This reasoning is faulty. Rather than confuse the
doctrines, courts should discard Armstrong outside the selective prosecution
context and reach sufficiency of statistical proof on the merits. Several
commentators also argue that applying Armstrong is improper. See Schifferle,
supra note 75, at 174-75 (arguing that a prima facie case of discrimination need
not include information on similarly situated offenders). See also Christopher
Hall, supra note 75, at 1086 (distinguishing prosecutorial discretion from
violations by police officers that involve unconstitutional conduct).
In addition, other indicia may support a finding of intent, such as:
evidence that disparate stops serve no legitimate law enforcement purpose as
they result in few arrests or tickets; statements by officers admitting practices of
profiling; training programs that do not discourage the improper use of race; or
the absence of minority officers.
99. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (finding that the selective
enforcement of a facially neutral law may allow the court to find an Equal
Protection violation).
100. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992) (finding a pattern of racial
discrimination in peremptory challenges sufficient to infer purposeful
discrimination violating the Equal Protection Clause).
101. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 293 (1987). Despite this stated re-
quirement of statistical proof, the Court held that showings of general patterns of
discrimination may not demonstrate intentions behind decisions that "rest on
consideration of innumerable factors that vary according to the characteristics of
the individual defendant." Id. at 294.
102. State v. Soto, 734 A.2d 350, 360 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996) (finding
that plaintiffs made a prima facie case of an Equal Protection violation sufficient
to justify suppression of evidence from traffic stops, inferring discriminatory
intent from a stark pattern of stops, where defendants could not rebut this
showing). Defendants may offer neutral explanations for statistical disparities
that cast enough doubt on plaintiffs statistical evidence to dismiss a lawsuit.
Defendants may contend that racial disparity 'naturally' follows from neutral
enforcement of traffic laws or from unobjectionable assignment of more officers to
'high crime' minority neighborhoods, a practice courts have flexibly permitted.
See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 815 (1996) ("[Plolice enforcement
practices, even if they could be practicably assessed by a judge, vary from place to
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in the alternative, contend that any use of race is legitimately based
on suspect profiles."'3 Of course, when presented with a stark pattern,
defendants should not be allowed to "rebut it merely by calling
attention to possible flaws or unmeasured variables," but should
instead be required to demonstrate specifically that other factors "eli-
minate or explain the disparity.
" 104
Police departments may also try to show a compelling state
interest for their 'stop and frisk' practices. The compelling interest
test has always been applied to use of explicit racial classifications,
so perhaps even a compelling interest should not permit a depart-
ment to surreptitiously rely on race. Furthermore, "an unsub-
stantiated and speculative interest in law enforcement cannot be
counted as a compelling state interest." 5 Any such justification for
racial disparity presupposes that ending racial profiling will unduly
constrain police discretion and unjustifiably undermine their ability
to respond to crime. Yet, as we will see, police discretion and
response may be enhanced by remedies being considered.
Finally, though it is still probably too soon to tell whether
Fourth Amendment and Equal Protection claims will provide a
place and from time to time.").
Plaintiffs can also try to control for neutral factors in their studies by
using larger or more carefully designed samples, but efforts to broaden the scope
of a study may (1) depend on access to police department records on past stops,
which may be difficult to obtain or inadequate in the scope of information
recorded, and (2) aggravate the McCleskey problem of generalizing about specific
kinds of decisions based on data regarding decisions made at different times and
places.
103. E.g., Jack Newfield, Race Report Is Indictment of Police Policy, N.Y.
Post, Dec. 1, 1999, at 8 (New York City Police Commissioner Howard Safir
counters that racial disparity in street stops shown by New York State Attorney
General Elliot Spitzer's report merely reflects "the descriptions of persons
committing violent crime as identified by their victims.").
104. Soto, 734 A.2d at 360.
105. Johnson, supra note 20, at 248. Such interests hardly rise to the level of
war-time emergency as in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217-18
(1944). Interests of local law enforcement already weigh heavily in a court's
analysis-for example in Fourth Amendment doctrine-where the court is
concerned with preserving police discretion. Since courts also will use police
justifications to defeat strict scrutiny by showing a neutral policy, these courts
would be 'double counting' if they allowed those same justifications to support a
compelling interest when the justifications were insufficient to show a neutral
policy.
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strong basis for bringing racial profiling cases, alternative legal ap-
proaches have also shown some promise. One recent suit-a chal-
lenge to the LAPD under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO)-survived a motion to dismiss. If civil
RICO suits become common, police departments may be faced with
treble damages for practices of misconduct.' °6 The movement to end
racial profiling is strong enough that additional causes of action may
be forthcoming if existing causes of action prove inadequate. 7 Thus,
future liability remains likely for discriminatory policing, and police
106. Guerrero v. Gates, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1292-93 (C.D. Cal. 2000)
(stating that plaintiffs, victims of alleged false narcotics arrests, have standing to
pursue RICO claim where they alleged economic injury as a proximate result of a
pattern of racketeering activities, including witness tampering, attempted
murder, narcotics dealing, and extortion).
107. For example, legislation introduced by Senator Russell Feingold would
permit individual suits against police and would condition federal funds to local
police on eliminating disparity in policing. Jennifer Whitson, Feingold Bill
Attacks Racial Profiling, Capital Times (Madison, Wis.), June 7, 2001, at 3A. The
bill would bring back to life what amounts to a Title VI private cause of action.
Racial profiling suits had included Title VI claims based on the 'disparate impact'
of police policy, but the Supreme Court recently ruled that there is no private
cause of action in Title VI cases. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 1049 (2001)
(finding no implied private right of action to enforce disparate impact regulations
promulgated through Title VI).
In addition, as Justice Stevens correctly points out in his dissent in
Sandoval, Title VI suits can still be maintained, not through a private right of
action, but through § 1983. He writes that "to the extent that the majority denies
relief to the respondents merely because they neglected to mention 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 in framing their Title VI claim, this case is something of a sport. Litigants
who in the future wish to enforce the Title VI regulations against state actors in
all likelihood must only reference § 1983 to obtain relief." Id. at 1526 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). One district court has already upheld Title VI claims under this
theory. See S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't Envtl. Prot., 145 F. Supp.
2d 505 (D.N.J. 2001). This approach is proper. Section 1983 permits claims
alleging deprivation, under color of state law, of "any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws." The Supreme Court has held
that federal regulations can create "rights" within the meaning of § 1983. See,
e.g., Wright v. City of Roanoke, 479 U.S. 418, 429 (1987) (permitting tenants to
sue housing authority for violating rent ceilings imposed by implanting
regulations promulgated by the Department of Housing and Urban
Development).
Critics have also called for laws deputizing private attorneys general to
combat racial profiling. See Gilles, supra note 2, at 1388 (proposing a law
permitting the Justice Department to deputize private suits against police
departments for unconstitutional patterns or practices).
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are right to be concerned that their practices will face future legal
scrutiny.
4. Obtaining an Effective Remedy
Plaintiffs still must convince a court to impose and enforce an
effective remedy, and remedial issues pose critical obstacles and op-
portunities. Obstacles surface in the guise of deference and restraint.
Federal courts often simply displace onto the remedial stage the
deference to law enforcement interests that causes courts to deny
injunctive relief at the outset. In this event, deference causes courts
to resist the imposition of structural relief that limits police
discretion, citing doctrines of federalism, comity, and equitable
restraint. As such, federal courts provide mixed rationales, and
emphasize the need for law enforcement discretion and their special
expertise, as well as the fear of interfering with local politics. Federal
courts "have no control over police work," and "it is exceedingly
unlikely that they will claim such powers in the foreseeable future."'0
Abstention based on federalism has extended far beyond the
original unwillingness to interfere with ongoing prosecutions in state
courts." Equitable restraint concerns are now increasingly invoked
in cases involving state and local law enforcement."' For example, in
a case regarding racial profiling in a suburb outside Los Angeles, a
Ninth Circuit panel reversed a preliminary injunction that required
a police department to follow its own rules on 'reasonable
suspicion."" More recently, the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc denied
108. Egon Bittner, Aspects of Police Work 112 (1990).
109. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (prohibiting federal courts from
staying or enjoining pending state court prosecutions, based on concerns of
federalism, comity, and equitable restraint).
110. A trilogy of Supreme Court cases begin to extend the Younger
abstention. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 112 (1983) (urging
.restraint in the issuance of injunctions against state officers engaged in the
administration of the States' criminal laws"); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 380
(1976) (suggesting that principles of federalism have applicability where
injunctive relief is requested against state and local executive branches); O'Shea
v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974) (denying relief on ripeness grounds, but stating
that monitoring state courts would violate principles of federalism).
111. Thomas v. County of Los Angeles, 978 F.2d 504, 506 (9th Cir. 1992)
(rejecting as overly broad in geographic and substantive scope a requirement that
police:
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injunctive relief in a racial profiling case. Its decision was based not
on a lack of standing, but on the dictates of federalism and deference
to local law enforcement-an unusual ground in a case seeking relief
against the federal border patrol."'
Part of this deference by federal courts may be due to an out-
moded fear that remedying racial profiling requires intrusive struc-
tural remedies that would interfere with law enforcement decision-
making. Federal courts have a responsibility to provide an effective
remedy-even if structural injunctions are required for relief-so
necessity of institutional reform does not excuse the court from its
remedial duty.' Federal courts may also hesitate to intervene for
1. Follow the Department's own stated policies and guidelines
regarding the use of force and procedures for conducting
searches; and 2. Submit to the Court in camera and under seal,
copies of reports alleging the use of excessive force that are in
the possession of the Department on the first of every month.).
112. Hodgers-Durgin v. De La Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1042 (9th Cir. 1999)
(denying injunctive relief based on equitable restraint and emphasizing "the
delicate balance between 'federal equitable power and State administration of its
own law'" (quoting O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 500 (1974) (quoting
Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 120 (1951))), and finding an insufficient
likelihood of future harm where plaintiffs had only been stopped once in ten
years). But see id. (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (stating that discussion of
federalism is dicta or improper and that dismissal was based only on Lyons
standing doctrine).
113. Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 Geo.
L.J. 1355, 1378-79 (1991).
Damage awards and negative injunctions do not provide
adequate relief in the context of much public law litigation. In
the absence of affirmative judicial intervention, the wrongful
conduct is likely to continue; and the injuries caused by
ongoing public law violations-intangible, dignitary harms and
deprivation of public norms-cannot adequately be redressed
through monetary compensation. Thus, the need to fulfill the
court's remedial duty justifies the use of structural injunctions
to remedy public law violations.
Id. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 163 (1803); Donald H. Zeigler, Rights Require Remedies: A New
Approach to the Enforcement of Rights in the Federal Courts, 38 Hastings L.J.
665, 666-67 (1987). See generally William A. Fletcher, The Discretionary
Constitution: Institutional Remedies and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 Yale L.J. 635,
635-49 (1982) (analyzing the ways in which trial courts try either to avoid the
exercise of remedial discretion or to structure such exercise).
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reasons of judicial efficiency. Judges rightly fear that even when
court orders are imposed, injunctions may prove ineffective where
individual officers engage in racial profiling despite their own
departmental rules."4 When misconduct is difficult for a police
department to detect, misconduct is far more difficult for a court
monitor to detect."' Uncertainty about detection and design of
remedies is increased by the lack of clarity as to what degree of
reliance on race violates the Fourteenth or Fourth Amendments. The
tangled legal doctrine and complex nature of racial profiling
described earlier creates difficulty in tailoring a remedy to legal
liability. When it is unclear how much use of race violates the law,
then compliance is equally unclear.
Because of judicial resistance to intrusive remedies, plaintiffs
have developed creative approaches to racial profiling that seek to
avoid obstacles in substantive and remedial law."' Plaintiffs have
114. See Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law
Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private Attorneys General, 88
Colum. L. Rev. 247, 284 (1988).
115. Pamela S. Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies in Criminal
Adjudication, 96 Mich L. Rev. 2001, 2013 (1998) ("[Plrecisely because much of the
enforcement activity goes unrecorded and discretion in any event remains so
prevalent in police enforcement decisions, injunctions may have little effect.").
116. For example, the settlement in Ledford v. City of Highland Park avoided
mentioning the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment at all, defining the class as
including:
All persons who (a) have in the past and are likely in the future
to be and (b) all persons who will in the future be, subjected to
any policy, practice, or custom which has the result of or
requires Highland Park Police Department officers to target
persons for surveillance, stops, detentions, interrogations,
requests for consent to search, and searches on the basis of
race or ethnicity.
Ledford v. City of Highland Park, No. 00C4212, 2000 WL 1053967, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
July 31, 2000).
While this class definition is narrow, the terms of the settlement instead
provide expansive relief, prohibiting officers from
considering race or ethnicity, in any fashion or to any degree,
in deciding whether to surveil, stop, detain, interrogate,
request consent to search, or search any civilian; except when
officers are seeking to detain, apprehend or otherwise be on the
lookout for a specific suspect sought in connection with a
specific crime who has been identified or described, in part, by
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sought remedies that have not required intrusive court monitoring. 117
race or ethnicity in determining whether reasonable suspicion
exists that a given individual is the person being sought.
Id. at *4 (delineating the first point of the proposed Consent Decree).
117. For example, in the lawsuit against the New York City Police
Department Street Crimes Unit (SCU), plaintiffs sought to enjoin the practice of
racial profiling by requiring, among other things, documentation of street stops
and better training and supervision. The court stated:
Plaintiffs seek to either enjoin the continued operation of the
SCU or, in the alternative, an order:
(1) enjoining the SCU from continuing its policy, practice
and/or custom of suspicionless stops and frisks;
(2) enjoining the SCU from continuing its policy, practice
and/or custom of conducting stops and frisks based on racial
and/or national origin profiling;
(3) enjoining the use of formal or informal productivity
standards or other de facto quotas for arrests and/or stops and
frisks by SCU officers;
(4) requiring the City, NYPD, Safir and Mayor Giuliani to
institute and implement improved policies and programs with
respect to training, discipline, and promotion designed to
eliminate the SCU's policy, practice and/or custom of
suspicionless stops and frisks;
(5) requiring the City, NYPD, Safir and Giuliani to institute
and implement more effective methods to screen applicants to
the SCU, including the use of psychological testing and
evaluations;
(6) requiring the City, NYPD, Safir and Giuliani to deploy SCU
teams with appropriate and adequate supervision;
(7) requiring the City, NYPD, Safir and Giuliani to institute
and implement appropriate measures to ensure compliance
with departmental directives that SCU officers complete UF-
250's on each and every stop and frisk they conduct;
(8) requiring the City, NYPD, Safir and Giuliani to institute
and implement appropriate measures to mandate that UF-
250's or other documentation be prepared and maintained in a
computerized database for each stop conducted by an SCU
officer, regardless of whether the stop is followed by the use of
force, a frisk, a search or an arrest; and
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Most have been open-ended, requiring police to gather statistics on
race and respond to disparities on their own.1 8 Data analysis of
traffic stops began with the settlement of a private lawsuit brought
in Montgomery County, Maryland.'19 Subsequent lawsuits and
(9) requiring the City, NYPD, Safir and Giuliani to monitor
stop and frisk practices of the SCU, including periodically and
regularly reviewing form UF-250's to determine whether
reported stops and frisks have comported with constitutional
requirements.
Nat'l Cong. Puerto Rican Rts. v. City of New York, 75 F. Supp. 2d 154, 158 n.1
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing Amended Complaint, Wherefore Clause).
118. Another typical example of relief requested in a private suit is the
consent decree entered in Ledford. In addition to the prohibition listed in supra
note 116, the Decree noted:
The parties have negotiated a proposed settlement ("Consent
Decree") of all disputed claims in the case. Under the
settlement, the City of Highland Park will:...
(2) Document every incident involving a stop, detention,
interrogation, and/or search of a civilian, including the race of
the civilian involved, and facilitate the analysis of this data by
recording and storing it on a computerized data system.
(3) Install audio and video equipment in certain HPPD
[Highland Park Police Department] vehicles.
(4) Use the materials in paragraphs (2) and (3) above to
supervise HPPD officers.
(5) Maintain a system of investigating and resolving civilian
complaints regarding HPPD officers.
(6) Provide specific training for HPPD officers.
(7) Allow plaintiffs' counsel to inspect materials in paragraphs
(2), (4), and (5) above.
The court will retain jurisdiction for three to five years to
enforce the terms of this Consent Decree.
Ledford v. City of Highland Park, No. 00C4212, 2000 WL 1053967, at *4 (N.D. Ill.
July 31, 2000).
119. Settlement Agreement, Wilkins v. Md. State Police (D. Md. Jan. 5, 1995)
(Civ. No. MJG-93-468); David A. Harris, "Driving While Black" and All Other
Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. Crim. L.
& Criminology 554, 563-66 (1997) (describing 1995 settlement agreement). The
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Justice Department decrees have followed this model, requiring
police to keep data and then address disparities through improved
training, supervision, and procedures. 0
The remedial goal of statistical monitoring may also be
achieved through discovery. For example, the New York City Police
have been in litigation for several years over racial profiling allega-
tions against its elite Street Crimes Unit. The court ordered that da-
ta from stop and frisk forms be compiled to assess these allega-
tions. 1 ' The Department, to avoid substantial costs of compiling writ-
ten forms,22 claimed that it will create a permanent computer da-
parties hired an independent expert to monitor a sample of drivers, showing
significant disparity, and leading to a requirement that the department keep
statistics on traffic stops. Subsequently, the Justice Department also intervened
in the lawsuit. See Mem. of Agreement Between the U.S. Dep't of Just.,
Montgomery County, Md., the Montgomery County Dep't of Police, and the
Fraternal Order of Police, Montgomery County Lodge 35, Inc., (Jan. 14, 2001)
(requiring data collection and review of data on stops), available at http://www.
usdoj.gov/crt/cor/Pubs/mcagrmt.htm.
120. Laura Little argues that since the Supreme Court, in Rufo v. Inmates of
Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 384 (1992), relaxed the standard for modifying
consent decrees, requiring only a "significant change," courts should be less
reluctant to exercise equitable discretion. Laura L. Little, It's About Time:
Unravelling Standing and Equitable Ripeness, 41 Buff. L. Rev. 933, 990 (1993)
("Indeed, the new standard reflects an attitude of allowing courts to alter decrees
where the defendant can show unintended or deleterious consequences of the
injunction. This allows courts to avoid long-term effects of prediction errors in
framing injunctive orders and should therefore diminish courts' reluctance to
issue injunctions.").
121. A study of initial data collected in response to a Justice Department
inquiry and a study conducted by New York State Attorney General Elliot Spitzer
showed substantial racial disparity. However, as the lawsuit progressed, this
data was over a year out of date, and the court requested updated data.
I can't see how you can let 13 months go by without putting it
on the database. The city is hereby directed to produce all UF-
250s for the last 13 months. The city will be in contempt of this
order if it doesn't get it done .... Update and then update it
monthly after that. Maybe you will discover that in fact it's
been databased. It's hard to believe that with all that's been
going on somebody hasn't gotten these UF-250's together.
Hearing, In the Matter of Nat'l Cong. Puerto Rican Rts. v. City of New York, May
10, 2000, at 17 (The Honorable Shira A. Scheindlin speaking).
122. The cost of the space, equipment, and labor needed to compile data on
stop and frisks was estimated at $1.5 million, because police officers were
required to understand the forms and enter them properly. Hearing, In the
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tabase for stop and frisk data."n While it is far from clear that the
NYPD will make a good faith effort to self-monitor," burdens of
discovery may be pushing the Department in the direction of the
relief requested, even though no legal resolution of the dispute has
been reached.
125
These remedial schemes suggest the effect of empowering
local law enforcement. They allow police to take on the project of
monitoring and to respond to the information they gather. And if
these remedies become accepted as practicable and non-intrusive,
Matter of Natl Cong. Puerto Rican Rts. v. City of New York, May 25, 2000, at 5
(Daniel S. Connolly, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York speaking). Part
of the reason is that the UF-250 form currently used to record stop and frisks in
New York is "extraordinarily ill designed for data entry" since the card is "an
awful lot narrative" and since "our agreement with the federal government was
that we would do it with no judgment. We would, every single word, no matter
how it was phrased, would go into the data entry, and it's an enormously
expensive time-consuming process." Id. at 6. Sixty police officers had to be
specially trained for the project, and senior officers performed spot-quality checks
to ensure against errors. Id. at 11.
123.
We have, at a cost of a half million dollars, designed a
computer program that will be used now precinct-wide and,
eventually when this is done, the 250 cards will be basically
inputted when they're filled out. It will be an online system
similar to how link data is tracked. That is several months
away, but it's well under way, and that will be the future of
how stop and frisk cards are handled.
Id. at 7 (Daniel S. Connolly, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York
speaking). Over eighteen months later, no such system is in place.
124. William K. Rashbaum, U.S. Says City Has Failed to Release Data on
Frisks, N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 2001, at Al (describing the NYPD's practice of
refusing to release data, or delaying release:
"This refusal to cooperate and to provide the documentation is
simply an enlargement of the same pattern that has gone on
with one individual case after another," said the lawyer,
William Goodman, the legal director of the Center for
Constitutional Rights. "It's part of the clamming up and the
stonewalling and the refusing to open up their operations to
outside scrutiny.").
125. For a practitioner's essay on how information systems and police
technology have affected the discovery process, see Robert L. Hernandez,
Technology and Police Misconduct Litigation Discovery, 2 Ann. 2000 Ass'n Trial
Laws, Am. Ann. Convention Reference Materials 1599 (2000).
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courts may be less reluctant to impose them. While these remedies
came in response to obstacles in Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
doctrine, the remedies may in turn shape parameters of the underly-
ing law. As compiling data about the race of those stopped becomes
the norm, failure to monitor stops may become prima facie evidence
of racial profiling, a sign of deliberate indifference to unconstitutional
practices.126
B. Legislative Solutions: Efforts to Gather Police Data
1. Recent Legislation
Across the country, from the largest cities to the smallest
towns, few have been untouched by efforts to collect police statistics.
Legislative reform efforts have focused on requiring local law enforce-
ment to maintain racial data on police stops. The existence of racial
profiling was dismissed by law enforcement authorities in many
states, most notably, in New Jersey, until the scope of the problem
was meticulously documented. For this reason, state legislators in
ten states-Colorado, Connecticut, Kansas, Maryland, Massachu-
setts, Missouri, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and
Washington-have passed laws requiring police to keep data, and
similar legislation is being considered in twenty-one other states. 127
126. This simple documentation requirement eliminates difficulties in
determining liability. Failure to document stops may estop police from claiming
no practice, since their own insufficient documentation makes it hard to show a
pattern. Perhaps such failure should constitute deliberate indifference under
Monell.
127. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 54-1m (West 2001); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-4-115
(2000); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-4604 (Supp. 2000); S.B. 208, 2001 Leg., 415th Sess.
(Md. 2001) (enacted May 15, 2001 as Ch. 342); S.B. 2238, 181st Leg. (Mass. 2000)
(enacted Aug. 10, 2000 as Ch. 228); 2000 Mo. Laws 590.650; N.C. Gen. Stat. §
114-10 (Lexis Supp. 2000); R.I. Gen. Laws § 31.21.1 (2000); S.B. 2415, 101st Leg.
(Tenn. 2000) (enacted June 19, 2000 as Ch. 910); S.B. 6683, 56th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Wash. 2000) (enacted Mar. 24, 2000 as Ch. 118). See also Inst. on Race & Pover-
ty, Univ. Minn. Law School, Racial Profiling Data Collection Status Report (Some
of the states in which bills have been introduced include: Alabama, Arkansas,
Florida, Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts,
New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Utah, Wisconsin,
and Virginia.), http'//wwwl.umn.edu/irp/ARB%20.html (as of March 2001) (on file
with author) [hereinafter UM Report]; Ryan Frank, Bill Aims to Track Racial
Profiling, Oregonian (Portland), Sept. 12, 2000, at B01 (describing proposed bill
in Oregon, which was hailed by state police and several major local police
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An increasing number of police departments nationwide now
voluntarily collect statistics, including city police in Houston,
Oakland, San Diego, and San Jose, and state police in Florida,
Michigan, New Jersey, Ohio, Rhode Island, and Washington. 12 8 Rep-
resentative John Conyers, Jr. (D-MI) proposed similar federal
legislation, the National Traffic Stops Statistics Study Act of 1998,
which passed unanimously in the House but was rejected in
committee by the Senate." President Clinton also required federal
law enforcement to collect racial data on all stops.
13 °
All of this focus on data marks a sea change in attitudes
towards policing. Police were never before required to attend to race
or expected to defend their patterns and practices to the public. If
nothing else, collection of these statistics, whether mandated by law
or performed voluntarily, create a new discussion about race in polic-
ing focused at the local level.' Data can be a critical way to inform
the public about the pervasiveness of racial profiling; otherwise "the
departments who expressed interest in collecting data on stops); Montgomery,
supra note 5 (describing enactment of the Maryland law requiring data
collection).
128. Harris, supra note 3, at 322-23. More than thirty California police
agencies have recently begun to collect statistics on traffic stops, requiring police
to record: race, ethnicity, and age of motorists; why driver was pulled over;
whether a search was conducted; and whether citation, arrest, or warning resul-
ted. See Armando Acuna, More Police Agencies Keeping Racial Data, L.A. Times,
Sept. 30, 1999, at A3. Michigan and Ohio state police collect basic information on
race and sex of individuals stopped. See David Shepardson, Cops Will Log Race of
Drivers: Program Seeks to Dispel Fears that Troopers Show Bias When They Make
Traffic Stops, Detroit News, Dec. 10, 1999, at Al.
129. H.R. 118, 105th Cong. (1998). The legislation passed unanimously in the
House, but was voted down in the Senate Judiciary Committee largely due to
opposition from police organizations. See Robert Cohen, Racial Profiling
Allegations Spur Lawmakers to Call for U.S. Study, Star-Ledger (Newark), Apr.
14, 1999, at 7.
130. William J. Clinton, Memorandum on Fairness in Law Enforcement
(June 9, 1999), available at http'//www.aele.orgfedprof.html. See also Edwin
Chen, 'Corrosive' Racial Profiling Must End, Clinton Insists Justice, L.A. Times,
June 10, 1999, at A18 (relating how Clinton ordered federal law enforcement to
collect race and gender data on all people stopped or arrested; the Treasury,
Justice, and Interior Departments were required to present a plan for collecting
data in 120 days).
131. For an example of the drama being played out in debates over the
meaning of traffic stop statistics in small towns and cities, see supra notes 48-57
and accompanying text.
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public is left with the impression that the abuses are more aberra-
tional than systemic. " 132 Indeed, the broader diffusion of data on ra-
cial profiling appears to be having an effect; majorities of black and
white Americans now believe racial profiling is a problem.ln Beyond
consciousness raising, increased information can help translate these
vague public concerns into concrete proposals for reforms, just as
New Jersey used a comprehensive study of traffic stops to focus its
reform program.' T Data also helps a community assess whether
police justifications for persistent disparity hold water. For example,
the New York Attorney General's report showed that race based
stops did not correlate with 'high crime' neighborhoods, forcing the
discussion to move to other possible reasons for the disparity.35 Just
as importantly, statistics may enable police departments to assess
the success of their own law enforcement strategies, convincing them
that a particular strategy causes too much racial disparity to justify
meager results. Requirements also place officers on notice that they
are being watched and will be held accountable for their decisions.
2. Criticism of Legislation
All of the state laws passed to date have been remarkably
incomplete and vague, focusing only on the thinnest notion of racial
profiling as statistical disparity. 13 Few laws list what kinds of factors
132. David Rudovsky, Police Abuse: Can the Violence Be Contained?, 27 Harv.
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 465, 500 (1992).
133. Poll Finds Most in U.S. Believe Police Practice "Racial Profiling," supra
note 58, at 15 (describing results of a Gallup poll in which a majority of Ameri-
cans believed that racial profiling is widespread and three fourths of black men
said they have been stopped by police because of their race).
134. New Jersey Report, supra note 24, at 1-12.
135. See New York Report, supra note 24, ch. 5. See also Fagan & Davies,
supra note 35, at 479
(The results show that crime rates only partially explain stop
rates overall, and fail to explain the rates at which minority
citizens are "stopped" by the NYPD. After controlling for race-
and crime-specific crime rates and the population composition
of the precinct, the results showed that black and Hispanic
citizens were significantly more likely to be stopped than were
white citizens.).
136. For criticism and comparison of the laws, see UM Report, supra note
127.
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should be noted by local police, and many do not require the
completion of any kind of standard statewide form. Merely recording
the race of people stopped may show disparities, but may not provide
more critical information, such as the identity of the officers
conducting the stops and the kinds of searches performed.137 For
example, it is important to record whether: a search took place; a
warning, citation, or arrest occurred; and any contraband was seized.
Information on the date, time, location, and duration of the stop are
also useful. In addition, it is important that officers articulate what
justified their stop to indicate whether they had reasonable
suspicion. It is also important that officers note whether force was
used, and if so, what kind, and whether injury resulted.
Their defects notwithstanding, the profusion of state laws
has led to some significant innovations. For example, some laws give
police departments discretion to increase the kinds of information
collected at stops-a practice that could lead to useful experi-
mentation. This principle can be expanded by allowing the communi-
ty to provide input into what information is collected about stops.
More creative efforts could be made to reach the public during stops.
Some police departments require officers making stops to hand out
business cards with information on how to make a civilian complaint.
North Carolina releases state police statistics in an interactive
website."
Beyond the problem of incomplete data collection, recent
state laws are also too narrow in their reach. Their exclusive focus on
traffic stops poses a serious limitation. Pedestrian stops are equally
common, yet only one state requires collection of data on these
encounters. 39 In addition, several states place limits on which police
137. Recording the identity of the officer may be important to identify
problem officers; no state law requires this information.
138. N.C. Div. Crim. Info, State of North Carolina Traffic Stop Statistics,
Public Reports, at http'//sbi.jus.state.nc.us/TSS_01Rpt/information.htm (last
visited Dec. 6, 2001) [hereinafter North Carolina Traffic Stop Statistics].
139. Only Kansas requires data on pedestrian stops. UM Report, supra note
127. This exclusive focus on traffic stops is hard to explain and very interesting.
Is it that "Driving While Black" defined the debate, or that people with cars who
are targeted feel more violated when police intrude on their property? Is it the
American association of freedom with the automobile? Or is it that more affluent
people have cars and when improperly stopped have more political capital to
expend in protest? One officer explained that he believes racial profiling is "'an
interstate highway issue, not an inner-city issue,' and that it grows out of drug
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departments are subject to the regulation. Washington, Tennessee,
and Texas only regulate state police, not local police,'140 and North
Carolina only discloses state police information.""
While data collection has the potential to create accountabili-
ty and inform the community about profiling problems, many of the
laws passed leave data in the hands of police. Only one state, Rhode
Island, requires that data from all local police departments be made
public in quarterly reports. 4' Departments are free to collect
interdiction campaigns rather than routine local law enforcement." Bruce Landis,
Police Begin Study of Racial Profiling, Providence J., Jan. 16, 2001, at A8 (quo-
ting Maj. Dennis W. Simoneau, commander of the Providence Police Depart-
ment's patrol division). This seems wrong, since in urban areas racial profiling
has been an issue, and yet right in so far as drug-interdiction is the focus for
targeting minorities. And outside large cities, most drug-interdiction, and most
policing for that matter, probably occurs on highways. See PERF Report, supra
note 2, at 122. Half of all encounters with police occur in traffic stops. Bureau
Just. Stats., U.S. Dep't Just., Contacts Between Police and the Public: Findings
from the 1999 National Survey 1 (2001), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs
pub/pdf/cpp99.pdf.
140. Tennessee solicits voluntary participation by local police. S.B. 2415,
101st Leg. (Tenn. 2000) (enacted June 19, 2000 as Ch. 910). See S.B. 6683, 56th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2000) (enacted Mar. 24, 2000 as Ch. 118); Daryl Bell &
Rudolph Bush, Racial Profiling Study Confirmed; DPS Says Records Kept Since
March, San Antonio Express-News, Sept. 29, 2000, at 01B.
141. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 114-10 (2a) (2000).
142. Traffic Stop Statistics Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-21.1-4 (c)(3)(d), (e).
The attorney general shall collect data for a period of not less
than twenty-four (24) months and report its findings and
conclusions to the governor and the general assembly not later
than twenty-eight (28) months after the commencement of the
collection of data under this chapter. The report, findings, and
conclusions submitted pursuant to this subsection are deemed
a public record.
(e) In addition, the attorney general, with the advice
of the committee, shall prepare, on a quarterly basis, a
summary report of the monthly data provided by each police
department and the state police for that quarterly period. This
report is a public record. The summary report shall include a
monthly breakdown by race for each police department of the
number of traffic stops made and of searches conducted, and
any other information deemed appropriate by the attorney
general with the advice of the committee. The report shall be
released not more than ninety (90) days after the end of each
quarterly period. No information revealing the identity of any
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statistics in secret, and then only announce favorable statistics or
analyze information in a way that puts the best face on their
conduct."
Furthermore, there are strong suggestions that data collec-
tion is used as a sham. Many police departments have stated that
they want to collect data to exonerate themselves. In this vein, some
have announced, after only weeks of collecting data, that they do not
engage in racial profiling.M Moreover, poor data collection has
resulted in open squabbling between police and civil rights groups
over the meaning of statistics, with police claiming that civil rights
groups are liars or publicity mongers, and civil rights groups
announcing that racial profiling occurs based on scant evidence or
without suggesting meaningful reforms.145
individual shall be contained in the report.
Id.
143. Bell & Bush, supra note 140, at 1B (criticizing the Texas Department of
Public Safety's study of their stops: "To me, it seems like the DPS was hedging
their bets. They didn't want the public to know, especially if it raised a flag, that
they may have something to hide,' [Will Harrell, executive director of the Texas
American Civil Liberties Union in Austin] said. The fact they did it for some time
and did not inform the public is puzzling.'"). Of course, many police departments
do conduct studies in good faith and simply want to be sure that they do not
engage in discriminatory stops. Paul Garber, Police Reveal Traffic-Stop Results:
Police Chief Louis Quijas Says Data Collected at Traffic Stops Should Allay Fears
of Racial Profiling in High Point, News & Record (Greensboro, NC), Aug. 30,
2000, at B1 (stating that though a voluntary local police study showed that the
race of those stopped matched the city population, police found the data valuable
and planned to continue collecting data).
144. E.g., Shantee Woodards & Oralander Brand-Williams, Dearborn Tracks
Race, Tickets: Record of Racial Group, Gender of Stopped Drivers Shows That
Most Are White Males, Detroit News, Feb. 9, 2000, at D1 (reporting, after only
one month of an ongoing data gathering program in Dearborn, Michigan, that
most motorists who were stopped were white men, thus implying that perceptions
of racial profiling are unwarranted). The Michigan state police similarly
announced that they do not profile after nine months of data collection. David
Shepardson & Oralander Brand-Williams, Searches of Black Drivers Level Off."
State Cops See No Racial Profiling; Critics Call Survey Flawed, Detroit News,
Jan. 24, 2001, at Al (quoting State Police Capt. Jack Shepherd as saying "What
the numbers have shown and will show is there is absolutely no evidence of racial
profiling at the Michigan State Police"). In response, the state ACLU chapter
argued that the report raises important questions, since the numbers of those
stopped were not compared against the overall number of drivers. Id.
145. The hubbub outside Kansas City provides an example of the rhetorical
byplay. See Bullers, supra note 56, at BI. The American Civil Liberties Union of
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If departments were compared in some way, then perhaps
statistics would be on a sounder footing as a department's perfor-
mance could be rated against those from other towns or precincts.
While auditing might provide a relatively simple check,4 6 none of the
laws require it or independent monitoring. Further, none suggest
how data is to be interpreted, with the consequence that there is no
way to know whether collected data is representative. For example,
racial profiling laws do not specify a control group against which the
data is to be compared-be it the general driving population, the resi-
dents of a neighborhood, or the percentage of those committing traffic
or quality of life violations. A persistent problem occurs where data is
compared with the total state population, even though racial dispari-
ty may be more pronounced if the data is compared to the driving
population.17 One possible solution is to conduct separate control
Western Missouri and Kansas put together its own study of stops based on traffic
convictions. The ACLU director, Dick Kurtenbach, admitted they were not offer-
ing constructive advice. At the outset at least, "[tihe role of the ACLU ... is not to
suggest ways to decrease racial profiling. Our job is to watch them and point out
when we think there's a problem. That's what we did." Id. The police chiefs of the
suburbs in question all said that the ACLU study was faulty and irresponsible,
and that the ACLU "took a swing and ran" and "destroyed" trust between it and
the police. Id.
In another example, data from St. Paul and Minneapolis, Minnesota
showed particularly egregious disparities in stops made by six officers, three of
whom were removed. Heron Marquez Estrada, St. Paul Council Wants Deeper
Look at Police Data, Star Trib., Jan. 11, 2001, at 3b. The St. Paul Police Federa-
tion president objected to making the data public, stating that the study was
misleading and flawed, and commented, "It's a shame that the city has given the
impression that its cops are racist." Id. The Minneapolis deputy police chief took
a more nuanced approach, writing, "I fear also the chilling effect that the
collection of race data might have on proactive police work if presented in a
presumptively accusatory manner. Good community partnerships and improved
public safety will not follow from such a climate." Greg Hestness, In Collecting
Racial Data, Police Face Risks, Opportunities, Star Trib., Jan. 26, 2001, at A19.
See also infra note 152 on the controversy over the release of Connecticut's study,
and infra note 158 on the Dallas police chiefs opposition to data collection.
146. Juan Forero, Precinct's Rosy Crime Rate Was a Distortion, the Police
Say, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 2000, at B1 (describing how within a year, falsified crime
statistics from a Brooklyn precinct were uncovered by department auditors, and
reporting that New York City Precinct commanders are placed under great
pressure to show reduced crime rates).
147. "This is the million-dollar question facing state police across the
country: How do we go about figuring out who is on what highway and when?,"
said Professor Chris Maxwell, quoted in Shepardson & Brand-Williams, supra
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group studies that will estimate the demographics of the potentially
relevant populations.'8
Some laws open up the possibility of convening new groups of
problem solvers. For example, Rhode Island brought together an in-
terdisciplinary group of community and advocacy group leaders, legi-
slators, and statisticians to advise the Attorney General regarding
the collection of data and the preparation of a monthly summary re-
port.4 9 Other laws suggest oversight and analysis of the information
by a disinterested state actor, which represents a step in the right
direction. 150 The laws do not spell out what happens next, but ideally
the departments with the greatest disparities could be singled out for
special attention by the state attorney general or some other agency.
The agency could then benchmark police departments to assess how
note 144, at D1. Advocates called into question studies in Connecticut and
Michigan which were based on population totals and not driving population. See
Matthew Hay Brown, Racial Profiling Study Called Flawed: Experts Criticize Ap-
proach, Methodology of State Report, Hartford Courant, Jan. 26, 2001, at Al;
Shepardson, supra note 128.
148. In New Jersey, these kinds of studies were conducted at toll booths. See
infra note 264.
149. This diverse statewide body, the Traffic Stop Study Advisory
Committee, included the Urban League of Rhode Island, the National Conference
for Community and Justice, and the Rhode Island Commission for Human
Rights, as well as the Attorney General's Office, the Police Chiefs' Association,
and a statistician. Traffic Stops Statistics Act, R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 31-21.1-3, 31-
21.1-4 (2000).
California's law also convenes a body, including representatives of civil
rights groups, to prepare an expanded training curriculum to help encourage
tolerance and awareness of race issues among police officers. See AELE L.
Enforcement Legal Ctr., Legislation (providing amended text of Section 13519.4
of the California Penal Code), at http://www.aele.org/calprof.html (last visited
Dec. 6, 2001).
150. A recent law enacted in California does not require data collection, but
does require that a "Legislative Analyst" study and report upon data that is vo-
luntarily collected by police departments. Greg Lucas & Lynda Gledhill, Governor
Signs Measure on Racial Profiling, S.F. Chron., Sept. 27, 2000, at A3.
The Missouri and Rhode Island laws require police departments to
submit data to the state attorney general's office, which analyzes the data and
publishes an annual report comparing data from different departments. See Mo.
Ann. Stat. § 590.650 (West Supp. 2001); Traffic Stops Statistics Act, R.I. Gen.
Laws § 31-21.1-4(d) (2000) (describing how the Attorney General collects data
and produces a public report: "The study authorized under this chapter shall
include a multi-variate analysis of the collected data in accordance with general
statistical standards.").
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successful they were in implementing the remedies that resulted
from their data gathering.'
Finally, these laws are toothless. There seems to be an as-
sumption in many of these efforts that statistics are only useful as a
one- or two-year study to find out if police are 'racist." 2 The laws do
not suggest any ongoing reform or long-term use for the data. No
laws provide avenues for action once data is collected, but only
penalize departments for refusing to collect data. Once these studies
have run their course, unless the data shows very dramatic dispari-
ties, the laws and political momentum behind them may fade away.
A few civil rights advocates also criticize the emphasis on
data. Randall Kennedy fears that monitoring at best supports the
status quo: "One danger is evasion-putting off making hard de-
cisions in the guise of needing more information. This motivation, I
fear, is behind Clinton's directive ordering federal agencies to gather
statistics on the racial demographics of stops, questioning, and
arrests."'53 Some also have advocated legislation outlawing racial pro-
filing as an alternative to collecting data; California and Oklahoma
have enacted such laws. T' However, these laws do not reach out to
151. For example, the New Jersey Attorney General's study found that the
state Patrol Unit issued far more tickets to African Americans than the Tactical
Patrol Unit, which operates in particular neighborhoods and with less discretion.
New Jersey Report, supra note 24, at 33-34. The study concluded that not only
should the Patrol Unit be the focus for reform, but that police discretion might
need to be limited across the board. Id. at 98-111. "Problem" departments could
face special scrutiny; successful departments should be rewarded and encouraged
to assist other departments. Id.
152. The Connecticut and Rhode Island laws provide only a two-year trial
run of data collection. Traffic Stops Statistics Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-21.1-4(d)
(2000); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 54-1m (West 2001). In fact, the Connecticut study
concluded that there is no pattern of police discrimination in the state, a result
that experts called flawed, especially where statistics were compared against
nearby residential populations, and where some statistics indicated racial
disparity. Brown, supra note 147, at Al.
153. Randall Kennedy, Profiling Revisited: It Helps Cops Catch Crooks, but
We Should Ban It Anyway, Star Ledger (Newark), Sept. 12, 1999, § 10, at 7.
154. Cal. Penal Code, § 13519.4 (West 2001) (banning racial profiling, which
is defined as "the practice of detaining a suspect on a broad set of criteria which
casts suspicion on an entire class of people without any individualized suspicion
of the particular person being stopped," and creating expanded training for
officers on the use of race in profiling); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22 § 34.3 (West 2001)
(banning racial profiling). In the same spirit, Democratic presidential candidate
Bill Bradley openly called for the next president to issue an executive order
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extend protection to any type of racial profiling that is not already
illegal under the U.S. and state constitutions.
1 5
Police raise two standard objections to reporting require-
ments: first, that they are burdensome for officers; and second, that
they are counterproductive because they encourage officers to focus
on race.' In practice, logistical difficulties often prove minor and
dozens of departments have implemented these programs by using
portable computers that reduce their paperwork dramatically. One
participant noted that, with the aid of such computers, "it takes 20 to
30 seconds to complete a report. " 15 1 Second, the argument that
banning racial profiling. See supra note 18.
155. Such laws could only expand the definition of racial profiling under the
Equal Protection Clause. As such, they might be unconstitutional under City of
Boerne v. Flores, because they purport to expand the law beyond what the
Fourteenth Amendment allows. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
156. Paul Shepard, Facts Hard to Come by in Police Brutality and Racial
Profiling Cases, Chi. Trib., Apr. 15, 1999, at 2
("If passed into law, the [Conyers] bill would place a burden on
the police and lengthen traffic stops," said Robert Scully,
executive director of the National Association of Police
Organizations.. . . "It's ironic that in the quest for a colorblind
society, some people want us to keep track of people by race,"
said Jim Pasco, executive director of the Fraternal Order of
Police.);
Editorial, Chicago and Race-Based Policing, Chi. Trib., June 8, 2001, at 24
(describing how an alderman opposed collecting data on the race of people
stopped "because minorities might find it offensive").
157. Maxine Bernstein, Exemptions Leave a Void in Police-Stop Data,
Oregonian (Portland), Jan. 13, 2001, at A01 (quoting Portland Oregon's assistant
police chief). Part of the enthusiasm may be that police get new toys. Montgomery
County, Maryland police say they are very excited about the settlement of racial
profiling suits, because they can now use Palm Pilots to enter data on stops. John
Drake, Police Get a Hand From New Palm PCs, Wash. Times, Aug. 29, 2000, at
C1
(Officer Johnson recently downloaded 76 traffic stops into a
computer at headquarters in 2 1/2 minutes, cutting his
paperwork to a fraction of its former amount. "It makes it a lot
easier than filling out the paperwork, handing it to someone,
who gives it to someone else, who gives it to a data entry
person," Officer Johnson said.).
See also Acuna, supra note 128, at A3 (noting that San Diego was testing a
system that would require officers to enter information on stops on hand-held
computers); Holly Edwards, Deputies to Record Race Data: Program Aims to Curb
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attending to race encourages officers to 'see race' ignores indications
that undue focus on race is already a pervasive problem that,
ironically, can only be addressed by attending to race in the short
run. Critics are right to say that data collection will change the way
officers perceive their work and how they behave, but, after all, that
is part of its purpose.
Police have also begun to present a third argument: that data
collection efforts are a waste of time because studies are always con-
tested, lead to more conflict than progress, and never provide clear
answers that help to solve actual problems."a Police are understanda-
bly concerned about being branded as racists if data is used only to
determine if their conduct is intentionally discriminatory. State laws
do not suggest what should be done in the usual situation where
police are not intentionally racist, but their behavior still leads to
unnecessarily large disparities based on race.
These laws appear meaningless because they provide no gui-
dance on how to interpret data. They lack teeth because they do not
require concrete steps to be taken once a disparity is found. In fact,
action is rarely taken unless someone, such as a state attorney gene-
ral, seizes upon the data to force change. But worse, the laws suggest
an all-or-nothing approach where little can be done to remedy prob-
Bias, Daily News of L.A., Jan. 11, 2001, at 3 ("'At first, we thought this would be
a lot of extra work, but so far it hasn't proved to be that bad,' said Deputy Dave
Miklos."); Michael Raphael & Joe Donahue, State Plans Database to Deter
Profiling: Troopers to Get Laptops in $14 Million Project, Star Ledger (Newark),
June 23, 1999, at 1 (describing how New Jersey will provide laptops to all officers
in the state, streamlining record keeping, and recording data on all traffic stops).
In addition, designing equipment and software for police data collection
is becoming a big business. See Chandrani Ghosh, Beat Reporting: The Latest
From the Politically Correct Front: A New Wireless Device that Helps Cops Defend
Themselves Against Charges of Racism, Forbes, Feb. 5, 2001, at 108 (describing
Robert Michels's start-up company, Mobile Commerce & Computing, that designs
and sells wireless software, a system called TrafficStop, to local police
departments). Michels has already attracted competition from others attempting
to develop comparable software. Id.
158. Dallas Police Chief Terrell Bolton said, "When you look at the number of
departments that have collected statistics, once they have completed the data
collection, they sit around and argue about what it means." Dave Michaels, Chief
Opposes Gathering Race Data; He Says Profiling Minimal in Dallas, Dallas
Morning News, Jan. 24, 2001, at 15A (quoting Chief Bolton). Instead, Bolton in-
stituted new training videos, a policy against profiling, and is seeking funds for
video cameras in patrol cars. Id.
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lems short of intentionally racist behavior.
Legislation suggests several important elements of a remedy
for racial profiling, including: collecting data; disclosing data to affec-
ted communities; and creating new bodies to evaluate data. What
they lack is the flexibility to give police a chance to interpret data
and respond to problems without being branded as racist. Recent
consent decrees in U.S. Department of Justice suits suggest ways to
take the remedy a step further. The decrees require a response to
problems like racial profiling, but give police departments the ability
to use data to engage in problem solving on their own.
C. Justice Department Suits as an Avenue for
Institutional Reform
The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,
passed in response to the Rodney King riots in Los Angeles, empow-
ers the Department of Justice to secure an injunction against the
misconduct of local police."5 9 The law permits the DOJ to obtain
equitable and declaratory relief to eliminate a wide range of police
misconduct-any "pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement
officers" that deprives persons of "rights, privileges, or immunities
secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United
States."6 ° Thus, the focus can include police brutality or other kinds
of misconduct.16
The Department has brought three suits to date-in Pitts-
burgh, Pennsylvania; Steubenville, Ohio; and Columbus, Ohio-and
has secured consent decrees in Los Angeles and New Jersey. 62 While
159. 42 U.S.C. § 14141(a) (1994).
160. Id.
161. Taking the focus off race seems to help diffuse a situation and permit
more cooperation in resolving the problem. Columbus, Ohio has been the first to
challenge a Justice Department suit. City officials reacted very negatively when
the Department attempted to add to its allegations evidence of racially disparate
stops. Presumably, the original complaint of civil rights violations was less
controversial. See Columbus Says Feds Injecting Race into Lawsuit Against
Police, Dayton Daily News, July 20, 2000, at 3B (describing how the city, in its
request to deny the Department of Justice permission to introduce evidence of
racial profiling, stated that the DOJ "has chosen to inject race into the case at
this time in a transparent effort to 'turn up the heat' on the defendants").
162. For the text of the consent decrees, see Consent Decree, United States v.
City of Los Angeles, (Civ. No. 00-11769 GAF), http'//www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/docu-
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the DOJ has a powerful weapon in § 14141, it has tread softly,
crafting consent decrees that permit local involvement in efforts to
remedy racial profiling and the improper use of force. The decrees de-
serve special attention and analysis because they have become the
leading model for remedying racial profiling, though there has been
little discussion of their structure or how compliance has pro-
gressed.1" They have two main features: 1) early warning systems
that collect information on police stops; and 2) freedom for local de-
partments to design their own responses to problems.
1. Early Warning Systems
The Department brought its lawsuits in response to com-
plaints of excessive force, improper searches and seizures, false ar-
rests, including those targeting known critics of the police or witnes-
ses to police misconduct, and lack of departmental discipline and su-
ments/laconsent.htm [hereinafter Los Angeles Decree]; New Jersey Decree, supra
note 37; Consent Decree, United States v. City of Pittsburgh, (W.D. Pa., Feb. 26,
1997) (No. 97-0354), http://www.usdoj.gov/crtlsplitldocuments/pittssa.htm [here-
inafter Pittsburgh Decree]; Consent Decree, United States v. City of Steubenville,
(S.D. Ohio, Sept. 3, 1997) (No. C2 97-966), http'//www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/docu-
ments/steubensa.htm [hereinafter Steubenville Decree]. See also Feds Sue Co-
lumbus Police, Cincinnati Post, Oct. 22, 1999, at 9A (describing how the police
union scuttled the consent decree negotiated between the police and DOJ,
resulting in a lawsuit and continued negotiations). In addition, the DOJ has
investigations pending in several other locations, including: Buffalo, New York;
East Point, Michigan; New York City; New Orleans; Orange County, Florida;
Prince George's County, Maryland; Riverside, California; Tulsa, Oklahoma;
Washington, D.C.; and most recently, Cincinnati, Ohio. See Police Agency
Investigations, Oregonian (Portland), June 3, 2000, at A05; Jane Prendergast,
Investigation Begins-Federal Team Examines Practices, Cincinnati Enquirer,
May 23, 2001, at A01.
163. News reports on the progress of the decrees have usually described court
monitor reports, with some reporting on community objections and protests. The
author has relied on discussions with lawyers at the Department of Justice and
others involved with the decrees for information on interactions between lawyers
and the community. For early commentary lauding the decrees, see Livingston,
supra note 7, at 818 (arguing that innovative consent decrees that resulted from
these first two suits promise to have an important impact on police reform
efforts). All of the civil rights lawyers litigating racial profiling cases consulted by
the author have said that the consent decrees provided the model for relief
requested, though the consent decrees themselves may have been based on the
reforms and study commissioned in the Maryland settlement. See supra note 7.
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pervision.'" The expansive language of § 14141 permits broad reform
of troubled police departments, so that the decrees need not focus ex-
clusively on racial disparity or particular kinds of misconduct, but
can also target institutional problems of police training, manage-
ment, and monitoring. Despite their expansive mandate, the decrees
thus far, have focused mostly on responding to individual instances
of misconduct, on identifying 'problem officers,' and not on broader
remedies.
At the core of the consent decrees is the automated monitor-
ing program, usually referred to as an 'early warning system.' At the
scene of every stop, officers use a computer to record: its date, time,
and location; the age, sex, and race of persons involved; the reason-
including legal grounds-for the encounter; and if any seizures or ar-
rests resulted. 16' A special report is prepared when non-consensual or
warrantless searches are performed or force is used. 6 6 Information
from reports is automatically entered into a computer database that
arranges and makes accessible information about arrests made by
each officer.167 The database includes complaints lodged against an of-
ficer, listing any shootings in which the officer was involved, any mis-
conduct alleged, and whether discipline resulted.
'Early warning' alarms go off if particular officers, or groups
thereof, use questionable techniques or methods substantially more
often than the norm in analogous situations.lu The computer data-
base also signals a problem if officers are involved in several inci-
dents with particular offenses or in a sufficiently serious event. For
example, under the Pittsburgh and Steubenville decrees, periodic au-
dits are required and review is triggered within a week of any com-
plaint or use-of-force report.'69 With the database, a citizen's com-
164. Livingston, supra note 7, at 821; Marshall Miller, Note, Police Brutality,
17 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 149, 193 (1998) (describing how the Pittsburgh consent
decree stemmed from a lawsuit brought by the local ACLU and NAACP as well as
the Police-Barrio Project of Philadelphia).
165. See, e.g., New Jersey Decree, supra note 37, 29. The other decrees all
have similar provisions.
166. Id. 32-33. The Pittsburgh Decree requires a special use of force
report. See Pittsburgh Decree, supra note 162, 18.
167. New Jersey Decree, supra note 37, 1I 40-56.
168. Id.
169. Pittsburgh Decree, supra note 162, 18-19; Steubenville Decree,
supra note 162, 1 23, 66.
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plaint about a stop can be instantly checked against the computer,
whereas in the past, officers might not have bothered to sort through
thousands of handwritten forms to find out whether a complaint was
substantiated by a report.
While officers can avoid filing computer reports just as they
do when using paper and pencil, ° the use of audio or video recorders
in each patrol car-as is now done in New Jersey-may help prevent
officers from forging or failing to complete reports. 1 ' Moreover, com-
puterized bookkeeping makes it easier to determine if particular offi-
cers fill out fewer reports than do other officers or than they did in
the past. This sets off a different, but equally important, kind of early
warning signal, especially in conjunction with citizen complaints.
The computer cannot replace human management, and police
departments already have mechanisms of accountability and review
by supervising officers. The database does formalize review, though,
and more importantly, the system organizes information efficiently,
making supervision and monitoring easier. Studies commissioned in
New York and New Jersey required months and years of compiling
hand-written reports to present the data in a useful form. The early
warning database is instantly accessible by officer, unit, shift, or
special unit, permitting close examination of sources of misconduct.
This aids the department in quickly pinpointing issues of concern,
such as problem units or 'rogue' cops.
These consent decrees also collect more local information
170. See Nat Hentoff, Giuliani's Lawless Police, Wash. Post, Apr. 10, 1999, at
A21 (quoting New York State Attorney General Elliott Spitzer, who estimates
that police "may fill out one in five or one in 10" of the required stop and frisk
forms). Police may tend to record violent stops in which misconduct could be
alleged in order to protect themselves against complaints by filing their side of
the story. Thus, few records may exist for most inconclusive stops in which a
quick frisk is performed. As noted earlier, the DOJ approach permits inferences
from the absence of records, as well as from the content of those reported, to raise
red flags.
171. New Jersey Decree, supra note 37, 34 (requiring mobile video or audio
recorders in state patrol cars). See also Beth Shuster, Deputies to Test Tiny Vide-
ocams Safety: They May Wear Lens as Part of Pilot Project. Traffic Stop Tapes
Will Be Used as Evidence, L.A. Times, Feb. 1, 2000, at B1 (reporting that fourteen
deputies now use these 'bodycams' and that they hope to use the cameras to aid
in prosecutions). For a description of advances in wearable computing, see Lisa
Guernsey, Hard Hat, Lunch Bucket, Keyboard: Blue-Collar Workers Are Way
Ahead of the Geek Elite in Actually Using Wearable Computers and Peripherals,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 2000, at G1.
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about individual officers and units than legislation has required, per-
mitting close monitoring and supervision.'72 Of course, departments
can already supervise and discipline officers, and if they already ig-
nore indications of abuse, new warnings may be avoided just as rea-
dily. However, placing information in a database makes police con-
duct and internal review transparent to internal supervisors and to
outside monitors, like the DOJ, as well as to a court.
2. Experimenting and Remedying Racial Profiling
The consent decrees provide for mostly internal accountabili-
ty, by encouraging police to monitor themselves. Likewise, the second
half of the remedy-deciding what to do with the data once a problem
is identified-is left to the police departments themselves to imple-
ment. Police are given room to experiment with techniques for com-
bating misconduct and are encouraged to develop their own problem-
solving skills in order to move beyond the mere identification of prob-
lem officers. Indeed, "[tihe negotiation of Section 14141 consent
decrees offers the Justice Department an opportunity to push local
police departments in the direction of best practices in the area of
police accountability while not relinquishing the benefits of local
knowledge and experimentation .... ,'7 The consent decree require-
ments are mostly procedural, so that the departments must decide
what kinds of policing will result in less disparity or misconduct. The
hope is that local police will know more about what works in their
neighborhoods and will be more likely to follow the rules and proce-
dures set out by their own supervisors than they would those im-
posed by court orders.
As none of the police departments have completed implemen-
tation of the decrees, it is too early to determine how well reforms
will work. Local experimentation might begin by identifying practices
suggestive of racial profiling. Early warning systems could be used to
identify stops with a high degree of racial disparity that have been
performed by particular officers or units. Having determined the
172. For example, the Michigan State Police only log in a database the race
and sex of individuals stopped. The Michigan plan might "reassure motorists that
they aren't being singled out because of their race," but it does not record critical
information, such as which officers are responsible for stops, where they occur,
what the grounds for suspicion were, or the kinds of searches that resulted.
Shepardson, supra note 128, at A10 (quoting U.S. Attorney Saul Green).
173. Livingston, supra note 7, at 845.
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existence and source of disparity, police departments would ideally
weigh options and experiment with solutions.' 74 For example, the
department might decide that the best way to prevent disparity is to
limit police discretion. Alternatively, it might determine that the
disparity can be eliminated by: training police to be sensitive to race;
hiring more minority candidates; or assigning officers to a fixed beat
within a neighborhood and requiring their regular contact with
neighborhood or community groups most concerned with crime and
police practices. A department might even let each precinct choose its
own approach for a trial period and use the results to determine
those practices that most successfully eliminate disparity and combat
crime.
Early indications suggest that some problem solving is occur-
ring. Pittsburgh, for example, has identified problem officers for re-
training and has also instituted a policy change, prohibiting use of a
chokehold that it found resulted in excessive injury.175 New Jersey is
also engaging in this kind of problem solving. The New Jersey
Attorney General's study identified excessive police discretion as the
chief source of racial disparity. The existing procedure for performing
stops stated:
174. The Steubenville Decree details the areas in which police must conduct
regular audits of the data collected, including use of force, arrests, and potential
racial bias. Steubenville Decree, supra note 162, 74-77. The Pittsburgh Decree
requires similar audits by senior supervisors. Pittsburgh Decree, supra note 162,
[ 19-20.
175. Telephone interview with Robert Moossy, Trial Attorney, Civil Rights
Division, U.S. Department of Justice (Sept. 2, 2000). See also Jamie Stockwell,
Federal Probe Lifts Hopes of Police Reform: Pr. George's Should Expect Tension
with Public to Increase, Experts Say, Wash. Post, Nov. 13, 2000, at B1 ("'It was
tough on everyone, and no one liked the fact that the Justice Department had to
come in and clean us up, but now we're a nationally recognized agency,' said Sgt.
Albert Preik, commander of Pittsburgh's police research and planning division.").
Pittsburgh, despite strong community statements to the contrary,
claims it has successfully complied with its decree, though there is little evidence
that reforms are complete. Timothy McNulty, Mayor Seeks End of Consent
Decree: '97 Measure Required Oversight of Reforms in Police Department,
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Nov. 5, 1999, at B1 (describing how the Mayor called for
an end to the decree, while the ACLU promised a new lawsuit if the DOJ
permitted the decree to end). See also Jonathan D. Silver, U.S. Urged Not to Lift
Police Decree: Coalition of Activists Target Murphy Effort, Pittsburgh Post-
Gazette, Nov. 18, 1999, at C1 (describing efforts by Pittsburgh civil rights,
religious, and black organizations to prevent the Mayor from ending the consent
decree, based on the belief that the reforms were only beginning).
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Physical and personal characteristics such as race, age, sex,
length of hair, style of dress, type of vehicle, and number of
occupants of a vehicle may not be utilized... to establish
reasonable suspicion unless the ... member can identify
and describe the manner in which a characteristic is directly
176
and specifically related to particular criminal activity.
The report concluded that a new policy should limit discre-
tion, but more importantly, should not mention race "in the same
breath" as less suspect factors. 177 The report suggests that changing
the policy will not be enough and, along with the consent decree, calls
for an examination of the training, rewards, and discipline systems.178
Change may be slow in coming, however, and after two years, traffic
stop statistics are unchanged and still show great racial disparity.9
3. Criticisms of the Decrees
Because Department of Justice consent decrees have become
the leading model for police reform, it is important to evaluate them.
They are influencing police departments seeking to avoid liability
and private plaintiffs seeking to impose similar remedies. 80
Additionally, some of the legislation being proposed and implemented
in other states is based on requirements that are contained in the
decrees. Finally, the decrees reflect approaches that have been used
in other civil rights contexts. For example, in the areas of race
discrimination and sexual harassment in the workplace, consent
176. New Jersey Report, supra note 24, at 40.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 42-44. New Jersey Decree, supra note 37, I 93-95 (on revising
training procedures); T 59-92 (on revising misconduct and disciplinary
procedures).
179. Josh Getlin, Racial Profiling Still a Problem: Despite Efforts in New
Jersey, Statistics Stay High, Chi. Trib., May 27, 2001, at 10. David Harris
commented that it may take time for troopers to 'unlearn" profiling practices
since, "[tihis problem goes very deep into the past." Id. (quoting David Harris).
180. Raphael & Donahue, supra note 157, at 1 (describing how New Jersey
will provide laptops to all officers in the state as part of its effort to require that
data be collected on all traffic stops and noting that the State approved the
program after observing similar requirements in other consent decrees and
pursuant to its ongoing negotiations with DOJ). See also Nat'l Congress Puerto
Rican Rts. v. City of New York, 75 F. Supp. 2d. 154, 158 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
(noting that plaintiffs seek to require that the NYPD record all stops in a
computer database).
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decrees entered into with employers require early warning systems,
statistical monitoring, and new training programs. 8' Thus, although
consent decrees may seem like a departure from traditional police
reform, they are actually part of a broader new approach to
institutional reform whereby collaborative problem solving is
combined with information gathering.
182
181. See Haynes v. Shoney's, Inc., No. PCA 89-30093-RV, 1993 WL 19915
(N.D. Fla. Jan. 25, 1993) (approving a consent decree for a class of over 200,000
present and former employees of Shoney's restaurants, in a lawsuit alleging sexu-
al harassment and race discrimination). The order required: hiring recruitment
and equal opportunity officers; drafting new grievance and disciplinary proce-
dures for harassment or retaliation; setting flexible hiring and promotion goals
geared towards the minority populations of the communities in which the
restaurants are located; designing training and education materials; establishing
tuition reimbursement for minorities to pursue continuing education; adopting
and implementing job qualification and performance standards; and introducing
a 'tester' program to monitor compliance with the decree. Id. See also EEOC v.
Astra USA, Inc., No. CIV. A. 98-40014, 1998 WL 80324, at * 2-5 (D. Mass. Feb. 5,
1998) (requiring compliance with new policy against sexual harassment, training
employees to respond to problems with sexual harassment from customers and
contractors, providing employees with the Policy Against Sexual Harassment,
and appointing a neutral outside person to review compliance in each action and
to report directly to the EEOC). For other consent decrees requiring information
gathering, training, and monitoring, see, for example, McKnight v. Circuit City
Stores, Inc., No. Civ.A. 3:95CV964, 1997 WL 328640 (E.D. Va. Mar. 12, 1997);
Joint Mot. for Entry of Consent Decree, EEOC v. Mitsubishi Motor Mfg. of Am-
erica (C.D. Il. June 10, 1998) (No. 96-1192), http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/mmma.
html.
182. Professor Sturm discusses the consent decrees listed in the previous
footnote and describes how in cases of sexual harassment, some "courts have
overseen the formulation, approval, and implementation of consent decrees, some
of which contain many of the characteristics of effective problem solving. .. "
Sturm, supra note 14, at 563 & nn.367-68. Sturm describes the court as a
facilitator of the problem solving process:
A court that acts self-consciously to construct a framework for
accountable deliberative decision-making as part of the
remedial stage would provide not only a visible opportunity to
witness a problem-solving process, but also to share the results
of that process through a reported decision .... Thus, in this
structural regulatory regime, courts create a framework that
will generate the information, incentives and opportunity to
elaborate the meaning of a general norm in context and the
development of contingent solutions in cases that do not lie on
the normative boundary.
Id. at 563.
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One misguided criticism is that flexibility gives departments
the opportunity to choose mediocre solutions and possibly even to
evade reform. Departments already choose to permit misconduct and
disparate treatment based on race, and these consent decrees make
departments more accountable than other available avenues because
they are so comprehensive.
Serious concerns remain. There is the institutional concern
that the DOJ may not be well situated to remedy racial profiling. As
a political agency, the Justice Department's enforcement methods
vary in degree and kind from administration to administration.l1 For
example, President Bush that he did not want to "federalize the local
police forces."18 Such statements do not inspire community
confidence that the DOJ will provide lasting protection. Bush has
more recently stated that, "Racial profiling is wrong, and we will end
it in America."""
Even given the will, the DOJ lacks resources to remedy racial
profiling across the country. Few consent decrees have resulted
during the years since § 14141 was enacted."s The DOJ has
183. For example, DOJ rushed to reach settlements in consent decrees in the
Fall of 2000, fearing an incoming Bush administration. For criticism of DOJ
inaction during the Bush and Reagan years that ignored police abuse in Los
Angeles until the Rodney King beating was videotaped, and even then, reacted
slowly, see Paul Hoffman, The Feds, Lies, & Videotape: The Need for an Effective
Federal Role in Controlling Police Abuse in Urban America, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev.
1453 (1993).
184. Comm'n on Presidential Debates, Transcript of Second Presidential
Debate (Oct. 11, 2000), at http://www.debates.org/transcripts/textfiles/CPDDe-
bate_3_FinalTranscript_(English).txt. See also Eric Lichtblau, Bush Sees U.S. as
Meddling in Local Police Affairs, L.A. Times, June 1, 2000, at A5 (quoting George
W. Bush, stating, "I do not believe the Justice Department should routinely seek
to conduct oversight investigations, issue reports or undertake other activity that
is designed to function as a review of police operations in states, cities and
towns."); Patt Morrison, George or Al? Answer Means Plenty in LA, L.A. Times,
Nov. 10, 2000, at B1 ("George W. Bush is no lover of federal consent decrees, and
has said he thinks local police issues should be handled locally.").
185. Will, supra note 13, at A19 (quoting George W. Bush).
186. Gilles, supra note 2, at 1407-08, explains that
the fact that only three suits have been brought seems to
reflect the lax enforcement of the statute. This view is
bolstered by the fact that the Justice Department has been
"investigating" pattern or practice violations in at least twenty
other police departments-mainly in large, urban cities-since
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investigated police brutality in places like New York City and New
Jersey where police killings drew attention to profiling, but smaller
communities have had to rely on private suits to act as critical cata-
lysts for change. The DOJ could provisionally immunize departments
in compliance from lawsuits. 87 However, the DOJ is federal, removed
from communities in which it seeks to intervene, and cannot
maintain close connections with local public interest or community
groups.1-
It is important to note that decrees usually do not involve the
community or require that the information collected be made public.
The information only generates internal accountability, and all of the
decision-making and interpretation of information is left in the hands
of the local police. For example, the Pittsburgh Decree's short section
on "community relationships" merely states that the police should
make efforts to attend community meetings and hold quarterly gath-
erings to discuss policing issues."89 The Los Angeles Decree requires
1995, yet no reports, much less lawsuits, have resulted.
She adds that resource limits and political constraints are probably most
responsible for underenforcement. Id. at 1409-11. See Miller, supra note 164, at
176-79 (raising concerns with the Department's inability to show a 'pattern or
practice' in many cases, with the communities lacking a voice in Department
negotiations, and with the effectiveness of 'procedural reforms' in these consent
decrees).
187. See Skolnick & Fyfe, supra note 14, at 211 (noting that the DOJ has
only forty-four civil rights prosecutors, and that, from 1982-89, it only brought
twenty-two "significant civil rights prosecutions of police brutality cases").
188. Professor Livingston fears that Justice Department investigations alien-
ate officers from their community:
You want the officers to exercise discretion, to reach out to
citizens to let them know what's available, to work with them
to combat crime .... But a department that feels it is under
siege and is being punished by the community... it may be
hard to establish good relations with the community.
Stockwell, supra note 171, at B1 (quoting Professor Livingston). Of course,
investigations occur because the community is dissatisfied, and officers should
feel that they are subject to questioning. And while police may feel lower morale,
the community may perceive an improved relationship. See David Voreacos, Peek
at N.J. Troopers' Future? Federal Cuffs Chafe Pittsburgh Police, Record
(Trenton), Mar. 8, 1999, at Al (quoting a black councilman's statement that the
Pittsburgh decree "has improved" the department and that "police behavior is
beginning to change").
189. Pittsburgh Decree, supra note 162, 31-32. The Decree adds, "The
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annual meetings in precincts and meetings with "community adviso-
ry groups."1' 9 The Steubenville Decree does not even require meet-
ings, and only asks that the police manual be made public."' Part of
the reason may be the Justice Department's own distance from com-
munity concerns; they rarely meet with community groups after the
decree is in place. For example, while they conducted meetings of
interested groups in Pittsburgh during their investigation, after the
Decree was established, they have returned to attend a meeting only
192
once.
Each decree does require that information collected be
released to an independent monitor, the court, and the Department
of Justice, all of which retain a role in monitoring compliance.193
These monitors' reports are made public and do indicate the kinds of
City shall hold quarterly open meetings in rotating zones to educate the public
about proper police functions; police misconduct, including excessive use of force,
improper searches and seizures; and the proper methods for filing complaints
against police officers." Id. 51. The New Jersey Decree also asks that the state
police conduct "outreach." New Jersey Decree, supra note 37, 60.
190. The Los Angeles Decree requires:
[Alt least one open meeting per quarter in each of the 18
geographic Areas for the first year of the Agreement, and one
meeting in each Area annually thereafter, to inform the public
about the provisions of this Agreement, and the various
methods of filing a complaint against an officer.
Los Angeles Decree, supra note 162, 155.
The Decree does not require police to ask for citizen feedback and only
vaguely alludes to 'interaction' that might result from the meetings: "the open
public meetings described above shall include presentations and information on
the LAPD and LAPD operations, which presentations and information are de-
signed to enhance interaction between officers and community members in daily
policing activities." Id. The Decree also refers to "community advisory groups"
with which the LAPD will meet quarterly, but the function and makeup of the
community advisory groups is not explained. Id. 157.
191. Steubenville Decree, supra note 162, 28.
192. Telephone interview with Vic Walczak, Executive Director, Greater
Pittsburgh ACLU (Oct. 25, 2000) [hereinafter Walczak Interview].
193. Pittsburgh Decree, supra note 162, TT 70-76 (requiring that full access
be given to an outside monitor appointed by the city that makes periodic
compliance reports to the court and the parties and that full access to all data be
given to the United States); Steubenville Decree, supra note 162, 82-86, 91
(stating that the City and DOJ will jointly choose an independent auditor who,
along with the United States, has full, unrestricted access to all records and
data).
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progress that police are making. For example, the Pittsburgh reports
are available on the Internet.'9 In Pittsburgh, the monitor has also
held informal meetings with community groups to talk about con-
cerns. The New Jersey Decree takes an additional important step,
asking that the State Police release aggregate information every six
months, including breakdowns by race and type of civilian com-
plaints.195 Similarly, the Los Angeles Decree requires release of semi-
annual reports.' Hopefully, future settlements also will call for the
194. The Pittsburgh report is available at the Pittsburgh ACLU website. See
ACLU, Court-Ordered Pittsburgh Police Reform: Auditor's Reports Available
(June 28, 2000), at http://www.pgh.aclu.org/aclu/features. Other monitors' reports
may be made public on the DOJ website.
195. New Jersey Decree, supra note 37, 6, 114.
The State Police shall prepare semiannual public reports that
include aggregate statistics on State Police traffic enforcement
activities and procedures broken down by State Police station
and the race/ethnicity of the civilians involved. These aggre-
gate statistics shall include the number of motor vehicle stops
(by reason for motor vehicle stop), enforcement actions (inclu-
ding summonses, warnings, and arrests) and procedures (inclu-
ding requests for consent to search, consent searches, non-con-
sensual searches, and uses of force) taken in connection with or
during the course of such stops. The information regarding
misconduct investigations shall include, on a statewide basis,
the number of external, internal, and total complaints received
and sustained by category of violation. The information con-
tained in the reports shall be consistent with the status of
State Police recordkeeping systems, including the status of the
MAP [Management Awareness Program] computer systems.
Other than expressly provided herein, this paragraph is not
intended, and should not be interpreted, to confer any addi-
tional rights to information collected pursuant to this Decree.
Id. 114.
196. Los Angeles Decree, supra note 162, 156.
The LAPD shall prepare and publish on its website semiannual
public reports required by this paragraph. Such reports shall
include aggregate statistics broken down by each LAPD geo-
graphic area and for the Operations Headquarters Bureau, and
broken down by the race/ethnicity/national origin of the citi-
zens involved, for arrests, information required to be main-
tained pursuant to paragraphs 104 and 105, and uses of force.
Such reports shall include a brief description of each of the
following that was completed during that period: (i) report of a
specified audit completed,.., and any significant actions taken
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release of this information.
These consent decrees have short life spans, and without
monitors' reports and oversight, the accountability and sunlight
disappear. The Pittsburgh Decree expires in less than a year, and
community groups are understandably concerned that without the
independent court monitor, they will lose access to all information
about whether police have acted upon the information collected.
197
The hope is that the Police Department will become more capable by
that time. Thus far, however, this hope has not been borne out. In
fact, over mayoral and city council opposition, the Department
undermined the civilian complaint review board that citizens voted
into place by referendum. 9 ' Further, the Department consistently
refused to permit community groups to sit at the negotiating table
when it began settlement talks, even though these groups had filed
the underlying lawsuit and the Department of Justice requested
their participation.1" Given police hostility to community concerns,
the consent decree may only be a temporary solution absent
provisions that would make information permanently public or would
involve community groups in monitoring police. Vic Walczak,
Executive Director of the Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, said that unless
the police express a new willingness to work with the community,
once the decree expires, "We'll be back to the community working
with a closed system."2"
Los Angeles civil rights groups have sued to be included as
monitors of the consent decree because of their concern that the
court-appointed independent monitor will fail to represent their inte-
rests."°1 Their goal is to be included as 'equal partners' in implemen-
as a result of such audits or reports, (ii) a summary of all disci-
pline imposed during the period reported by type of miscon-
duct, broken down by type of discipline, bureau and rank, and
(iii) any new policies or changes in policies made by the
Department to address the requirements of this Agreement.
Id.
197. Walczak Interview, supra note 192.
198. Id. (discussing efforts to undermine the review board). See also
Voreacos, supra note 188, at Al (describing how the review board was created by
referendum).
199. Walczak Interview, supra note 192.
200. Id.
201. Mem. of Points and Authorities in Support of Mot. to Intervene Under
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ting the decree, which "fences out those individuals who have the
greatest interest in the most conscientious enforcement and that is
the victims of these practices and the citizens and residents of Los
Angeles.""' In the meantime, the consent decrees have not been im-
plemented, and have languished amidst wrangling over who should
be hired to serve as monitor.2 3 Similarly, in New Jersey, civil rights
groups have sued in a class action, seeking separate injunctive relief
because the consent decree does not sufficiently involve the public;
"[Pilaintiffs believe that a critical aspect of the injunctive relief is
public awareness, a remedy which is hardly touched upon in the Con-
sent Decree."2°4
Despite shortcomings, the Department of Justice has exacted
the best settlements from police departments to date. Improving on
these consent decrees, though, will require more local involvement.
Remedies cannot remain stable where local groups are excluded, for-
cing them to seek inclusion or to work around the settlement. Build-
ing remedies with outside groups as 'equal partners' can solve many
of the problems these decrees have encountered.
Rule 24(a)(2) and Rule 24(b)(2) at 5, United States v. City of Los Angeles (filed
Jan 8, 2001) (Case No. CV-00-11769AF) (on file with author) ("Without interven-
tion, then, members of the Los Angeles community must, once again, place trust
in the incredible by believing that the LAPD will reform itself or be subject to il-
lusory discipline by a body disempowered and disinclined to effect the necessary
changes."). See Morning Edition (National Public Radio broadcast, Dec. 18, 2000)
("With President-elect Bush on the record opposing such decrees, [Los Angeles
community groups] are concerned that an appointed federal monitor won't
effectively enforce the city's agreement."), available at http://search.npr.org/cf/
cmn/cmnps05fm.cfm?Seg ID=115661.
202. Morning Edition, supra note 201 (quoting Mark Rosenbaum, Legal Di-
rector, ACLU of Southern California). The Los Angeles Police Protective League
(LAPPL), the police union, surprisingly also criticized the decree for not encoura-
ging effective police problem-solving and community policing. Tina Daunt, Police
Union Asks for Broader Reform Decree Council: League Looks for a Range of
Provisions that Have Long Been Opposed by Chief Bernard Parks, L.A. Times,
Oct. 5, 2000, at B1. Their proposed additions include community meetings and
convening an expert group on implementing problem-solving policing. Id.
203. Erwin Chemerinsky & Mark Rosenbaum, LAPD Reforms Fade Like the
Cheshire Cat, L.A. Times, May 14, 2001, at Bl.
204. Pls.' Mem. of Law in Reply to Def.'s Opposition to the Mot. for Leave to
Amend the Compl. and for Class Certification, Morka v. State of New Jersey
(2000) (No. L-8429-97 66).
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III. A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH
One police chief noted: "Until they define [racial profiling], we
can't really discuss it .... It means too many things to too many peo-
ple." 5 Indeed, no social or legal consensus exists on what degree of
disparity in police treatment is tolerable and under what conditions.
Defining racial profiling has befuddled courts and legislators dealing
with the question of what to do if disparity is uncovered. The Justice
Department consent decrees suggest a way of sidestepping this prob-
lem: they focus on eliminating disparity by making the policing pro-
cess more responsive and informed. However, the decrees only use in-
formation supplied by officers during traffic stops and only provide
for a few years of monitoring by an independent monitor or state at-
torney general's office. Further, as noted above, neither Justice De-
partment consent decrees, state legislation, nor remedies pursuant to
private litigation require that racial profiling data be made public.
Additionally, all three of the mechanisms discussed above fail in sig-
nificant ways to include outside actors in the decision-making pro-
cess. If police departments can be made more responsive, the ques-
tion is: Responsive to whom?
Police may have embraced collecting detailed data about
stops because they have had complete control over the circumstances
of the collection and interpretation of the results. Maybe advocacy
groups have not questioned data collection as a remedy because they
believe that lawsuits and consent decrees allow them to retain some
control over interpreting data and to ensure that police efforts are
not a sham. In order for lasting change to result from these lawsuits
and consent decrees, permanent institutional monitors need to be in
place when they end.
Racial profiling remedies have left key constituencies without
a role in the definition of policing norms. This is true, above all, of
the community groups that acted as a critical catalyst in calling for
an end to racial profiling. If these groups are shut out of the process,
they will demand a role in defining remedies-by litigation, as in Los
Angeles, or by establishing, via referendum, a civilian board to sup-
plement the consent decree, as in Pittsburgh.206 Any approach at-
205. Chen, supra note 130, at A18 (quoting Los Angeles Police Chief Bernard
C. Parks).
206. Pittsburgh's civilian complaint review board was created by referendum
in 1997, though it only has the power to make recommendations to police. See
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tempting to redress discriminatory policing should employ outside
expertise and permit key outside actors to play a role in defining the
remedy.
In explaining a more comprehensive approach to racial profil-
ing, this Part discusses two examples of participatory reform, show-
ing how police departments can begin to implement a more effective
remedy. It will then analyze what makes participatory police reform
work, examining three key elements of successful remedies: 1) infor-
mation gathering; 2) institutional problem solving based on reflection
upon, and assimilation of, collected data; and 3) partnership with
outside participants.
A. Participatory Reform: A Look at Two Police Departments
After making information public, police must take more steps
to include outside groups in the long-term project to solve police prob-
lems. Several police departments have moved towards a model of
interpreting data and problem solving that stresses collaboration
with experts, researchers, service-providers, and community groups.
These projects show how police and the community can sustain a
long-term commitment to work together and how remedies can be
institutionalized. They also indicate a trend in the evolution of racial
profiling remedies.
One recent project in Philadelphia demonstrates how com-
munity groups can rapidly become involved in interpreting data, de-
signing how it is collected, and contributing to police department ef-
forts to respond to problems and identify new ones. 7 In 1999, the
Philadelphia Inquirer uncovered a twenty-year practice by which the
city police were "dump[ing]" reported sex crimes.2 8 Police either
failed to investigate crimes at all, investigated them poorly, or
Voreacos, supra note 188, at Al.
207. This description was supplemented by a telephone interview with Carol
Tracy, Executive Director of the Women's Law Project, Philadelphia, Pa. (Oct. 19,
2000) [hereinafter Tracy Interview].
208. Mark Fazlollah et al., In Council, Questions on Rape Cases: Some
Members Want to Know Why Many Assaults Were Not Investigated. Public
Hearings Are Likely, Phila. Inquirer, Oct. 22, 1999, at Al (describing how the city
council proposed hearings on how thousands of sexual assault cases were not re-
ported and how groups pushed for public review and monitoring of the police.
Carol E. Tracy, Executive Director of the Women's Law Project, called for "lots of
sunshine.").
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downgraded their seriousness by reporting them as lesser or non-
criminal offenses. Reports indicated a pervasive attitude of blaming
victims and an unwillingness to find their stories credible and worth
pursuing. City Council hearings were held, and the new police
commissioner, John Timoney, assigned forty-five detectives to look at
over two thousand closed sexual assault cases, including hundreds of
rapes, that dated back to 1995.u
In the midst of this unfolding scandal, the Commissioner did
something dramatic-he invited women's and domestic violence
groups in Philadelphia to form a special task force with police to re-
view all relevant police files and help to decide if cases should be re-
opened. The police courageously admitted that they could not solve a
problem without outside expertise and the credibility which those
community groups would bring. This was a first-permitting outside
groups to review police records without litigation. The groups in-
volved were the Women's Law Project, Women Organized Against
Rape, the University of Pennsylvania Women's Center, and the
Pennsylvania National Organization for Women (NOW) Chapter.210
As a condition to their participation, these groups agreed that they
would review only closed cases, take no notes, and keep all informa-
209. Craig R. McCoy & Mark Fazlollah, Review Turns Up Hundreds of
Rapes: Police Had Dismissed More Than 300 of the Cases from 1995 on,
Commissioner John F. Timoney Revealed, Phila. Inquirer, June 21, 2000, at Al
(describing that of the first 1000 cases reopened over half involved serious crimes,
that forty-five new detectives would be hired to continue reviewing the cases, and
that investigators in the past did not report crimes because they were "blaming
victims").
Notwithstanding his laudable efforts on this issue, Commissioner
Timoney has been less concerned with community coalition building in other
contexts. Most notoriously, Philadelphia police made mass-arrests of protestors
during the Republican National Convention in 2000, many of which were later
thrown out for lack of any evidence. Rather than cooperate with protesters, police
adopted a hostile stance, using tactics that may have been illegal. They infiltra-
ted groups, targeted group leaders merely for espousing social activism, sought
high bail to drain group resources, and destroyed protestors' signs and written
material. Linda K. Harris & Craig McCoy, City's Push for Peace at GOP Meeting
Raises Rights Debate, Phil. Inquirer, Jan. 14, 2001, available at httpi/spe-
cials.philly.com/content/specials/gop2000/1954464883.htm.
210. Mark Fazlollah & Craig R. McCoy, Sex-Case Monitors to Begin in May:
Timoney Met Last Week with Women's Group Leaders in an Effort to Improve
How Rape Reports Are Handled, Phila. Inquirer, Apr. 10, 2000, at B1; Gina
Cappello, Women's Groups Can Oversee Sex Cases, AP Online (Mar. 22, 2000), at
http://www.spiritone.com/-law/watchers.html.
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tion confidential.2 1 They did so, as it allowed them to continue assist-
ing people who needed advice or advocacy on open cases while preser-
ving police investigations."' The review process most often ended in
agreement, with a few cases provoking dispute over police handling
of the case.13
The project quickly led to joint problem-solving and reinter-
pretation of how data is collected, as well as the incorporation of new
community groups-the sorts of remedies needed to address racial
profiling."4 Using data to ask questions about the source of original
problems, advocates and the police soon found that more information
and expertise were needed to address broader underlying problems.
For example, they found that part of the reason that sexual assaults
were characterized as lesser offenses was that Philadelphia's police
code manual had either vague definitions of sexual assault or
definitions inconsistent with Pennsylvania law. They began to study
how codes are written and began a project of rewriting the police code
manual.2"' They also found that files were often vague or incomplete,
and suggested the need for training on interviewing techniques."6
Furthermore, they saw that supervision in the sex crimes unit was
lacking. In response, they sought data from the police department on
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Tracy Interview, supra note 207.
214. Jennifer Brown, Philadelphia Police Open Files for Review of Shelved
Sex Cases, Seattle Times, June 25, 2000, at A2 (describing the origins of
collaboration and the basis for police satisfaction:
Capt. Joseph Mooney, a former internal-affairs detective
leading the special-victims unit, said the outside guidance was
helpful and is likely to continue. "The advocates have worked
with victims and cases similar to this, so you get an insight
into victims. You don't see that side of it as clearly as you
would or could on the police side," Mooney said.).
The International Association of Chiefs of Police, which had sharply
criticized the project as an incursion into police authority, has now reversed its
position and states that bringing in outside groups can provide valuable expertise
and improve community relations. "'Partnership between police and these groups
is in line with national and innovative thinking. You have a situation where
police gain expertise and information that they might not have on their own,' said
John Firman, research director of the association." Id.
215. Tracy Interview, supra note 207.
216. Id.
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how it responded to sex crimes.217 Interestingly, they asked the police
department to have the data broken down in ways useful to the
outside groups-by sex, race, and zip code.21 They hoped to see if race
or class affected disposition of complaints, although given the scope
of the crisis, the problems may have been systemic.2 9 Finally, they
discovered that many of these mishandled cases involved children,
and lacking expertise in the area, they brought in two children's
advocacy groups: the Support Center for Child Advocates and the
Philadelphia Children's Alliance.220
What helped this collaboration come together so quickly? The
police were willing to make the initial overture to grant access to
outsiders. The existence of a crisis may have helped, though police
departments can just as easily close ranks when there is a scandal or
crisis. The Philadelphia police have also been willing, so far at least,
to enter into a partnership extending beyond the immediate problem
of reviewing case files, to allow an exchange of advice and informa-
tion, and actually to cooperate on problem solving. Philadelphia also
has a particularly cohesive group of public interest organizations
that were ready to address the issue and made a show of good faith
by being willing to take the risk of foregoing litigation in favor of
collaborating. The existence of cohesive and able institutions with
strong ties to the community must have helped make the police
commissioner's decision much easier. Other institutions also played
an important role: the city council insisted on change and held
hearings, and the Philadelphia Inquirer broke the initial story and
then maintained continuing press coverage.
Successful problem solving may require the right kinds of in-
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. See Brown, supra note 214, at A2 (stating that advocates want to study
trends in police response.)
220. Id. The Support Center for Child Advocates provides legal assistance
and social service advocacy to children in Philadelphia who are victims of abuse
and neglect. See Support Center for Child Advocates, at http://www.choice-phila.
org/CHLguide/6ioog9hw.htm (last visited Dec. 6, 2001). The Philadelphia Chil-
dren's Alliance provides a point of contact between an abused child and an array
of private and government services. They cooperate with the Philadelphia police
to arrange joint law enforcement and child protective services interviews, provide
case counseling, and advocate generally on the child's behalf. See Philadelphia
Children's Alliance, at http://www.philachildrensalliance.org (last visited Dec. 6,
2001).
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stitutions, not just in the police department, but in the community as
well. One fear is that partnerships cannot occur in places where, un-
like in Philadelphia, community groups do not exist, are at odds with
each other, or are antagonistic towards the police or other parts of
the community. Such divided communities may find it especially
hard to accept the legitimacy of lawsuits or decisions over which they
have had no input. However, just bringing different groups together
to work on a problem may also foster institutions that can cooperate
with police and represent the community. Conversely, institutions
can be created to encourage community-police cooperation. For exam-
ple, civilian complaint review boards have been created as oversight
bodies with varying degrees of success. While most are organized as
internal boards, or as external monitors, some have been more inde-
pendent and have collaborated with police. 2 ' For example, in Phoe-
nix, citizens have been invited to sit on use-of-force review boards as
well as hiring and promotion boards, to provide input, and to inform
the public.222
Another concern is that public interest and legal advocacy
groups may not adequately represent the community; to some degree,
they are elite and removed. However, these groups have stronger ties
to the community than the impact groups that now control racial
profiling litigation. To some extent, the process of litigation itself
creates a hierarchical relationship that distances the Justice De-
partment and groups like the ACLU from the community. In control
of litigation, disclosing negotiations only to the court at the time of
settlement or decision, these groups have only periodic informational
meetings with the community. In contrast, collaboration permits a
greater role for the community by giving people the opportunity to
participate in an ongoing process of problem-solving-one in which
they receive constant information about the progress of reform ef-
forts.
221. Andrew J. Goldsmith, External Review and Self Regulation: Police
Accountability and the Dialectic of Complaints Procedure, in Complaints Against
the Police: The Trend to External Review 13, 33-38 (Andrew J. Goldsmith ed.,
1991) (acknowledging the disadvantages of civilian complaint review boards, yet
recognizing that their role could be enhanced). For problems with civilian com-
plaint review boards, see Samuel Walker, Citizen Review Resource Manual 6, 13
(1995) (stating that only half of review boards can even conduct public hearings).
See also Hecker, supra note 2, at 551 (arguing that civilian review is necessary to
combat selective enforcement of traffic laws).
222. PERF Report, supra note 2, at 112.
20011
112 COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [33:41
The strongest partnerships have resulted in two-way com-
munication between the police and community groups where police
share data with community groups and invited their input. While
community and advocacy groups have not traditionally shared
responsibility for data collection and interpretation, this process can
be collaboratively designed and implemented. Police departments can
bring together representatives from the department, the community,
and expert and advocacy groups to discuss ways to design data
collection as well as the means to implement and improve these
measures. For example, Rhode Island took this approach when it
convened an interdisciplinary group of community leaders and
223
experts to decide how to interpret statewide data on race.
Along these lines, a Chicago project in the late 1980s involved
both the police and the community in a collaborative data gathering
and problem-solving effort to map crime in neighborhoods. 224 Like
collecting data on complaints and race, crime mapping has normally
been exclusively in the hands of police. However, residents often have
very different ideas of where trouble spots exist in their
neighborhoods.225 With better computer technology, mapping was for
the first time providing a powerful tool for community members to
visualize crime patterns and to evaluate police response.26
Community groups in Chicago had to overcome a history of
strong police resistance to providing community groups with access
223. See supra note 149.
224. Michael D. Maltz et al., Mapping Crime in Its Community Setting:
Event Geography Analysis 2 (1991) (describing the research project with the
Chicago police and the Chicago Alliance for Neighborhood Safety, which began
Nov. 1, 1986, ended Sept. 30, 1988, and used crime mapping to enhance
cooperation between police and community).
225. See Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 Iowa L. Rev. 1107, 1172-93
(2000) (describing examples of crime mapping and showing sample maps).
226. Id. at 1175.
These two features-conveying complex information
in a simple format and inspiring police-citizen collaboration-
make crime mapping an excellent medium for transparent
policing. By not only opening law enforcement data to the
public, but also providing them in an understandable visual
format, crime mapping offers an enhanced basis for trust.
REMEDYING RACIAL PROFILING
to police information on neighborhood crime.n7 In a pilot district, po-
lice agreed to supply community groups with daily crime reports that
were already kept in a database."u As in Philadelphia, there were or-
ganized community groups that worked well together-the Chicago
Alliance for Neighborhood Safety (CANS) and a consortium of local
neighborhood watch and crime-prevention groups. The consortium
had already cooperated with police, receiving some crime reports,
and had worked with six local neighborhood groups that ran block
meetings and crime watch programs.' CANS analyzed the crime
data, prepared the basic neighborhood maps, performed daily data
entry, linked the information to the maps, and evaluated and
distributed the maps to the six other neighborhood groups.23 ° They al-
so aspired to gather data on "incivilities," or other disturbing non-cri-
minal incidents reported by community members, which would then
be mapped together with crime data and discussed in a joint• 231 232
meeting. Unfortunately, this did not occur.
One of the great successes of the project was learning from
the two-way exchange of information. Community input provided
crime maps that showed trends and compared data in ways the police
had never thought of before, pointing to a more comprehensive
approach:
In one instance, the police thought that residents' fear of
crime had overcome their objectivity and that their alleging
that one busy corner was especially dangerous (particularly
on weekends) was a clear error. But long-term data for the
area, which community analysts were able to provide, and
calls-for-service data, which were added to the mapped
analysis, verified the accuracy of the residents' perceptions;
relying on crime statistics alone gave a misleading picture
227. Maltz et al., supra note 224, at 16-17 (describing stormy background of
"mutual suspicion" causing police to initially refuse to provide community groups
with neighborhood 24-hour activity reports, though the same reports were pro-
vided to news agencies, universities and "some favored community organiza-
tions").
228. Id. at 19 (stating that the project was only in District 25, with a
population of 167,000).
229. Id. at 14, 30-31, 131.
230. Id. at 112.
231. Id. at 227.
232. Id. at 112.
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of the corner's problems. This experience resulted in a
vigorous response by the district commander, and each
party's respect for the other was solidified. m
Identification of hot spots, in meetings that presented crime
maps and gathered data to make a case to the police, resulted in suc-
cessful crime prevention. 2" Both the police and the community found
they had a great deal to learn from each other. The researchers
emphasized that any information system must be designed in
collaboration with its users. 5
Institutionalizing information sharing can occur with varying
degrees of cooperation. The Chicago pilot project allowed community
groups to prepare maps, to make information accessible, and to use
their own knowledge and maps to solicit police response to their
needs. Today, with its community policing approach, the Chicago
police still create maps of crime using the techniques learned in the
pilot project, and they bring them to community beat meetings as a
basis for discussion. Making information public seems much easier
when the information is in such a useful form.
However, the community has lost its stake in the process, its
ownership in producing the maps, and its ability to decide how the
maps would be organized, when they will be displayed to police, and
in what cases maps are inadequate.236 Making the maps public and
explaining them is helpful, but without giving the community an
equal stake in interpreting the maps, there is no longer the same
kind of problem solving.237 Similarly, the project in Philadelphia does
233. Id. at xii.
234. Id. at 115-20.
235. Id. at 50-53 (advocating user-based system development). Decentral-
ized, user-focused systems development has been a chief source of innovation and
reliability in software design, with Linux being the most famous example. For the
seminal work on open-source development and theory, see Eric S. Raymond, The
Cathedral and the Bazaar, at http://www.tuxedo.org/-esr/writings/cathedral-ba-
zaar/ (last visited Dec. 6, 2001).
236. Telephone interview with Archon Fung, Assistant Professor of Public
Policy at the John F. Kennedy School of Government (Nov. 6, 2000). Fung has
carefully examined community policing in Chicago and the implications of deli-
berative, transparent, and accountable systems of governance. See Fung, supra
note 14.
237. San Diego provides detailed interactive crime maps, updated monthly,
accessible by crime and by neighborhood on the Internet. Although they empha-
size a community policing approach, they do not involve community groups in
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not yet involve neighborhood groups, nor is collaboration on interpre-
ting data formalized yet; hopefully the police will allow the external
review to continue.
B. Creating Problem Oriented Partnerships
The examples provided by Chicago and Philadelphia suggest
how police can institutionalize a problem-oriented approach that in-
corporates information gathering and analysis. Neither deals specifi-
cally with racial profiling, but the same kind of approach can apply in
any problem solving effort. The prior section argues that this ap-
proach is particularly suited to dealing with problems of race in poli-
cing. Three features stand out: 1) police departments took the initial
step of setting up a system of information gathering and making
public the results; 2) they began an ongoing process of reflection,
questioning, and problem solving based on that information; 3) they
opened participation to outside groups that assisted in problem
solving, lent support to the effort, helped rearticulate the process of
information gathering, and even raised new problems.m
1. Information Gathering
"Information is the lifeblood of the police.'239
Police departments increasingly rely on information systems
to guide their policing. New York led the way early in the 1990s with
its Compstat system, used to monitor crime and pinpoint areas
where more resources should be deployed.240 Police departments can
preparing the maps. City of San Diego Police Dep't, Crime Statistics and Maps,
http'J/www.sannet.gov/police/stats/ (last updated Dec. 6, 2001).
238. For a description of this approach, see Susan Sturm & Brandon Garrett,
Moving Beyond Racial Profiling in New Jersey, Phila. Inquirer, Dec. 4, 2000, at
A15.
239. Maltz et al., supra note 224, at 12. Maltz adds that
[information] is used to determine how to allocate patrol
resources among districts and among beats within districts,
when and where to patrol, who the likely suspects of a crime
are, which offenses are likely to be solved, and in general how
to serve and protect the community. For the most part, this
information is provided to the police from community residents.
Id.
240. Former Police Commissioner William Bratton hails Compstat as the
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use the same problem-solving and information systems to improve
their services and to monitor themselves. 41
Racial profiling, itself defined through statistics, has led to a
new expansion of police information gathering. Laws passed and
remedies in consent decrees have encouraged police to take advan-
tage of technology in order to modernize their approach to routine
traffic stops. One example of the revolutionary possibilities
information technology can provide to communities is a website
maintained by the state of North Carolina. The website allows one to
backbone of their quality-of-life policing problem solving strategy, embodying "an
organizational method both for holding precinct commanders accountable and for
developing anti-crime tactics .... " George L. Kelling & William J. Bratton,
Declining Crime Rates: Insiders' Views of the New York City Story, 88 J. Crim. L.
& Criminology 1217, 1227 (1998). For a description of how Compstat works and
the problems with its exclusive focus on tracking crime and arrests, see W. Reese
Davis & Bruce D. Johnson, Criminal Justice Contacts of Users and Sellers of
Hard Drugs in Harlem, 63 Alb. L. Rev. 877, 880-83 (2000); Jenny Berrien &
Christopher Winship, Lessons Learned from Boston's Police-Community Collabo-
ration, Fed. Probation, Dec. 1999, at 25, 32 (criticizing the way that Compstat is
applied in New York versus Boston, where the approach is community-focused:
"Computer-based technology, aggressive initiatives, and preventive tactics are all
important. However, if the community is at odds with local law enforcement
agencies, these innovations will be less likely to bring about long-term
improvement.").
241. New York's new Police Commissioner Bernard B. Kerik intends to do
exactly that, to use Compstat-like data to evaluate police ability to meet
community needs. William K. Rashbaum, Broad Plan Aims to Improve Police
Rapport with Public, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 2001, at Al. Kerik intends to have an
outside consumer expert design a survey to evaluate community satisfaction and
to have precinct commanders report on their progress in meeting neighborhood
issues, providing incentives to officers that attend to their communities. The
survey "would be a tool similar to the department's vaunted Compstat process, in
which weekly crime statistics are used to measure the performance of police
supervisors." Id. Precinct commanders must also now attend precinct community
council meetings and "must also hold a monthly meeting with local clergy
members and attend a monthly meeting organized by their local community
board's district manager, which is held to review city services." Id. at B5. The
commanders must file reports on problems raised at the meeting and what
actions were taken in response. Invoking the language of partnership, the
Commissioner called this a new "working relationship" with the community, and
Michael E. Clark, of the Citizens Committee for New York City, "said the groups
he works with would welcome more regular input into how the department
polices their neighborhoods. 'Our hope would be that this doesn't just involve
measuring how many times people attend meetings, but how many crime
problems get solved in partnership with the community. Id.
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select a police department and view statistics each month, broken
down by race, sex, age and ethnicity, initial reason for stop, basis for
search, and what enforcement action was taken. 2
The most critical aspect of the data collection is that its re-
sults be disclosed. This should be the goal of any initial remedy. Dis-
closing data from early warning systems would create a dramatic
change in community access to policing information. It could give
communities access for the first time to in-depth information about
how police work in their neighborhoods. Thus, residents would find it
easier to show that a department is deliberately ignoring the abuses
of 'problem' officers.
More importantly, making information public allows police to
announce their policies and goals, and build the trust of the public by
allowing them to assess the success of a policy. Thus, public informa-
tion helps police accomplish key law enforcement goals. "[Tiranspa-
rency requires not only visibility of policy choices but a publicly de-
clared rationale for these decisions. Requiring government to an-
nounce both positive action and normative justification acknowledges
the human desire to assess the bona fides of public officials."m Trans-
parency of government action also provides stronger democratic
legitimacy. "[Transparency is a prerequisite of legitimate, demo-
cratic government. Nowhere is this mandate more important-in
terms of rights, interests, and costs-than in the criminal justice sys-
tem."'
Despite the benefits, police have strongly resisted sunlight, so
much so that they have even resisted sharing information with other
law enforcement organizations. Police have historically resisted any
attempt at civilian review and public access. 5 This distrust of the
public leads to insularity. Further, a police culture of silence can then
take on an institutional life of its own. Thus, although police depart-
ments increasingly applaud data collection requirements, they adopt
tepid forms of data collection. If they eventually acquiesce to the
consent decrees and state laws, it is only because the information is
kept out of the public eye.
242. North Carolina Traffic Stop Statistics, supra note 138.
243. Luna, supra note 225, at 1164.
244. Id. at 1166.
245. See supra notes 124 and 221.
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Police may fear liability from data, though such concerns
seem unwarranted. After all, if plaintiffs decide to sue, they can
obtain data through discovery even if none has yet been collected.
Racial profiling lawsuits have only required data collection as a
remedy. Any individual damages are premised on the harm caused
by use of force and unreasonable searches; no damages have been
awarded for the purely stigmatic harm caused by being part of a
statistical pattern of disparate stops. Concerns about liability or ac-
cess to privileged information could be easily avoided by having a
monitor decide which data could safely be made public, perhaps ag-
gregating data by neighborhood without names of officers.' The New
Jersey Decree and the Rhode Island state law both require release of
aggregate information.247
Police also justifiably fear releasing data that might be mis-
understood or seized upon by opponents. They worry that if informa-
tion is made public, advocates will exaggerate this data to make it
appear that they are 'racists.' Given that such data is often released
into such highly charged situations, it stands to reason that its
interpretation will be in dispute. On the one hand, police depart-
ments are very quick to declare that the data proves that they do not
engage in racial profiling, despite deep-seated community feelings to
the contrary. 8 On the other hand, advocates often latch on to incom-
plete data given their limited access.
In order to defuse this conflict, departments should release
enough information to be meaningful to communities, broken down
by neighborhood, and compared with relevant demographic informa-
tion. Police can release the information in different ways depending
on the audience. Aggregate information may be of interest to groups
addressing systemic problems, while more specific information will
prove critical to individuals, victims, and their advocates. Public in-
formation will make police information gathering less suspect, but
246. For example, the Los Angeles Decree makes public reports quarterly,
including aggregate statistics. The independent monitor, however, has unfettered
access to all non-public police records, which, in turn, can be used to inform this
office's public reports. See Los Angeles Decree, supra note 162, 163-68, 173.
The monitor can also petition the court for access to 'sensitive data' in open cri-
minal investigation files. Id. 170.
247. New Jersey Decree, supra note 37; Traffic Stops Statistics Act, R.I. Gen.
Laws § 31-21.1-4(d) (2000).
248. See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
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only if the information released is comprehensive.
Collecting highly personal information during stops also pre-
sents a civil liberties threat that justifies public scrutiny of the infor-
mation.u9 While police departments may resent requirements that
they collect data, these new databases give police access to an unpre-
cedented amount of information about the people with whom they
come into contact. Two of the consent decrees permit officers to ask
for personal information even though these requests may serve to in-
timidate people and may be of dubious value in reforming policing.
The New Jersey Decree asks that police collect license plate numbers
and dates of birth of those stopped, and that they videotape or tape
record the stops.5 ° The Steubenville Decree mandates collection of
the names and contact information for those stopped, as well as for
witnessesn 1
Personal information itself should not be made public. For
example, the names of officers or of people stopped should be with-
held, with detailed figures from databases being made public. The
hope of the decrees is that increased police accountability will
minimize opportunities for abuse. However, the threat of misuse of so
249. See Livingston, supra note 7, at 854-55.
[Tihese provisions are not dramatically different from record
keeping requirements in some other departments; whatever
civil liberties costs are attendant upon the maintenance of such
records, moreover, will presumably be more than offset by the
records' value in constraining police illegality. The example
nevertheless points to the fact that police activities-even
those directed at the control of police abuse-impact on citi-
zens' lives in many ways that can be vitally important, but that
often go unremarked and unregulated by positive law.
Id.
250. New Jersey Decree, supra note 37, 29, 34. Police are often happy that
racial profiling controversy has given them funds to outfit patrol cars with video-
cameras that they hope will be used to vindicate them when complaints are made
or when evidence needs to be introduced in prosecutions. Brendan Miniter, Video
Vindication, Am. Enterprise, Sept. 2000, at 7.
251. Steubenville Decree, supra note 162, 24. See also Brian Bakst, Crimi-
nal Profiling Program Criticized: Minneapolis Police Say Computer Software
Helps Them Target Problem Areas. Others Say Officers Have Become Too Aggres-
sive, L.A. Times, Feb 5, 2000, at A12 (following the New York model, Minneapolis
uses computer databases not to monitor police, but instead to identify and target
"problem" neighborhoods for aggressive street tactics combating "quality of life"
offenses).
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much personal information justifies some accountability to the
public, especially where it originally sought this information to
prevent, and not further compound, police abuse.
One way to disclose very specific information, without com-
promising the police or public, is to ensure that officers provide badge
numbers when they make stops, so that citizens can follow up on
complaints. The New Jersey Decree provides that, "The State Police
shall require all state troopers to provide their name and identifica-
tion number to any civilian who requests it." "u Making badge num-
bers clearly visible also reassures people during a stop that they have
some recourse. Even better, the new Colorado law requires police to
give those stopped business cards to explain how to file a com-
plaint.2  Recording or videotaping stops also provides a more compre-
hensive public record. Ultimately, the effectiveness of this informa-
tion depends on whether a real review follows a civilian complaint,
and whether police also publicize how to make a complaint.2
Not only will data transform the relationship between police
and the public, it will transform internal relationships within the de-
partment. The examples above show how information' systems can
help organizations abandon habits and traditional assumptions in
order to become more effective.255 Information makes general police
policies and the specific actions of officers more transparent to the
community and to problem-solvers within the department. Moreover,
information can spearhead a new, more open approach to
organizational change; Malcolm Sparrow describes a "new philosophy
of information management" where agencies broadly share data,
embrace public access, and encourage cross-analysis and integration
of different kinds of data.256
252. New Jersey Decree, supra note 37, 57.
253. Kyle Henley, Racial Profiling Banned in Colorado; Law Also Calls for
Traffic Stop Details, Gazette (Denver), June 6, 2001, at Al (explaining that
Colorado law forbids police from engaging in racial profiling and requires State
Police of Denver to collect statistics about traffic stops).
254. New Jersey Decree, supra note 37, 1 58-60 (describing requirements
that New Jersey State Police disclose information about complaint and police
procedures, and provide convenient access to complaint forms).
255. On the advantages and challenges of information systems, see Sparrow,
supra note 14, at 108-11.
256. Id. at 119 (describing the Environmental Protection Agency's new
approach).
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In designing information gathering systems, departments
should begin with a comprehensive approach.25 ' Consent decrees and
lawsuits have sought to broaden the data set, including information
about the use of force, neighborhood, and time of day, in order to
capture the quality of the stop and not just its rationale or racial fo-
cus. Unlike those mandated by state legislation, questionnaires must
avoid becoming simplistic litmus tests. On the other hand, if they are
too complicated, police, feeling burdened, will be less likely to fill
them out.m As discussed earlier, data must also be made public so
that the process is transparent. The data should not just be released
in the aggregate, but also by neighborhood, so that communities
know how policing affects them specifically.259 Further, information
must be organized in an accessible database, so that data can be
assembled or analyzed easily.2 ° Finally, and critical to the legitimacy
of the project, the data must be compared against control groups,
such as driving populations or demographic samplings of neighbor-
hood street traffic. Internal comparisons, against data from other pa-
257. Id. at 102-03 (describing the pitfalls of investing in an inflexible system
of information management). Sparrow describes how the Houston, Texas police
invested in a computer dispatch system only to find after a few years that the
system could not accommodate neighborhood policing values, like assigning the
same officers to calls in an area, saving more information about calls, or allowing
discretion in assignments. Id. For a comprehensive description of data elements
that should be included, see PERF Report, supra note 2, at 126-28.
258. An additional pitfall would be to make forms too easy to use, so that
police simply check off reasons for a stop. Write-in blanks force officers to
articulate specific reasons for a stop. On the other hand, blank spaces also
require more time and effort, and text is more subtle to interpret and less easy to
manage in a database. For examples of well-designed forms, see Ramirez et al.,
supra note 2. The authors provide a description of several data collection
programs and their successes and failures, which are intended as a blueprint for
designing data collection systems. See id. app. I for examples of forms used in
different states.
259. See, e.g., supra note 57.
260. Crime mapping and databases benefit police response to crime or other
problems affecting communities. New York City uses such databases
aggressively. See Eric Liptin, Computers to Track 'Quality of Life Crime' Giuliani
Says, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 2000, at B31 ("[C]omplaints about everything from
loud music to graffiti, public drinking, prostitution, panhandling and
homelessness will be 'pin mapped' precinct by precinct, and police supervisors
will be expected to move quickly and aggressively to counter any trends. .. ").
Commissioner Kerik says that New York will now analyze data from stop and
frisk forms for patterns of misconduct. John Marzulli, New Stop, Frisk Rule for
NYPD, Daily News (New York), Jan. 4, 2001, at 2.
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trol units, should also be done.'
The way that police gather information will also be critical.
First, data collection design efforts will necessarily transform how
stops, searches, and arrests are conducted. Second, data collection
itself sends a strong message of concern and accountability to the
community, indicating that racial disparity is being watched and is
not tolerated. For example, data collection can send a negative mes-
sage if police gather information in an intrusive way, leading to
perceptions of racial profiling or unfair singling-out. Citizens also
may be suspicious of police asking too many personal questions, such
as where they live. Such concerns may themselves be diffused by
providing an explanation for the stop at the time it occurs, or by apo-
logizing for its inconvenience.262 Further, if police fill out a stop ques-
tionnaire in front of the citizen, it may diminish any outrage over the
encounter. 2' The citizen knows that the stop is documented, that its
rationale is being recorded, and that she can check the identity of the
officer. However, if the form is filled out after the fact without any
questions being asked, then the citizen may be less likely to trust in
the reporting.
Alternatively, perhaps citizens should be asked to enter infor-
mation about stops into a database after the fact, so that officers are
not the only ones recording the data.26 If police rarely fill out forms,
261. The PERF Report evaluates different kinds of control group data and
controlled survey data that can be used; the report recommends the use of
sampling, recognizing that more cost-effective methods are needed. PERF Report,
supra note 2, at 137-42. See also supra note 148 and infra note 264 (on use of
samples as controls in New Jersey).
262. New York's Police Commissioner unveiled a new stop and frisk policy
aimed to improve community relations, asking police to explain the reason for the
stop. Marzulli, supra note 260, at 2. (Commissioner Kerik said, "I honestly believe
that it makes a big difference when an officer tells you why you were
stopped .... I think it will take the level of confrontation down by 50%.") Id.
(quoting Commissioner Kerik). Kerik has even ordered officers to 'play the
radioed description of a suspect for someone questioned for resembling the
description." Amy Waldman & Michael Cooper, Where Badge is Seen, Views Vary,
N.Y. Times, July 24, 2001, at B1. However, "[miost people stopped recently said
officers had not done that." Id. at B6.
263. Rhode Island has chosen to have officers fill out cards after the fact; "the
data collection is intended to be invisible to the motorist." Landis, supra note 139,
at A08.
264. Control group surveys can be used separately, as in New Jersey, where
drivers are asked their race at toll booths to provide a sample of the driving
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or citizens never witness officers performing this duty, then any sta-
tistics will be suspect. All of these decisions reflect strongly on how
the citizen and officer interact, and all depend on the values and con-
cerns of the police department and the community. Any protocol or
policy for conducting stops, searches, and arrests should come to
reflect the decisions that were made in the data collection design pro-
265
cess.
Police perceptions and concerns will also prove important in
deciding how to collect information. Police are trained as expert
observers and should be involved in the process of designing a system
that takes maximum advantage of their skills." Sparrow emphasizes
the importance of tapping into the 'local knowledge' of officers on the
beat.267 Information collection systems must give officers a convenient
way to submit information, but also an opportunity to raise problems
and concerns. For example, consent decrees have allocated money to
provide officers with personal digital assistants to reduce paperwork
and make the process easier than the old system. By doing so, this
policy prevents police from viewing data collection as an imposition
that they are tempted to avoid. On the other hand, if a form is too
easy to fill out, police may check off boxes rather than provide a
nuanced description of the stop.25 Police should also be given regular
opportunities to raise problems that cannot be expressed on a form,
or to offer suggestions that would prevent repeat problems on their
beats.
Standards for effective information gathering will evolve, as
police learn from their mistakes. The Department of Justice and
state governments should help by funding research to evaluate and
compare information gathering, thereby assisting police in improving
population and receive five dollars for their trouble. Diamond, supra note 57, at
Al.
265. For a model policy on conducting stops, see PERF Report, supra note 2,
at 51-53.
266. See id. at 27 (describing the one-letter codes that are used in San Jose to
make entering descriptions of stops easier). Letters stand for races, reasons for
stops, and outcome of stops. Their system costs under $10,000, including
software, training, and materials. Id. at 28. Obtaining police union support was
also necessary to ensure that officers complied with the program. Id. at 29.
267. Sparrow, supra note 14, at 125.
268. See Marzulli, supra note 260 (quoting Norman Siegel of the New York
Civil Liberties Union fearing that the NYPD's new form might be too convenient
and facilitate officers' justifying improper searches after the fact).
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their efforts.269 Police departments will also have to recruit new
269. See Ramirez et al., supra note 2, at 56 (suggesting a Best Practices
Guide, funded by the DOJ, as well as assistance in developing benchmarks to
compare statistics on race, with recognition and rewards granted to especially
successful programs). State attorneys-general, or other agencies with closer ties
to local police may be better able to conduct such benchmarking and comparison.
The Rhode Island statute creates such an advisory commission. See supra note
149 and accompanying text. Such benchmarking provides an avenue for
encouraging problem solving and experimentation. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note
14, at 329-32; James Liebman & Charles Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey
Barely Imagined: The Emerging Model of Public School Governance and Legal
Reform (unpublished paper) (arguing that the concomitant use of educational
standards and flexible administrative structures have led to innovation and
improvement in several state school systems), at httpJ/www.law.colum-
bia/sabel/papers/dewey-lab4.doc (last visited Dec. 6, 2001).
The Justice Department could tie funds to compliance with such bench-
marks, creating a national scheme to remedy racial profiling. Alternatively, the
Department could issue guidelines immunizing police who comply from suit
under § 14141. Representative John Conyers has proposed such a scheme. Law
Enforcement Trust and Integrity Act of 1999, H.R. 2656, 106th Cong., § 201, §
601 (1999) (calling on the Commission on Accreditation of Law Enforcement
Agencies (CALEA) to promulgate rolling standards, including "early warning
programs, civil review procedures, traffic stop documentation, and procedures
and administrative due process requirements" and directing the Justice Depart-
ment to deny funds to noncompliant departments or to grant funds to exemplary
departments). The Department of Justice could withhold federal funding from
departments that do not comply with benchmarks. Title VI suggests such an
approach, barring disparate impact discrimination by recipients of federal funds.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VI, § 601, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d (1994) ("No person in
the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.").
Each Federal department and agency which is
empowered to extend Federal financial assistance to any
program or activity, by way of grant, loan, or contract other
than a contract of insurance or guaranty, is authorized and
directed to effectuate the provisions of section 2000d of this
title with respect to such program or activity by issuing rules,
regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall be
consistent with achievement of the objectives of the statute
authorizing the financial assistance in connection with which
the action is taken.
Id. at § 2000d-1. Considerable funds are tied to Title VI compliance. The Bureau
of Justice Assistance at the Justice Department distributes block grant money
and other funds allocated by statute to state and local police departments. For
example, New York City receives over $30 million a year. New York Receives
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analysts, expert in interpreting data and in asking questions about
what new kinds of information would be helpful.27 °
2. Institutionalizing Problem Solving
The great hope of the consent decrees design does not lie in
setting up a computer system, but instead that by doing so, police
will develop expertise in using information to question their practices
and engage in ongoing problem solving. Commentators have termed
this approach 'problem-oriented' policing. 7' Under this approach,
police become skeptics and form the habit of asking why problems
occur, what larger social conditions contribute to the problem, and
who can help assist in solving the problem. 72 Police identify systemic
issues and become willing to make systemic changes. Along these
lines, the Justice Department's hope is that the information struc-
ture of the consent decrees will help to create a cadre of supervisors
that will maintain capacity for reflection.
Creating a cadre of problem solvers poses unique issues in a
traditionally hierarchical institution not used to tolerating, much less
fostering, internal debate and questioning. For example, a traditional
response to the racial profiling problem might be to merely issue a
police regulation requiring or suggesting that officers follow the
Fourth Amendment and not rely predominantly on race. This would
not be a reflective solution, though lawsuits and consent decrees have
begun by asking for such a policy as a starting point to begin problem
$30.3 Million to Improve Public Safety, PR Newswire, June 3, 1999.
The Commission on Accreditation plans to release a policy on racial
profiling following a report in March, with standards that will be binding on the
thousands of police departments that choose to become members of the Commis-
sion. See Residents Share Racial Profiling Stories, Herald (Rock Hill, SC), Jan.
25, 2001, at 3B. Hopefully, the Commission can serve a role in propagating
expertise on monitoring and remedying racial profiling.
270. Sparrow, supra note 14, at 114.
271. See supra note 17.
272. See Sparrow, supra note 14, at 44-49. Herman Goldstein lists the stages
in the problem-solving process as: "1. Grouping incidents as problems. 2.
Disaggregating and accurately labeling problems. 3. Analyzing the multiple
interests in problems. 4. Capturing and critiquing the current response. 5.
Searching uninhibitedly for a tailor-made response. 6. Establishing the
mechanism of accountability. 7. Implementing Solutions. 8. Measuring the
impact of implemented solutions." Id. at 44 (citing Herman Goldstein, Problem-
Oriented Policing (1990)).
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solving.273 The process must proceed by asking profound questions
about why officers rely on race, under what circumstances they do so,
what incentives help shape their behavior, how to train them better,
what law enforcement goals they are trying to accomplish by making
stops the way they do, and whether the goals are themselves
appropriate.
Police departments, paralyzed by accusations of racial profil-
ing, often manifest organizational inflexibility or inability to respond
to problems in order to change traditional ways of policing. They also
possess insularity, an inability to reach out to others who might be
able to assist them in understanding the problem.274 Admitting mis-
takes can be difficult for police; "The police culture makes it tough to
be honest about operational failures. The traditional belief is that
failures can only result from officers ignoring or forgetting the correct
procedures."27  Rather than blaming officers, the procedures them-
selves may need to be reconsidered. Thus, problem solving will re-
quire sustained efforts to change the organizational sub-culture and
break down rigid attitudes, such as the 'blue wall of silence.' 276 This
problem solving process must be ongoing, and will require a change
in attitude on the part of police.
Rather than teach officers to follow procedures set in stone,
273. Adero S. Jernigan, Driving While Black: Racial Profiling in America, 24
Law & Psychol. Rev. 127, 137 (2000) ("[Plolice rulemaking makes for better police
decisions, if only for the reason that it focuses the department on policy-making
and on the implications to the community of the police practices being regulated,
at the departmental level.").
274. See supra note 43 (discussing the silence of New Jersey officials for over
ten years, regarding disproportionate stops of minorities).
275. Sparrow, supra note 14, at 47.
276. See Fagan & Davies, supra note 35, at 500 ("Although the empirical
literature on police 'subculture' offers inconsistent evidence of generalizable
attitudes and beliefs, several studies show that the dynamics and structure of the
police workplace may work to reinforce social (behavioral) norms, perceptions,
and beliefs."). On police reluctance to speak out about corruption or abuse, see
Ariza v. City of New York, No. CV-93-5287, 1996 WL 118535, at *3 (E.D.N.Y.
Mar. 7, 1996) (stating that the "blue wall of silence" serves to "shield corrupt
officers and discourage honest police officers from reporting ... corruption"). See
generally Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The 'Blue Wall of Silence' as Evidence
of Bias and Motive to Lie: A New Approach to Police Perjury, 59 U. Pitt. L. Rev.
233 (1998) (describing the effect of the 'blue wall of silence' on police testimony in
criminal prosecutions and proposing that courts recognize the existence of the
problem as impeachment evidence).
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police must be encouraged to experiment with policy change and to
respond rapidly to new information. While many police departments
are beginning to do this with new technology, this work is usually
limited to supervisors. 77 Police officers are not encouraged to be
creative; they are taught to follow rules and orders, not to think
about them. Individual officers should be encouraged to use their
skills and knowledge to address problems and should be rewarded for
doing so. In part, innovation and change may itself begin to unsettle
hierarchy and traditional ways of making decisions; police will be
forced to confront and question data that is collected, which may help
lead to more long term strategic thinking.7 8 As the crime-fighting
advantages of flexible, rapid response become apparent, these
reforms may take hold more quickly.
Instead of taking orders, police must become used to open-
forum debate and deliberation. Police use of standing committees or
project-based work teams will, in effect, flatten the police hierarchy
and lead to more flexible definitions of people's jobs, so that officers
can question supervisors. As one commentator noted, "[R]igid super-
visory control should give way to a more respectful, more collegial,
more participative style of management."279 These kinds of changes
may engender resentment and fierce opposition from police unions in
particular, as reforms may undermine hard-won work rules by
threatening the seniority system, offering rewards for creativity and
problem solving, requiring flexibility and ambiguity in job descrip-
tions, and broadening the police mission to include community
needs.289 Thus, any reform effort along these lines must involve un-
ions in the planning process and make clear that officers will be gi-
ven more responsibility, at the same time that they will be able to de-
velop their skills and contribute more than ever before. 8'
If departments learn to institutionalize responsiveness to the
information that they gather, they will prove more able to adapt to
277. See, e.g., New Jersey Decree, supra note 37, [I 35-39, entitled
"Supervisory Review of Individual Reports and Incidents."
278. Sparrow, supra note 14, at 76 (describing how to best foster creativity
and innovation).
279. Id. at 153.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 154 ("If left out and allowed only to pick up disconnected snippets
of the plan, [the union's] legitimate efforts to defend members' job security could
torpedo efforts aimed at empowerment.").
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problems like racial profiling.8 Measuring the effectiveness of poli-
cies is not easy and requires asking questions about what the goals of
policing should be. By focusing on effectiveness, police will be able to
assess policies and ask whether discretionary stops lead to sufficient
arrests, seizures, or other benefits to the community so as to justify
the harm that such discretion may cause. Indeed, evidence increas-
ingly shows that police should consider alternatives to deterrence-
oriented policing-in which officers engage in large numbers of pre-
textual stops-because, rather than leading to less crime, or more ar-
rests or seizures, these methods instead lead to shoddy police work
that requires prosecutors and judges to dismiss more cases.2 8
The information gathering techniques described suggest a
new model for problem-oriented policing. While problem-oriented
police departments have engaged in some of these practices, they
have only engaged community groups informally and have shared
limited information when they desired to do so. Even though
community policing has become a mantra adopted by most police
departments, few actively engage the community, and even when
282. See Ramirez et al., supra note 2, at 55.
Historically, the police have defined their purpose as regula-
tory: ensuring the greatest possible order. Their task was
reactive and involved responding to obvious signs of disorder,
such as emergency calls. Realizing the profound limitations of
this model, the community policing strategy began to use infor-
mation, technology, research and data in order to engage in
more effective and better managed policing by anticipating and
disrupting the causes of disorder. Nationwide, police depart-
ments have begun using information and technology to mea-
sure and identify crime clusters and develop strategies to inter-
vene and disrupt violent crime before it occurs.
Id.
283. See Fagan & Davies, supra note 35, at 476-77 (describing results of the
New York Attorney General's Report, showing vast increases in misdemeanor
arrests due to quality of life policing, but a 60% increase in cases dismissed). The
debate over whether New York style policing was responsible for the crime drop
is hotly contested, but there are strong indications that policing practices were
not the cause. See Fagan, supra note 52, at 1285-86, 1289-91 (arguing that
changes in crime rates are caused by predictable cyclical changes in violence
rates, and that the only non-cyclical change has been in gun crime rates); Andrew
Karmen, New York Murder Mystery: The True Story Behind the Crime Crash of
the 1990s, at 13-24 (2000) (finding insufficient evidence to support any single
causal explanation for the decline in New York City's homicide rate from 1991-
98).
REMEDYING RACIAL PROFILING
they do, community policing has generally occurred on the police's
terms and without full disclosure of information to participants.2 8
Creating new information systems allows outsiders to help evaluate
the success of police work in a systematic way. Combining
information sharing and pooling with problem-oriented policing, as in
the examples described, can itself institutionalize problem solving.'
Future remedies should move beyond both the consent
decrees and old models for problem-oriented policing by combining
problem solving with information gathering. They should create
incentives for problem-oriented policing by encouraging supervisors
to spend time evaluating information and questioning practices in a
regular forum. This kind of change is feasible. Something as simple
as weekly meetings to discuss data and suggest responses could suf-
fice. Establishing a standing commission to give this body some
permanence and an institutional place within the police department
would also help. Police also could be given the message that
attending the meetings and making helpful suggestions on how to
address problems suggested by the data will be considered for promo-
tions. Openness of leadership and continuing support will be critical
to maintain problem solving.
284. More than two-thirds of police departments describe themselves as
community policing institutions. Bureau of Just. Stats., U.S. Dep't of Just., Law
Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics, 1997: Data For Indivi-
dual State and Local Agencies with 100 or More Officers v (1999) (stating that
63% of larger county police departments and 61% of larger municipal depart-
ments say they have written community policing plans). Actual implementation
varies widely, however. See Waldeck, supra note 17, at 1255. Waldeck adds, "In
the vast majority of police departments across the country ... [rielationships
with the community are valued primarily because they ease the task of
maintaining law and order-not because a department views itself as a
community-rooted, service-oriented organization." Id. at 1299-1300.
285. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 14, at 331-32 ("Viewed through the lens of
democratic experimentalism, the very recent project of Chicago community
policing reforms is therefore promising but incomplete. Though the fundamental
elements of experimentalism are in place, the essential institutional machinery of
benchmarking discipline has yet to be installed."). The projects discussed in this
Article, which do make public information available and bring in outsiders to
evaluate, come closer to this goal, and while I view participation as more critical
than benchmarking, more systematic comparison and benchmarking could be
included as part of the remedy. See supra note 269 (discussing benchmarking).
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3. Partnership
Participation by key actors in the community has proved
critical to successful problem-oriented policing efforts. Where police
have reached out to solve quality of life problems by working with
schools, landlords, neighborhood watch groups, businesses, and oth-
ers, the results have been positive.' As Susan Sturm describes,
"more interactive forms of participation are both possible and crucial
to achieving remedial legitimacy and success."2 7 Participation pro-
vides police with information and expertise, and helps build relation-
ships and support for their initiatives.' Moreover, considerable
research suggests that, in general, high quality problem solving and
analysis results from participation of people with diverse back-
grounds.29 As the recent Police Executive Research Forum (PERF)
286. See Sparrow, supra note 14, at 86-92 (discussing "the power of public
partnerships"). For example, the San Diego police cooperate with landlords to
help keep buildings safe, they help sponsor and train neighborhood watch groups,
and help provide local services through storefront stations staffed by volunteers.
City of San Diego Police Dep't, Crime Prevention and Education, at http:/Iwww.
sannet.gov/police/prevention/index.shtml (last visited Dec. 6, 2001). See also
PERF Report, supra note 2, at 102-13 (describing efforts around the country to
involve the community in police decision making); Moore, supra note 17, at 123
(noting that working partnerships between the police and community can play an
important role in reducing crime and promoting security); Livingston, supra note
17, at 576 (explaining that the police role in community policing involves not only
crime control, but also order maintenance, crime-prevention, and problem sol-
ving); Waldeck, supra note 17, at 1300-10 (describing how police partnerships
with local schools, businesses, and other institutions made possible different
efforts to combat juvenile truancy, loitering, vandalism, and other form of disor-
der).
287. Susan P. Sturm, The Promise of Participation, 78 Iowa L. Rev. 981, 983
(1993).
288. Thus, partnership preserves the identity and expertise of the police,
outside groups, and the community, and compromises none. Partnership can be
contrasted then with community control where precincts would be divided by
neighborhood and subject to strong local political control. See Samuel Walker,
The Police in America 273 (1999) ("A radical form of controlling the police
through the political process is known as community control. Under this concept,
a municipal police department would be divided into separate agencies according
to neighborhood, each with its own board of commissioners.").
289. Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action:
Reclaiming The Innovative Idea, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 953, 1024 n.289 (1996) (citing
studies showing improved problem solving in diverse work-teams). They add:
Research suggests that diversity is an independent
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report states, since "conducting analysis wholly internal to the agen-
cy can make the results appear suspect," not only should outside ana-
lysts be employed, but "[c]itizens ... should be represented in develo-
ping and implementing the data collection and analysis system."2N
Participation can begin with a simple invitation to join in
problem-solving efforts. Both the Chicago and Philadelphia examples
show how despite a history of mistrust between community groups
and the police, extending a simple but genuine invitation to work on
the problem was enough to begin a meaningful relationship. Police-
community meetings have often led to serious efforts to remedy ra-
cial profiling.nl Next, institutionalizing participation, so that regular
opportunities exist for police to interact with others, formalizes the
relationship and gives outside actors assurance that they will not be
shut out, abandoned, or blamed for failures. This can be achieved by
convening a committee, as in Philadelphia, on which experts from
interested groups are invited to collaborate in solving a problem, not
just to serve as outside monitors.292 Bringing outside groups into the
decision-making process also avoids the problems that plague exter-
nal monitors; excluded from police culture, these actors have been
dismissed as out of touch or lacking a stake in the outcome or real ac-
293cess to police information.
value in generating creative solutions to problems. This aspect
of diversity focuses on the interactive dynamic among
individuals with different vantage points, skills, or values.
Studies have shown that work-team heterogeneity promotes
more critical strategic analysis, creativity, innovation, and
high-quality decisions.
Id. at 1024.
290. PERF Report, supra note 2, at 142-44. Though they do not strongly
endorse intimate police-citizen collaboration, the recommendation is noteworthy,
and will hopefully influence its intended audience, police departments trying to
decide how to approach the racial profiling problem.
291. Id. at 112-13 (describing efforts stemming from meetings in Denver,
Colorado and Spokane, Washington).
292. In another example, Tacoma, Washington recently responded to a study
indicating racial disparity in police stops by convening a task force including civil
rights groups and community members. Stacey Burns, Tacoma Police Review
Tickets; Racial Profiling? Department Checks if Breakout Signifies Problem, News
Trib. (Tacoma), Jan. 9, 2001, at Al. The task force was convened to solicit input
from community members, analyze the survey data, and make recommendations
to the police. Id.
293. See Livingston, supra note 17, at 666 ("Monitoring mechanisms,
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Alternatively, police can identify the fora in which they al-
ready have regular contact with outside groups or the community.
Beat meetings, cop watch programs, and even city council meetings
could be used as initial ways to disclose data and invite public dis-
cussion about a problem. Once there is some dialogue, police can then
invite closer participation of interested groups in the actual problem-
solving effort.
Information gathering distinguishes this approach from past
attempts to start discussion about race and policing. Simply conven-
ing a group with a vague mission to discuss race, or the problem of
racial profiling, might degenerate into a shouting match. While dia-
logue alone may help create trust, this lack of definition may be a
failing of efforts to hold discussion forums, community meetings, or
initial attempts to solicit feedback. The key to formalizing the rela-
tionship is that all sides have a project to work on-designing proce-
dures for data collection, developing protocols for stops and the use of
race in these encounters, interpreting the information, and reevalua-
ting the procedures.
Data collection, if nothing else, gives everyone something
discrete to work with and evaluate. One criticism is that data collec-
tion is only a partial solution. Where departments need to rethink
training, supervision, hiring, and general policies and procedures,
why focus on data collection? Data collection is a point of entry into
those larger efforts. By looking at the data collection process, and
even deciding what to include in the form that officers fill out, groups
will be forced to think about what happens during an encounter,
what officers should do and say during a stop, and what elements of
this interaction should be scrutinized most closely. In designing data
collection, police and citizens will have a chance to evaluate their
priorities and begin to think about how to approach racially biased
policing. In turn, the data itself will help evaluate the success of
other reforms.
Advantages of outside participation itself run in several
directions. Bringing in outsiders, by its nature, introduces a new
democratic element of shared decision-making in the police depart-
ment itself, and thus helps break down the insular and hierarchical
whether internal or external, are no panacea for the management of police
discretion .... Departments may fail to take policy guidance from review boards
even when these boards are in a position to offer it."). Police have resisted review.
See supra note 210.
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processes that themselves create barriers for effective problem sol-
ving.294 As Professor Waldeck explains:
By encouraging alliances between the police and the
community, the strategy breaks through the "us and them"
mentality. Moreover, when the emphasis is on partner-
ships, aggressive and quasi- militaristic attitudes that risk
alienating significant segments of the community are coun-
terproductive. In sum, community policing has the ability
to alter not only the external face of policing-with the
introduction of permanent beat officers, neighborhood meet-
ings and the like-but also the internal dynamics and val-
ues of a police department itself.25
This challenge to traditional internal decision-making processes can
be viewed as a threat, and poses many of the same challenges that
effective problem solving poses.
Outsiders have access to different information, and working
partnerships allow everyone to 'pool' their data and expertise.2 The
process of institutional reflection requires questioning, which can be
better informed by others who share a commitment to a problem, but
have a different perspective, or access to different information. Thus,
making police information public is a precondition to any meaningful
problem solving. Participation requires evaluating police informa-
tion, comparing it with information groups may have, and deciding
294. See Fagan & Davies, supra note 35, at 502-03 ("The extent to which
opportunities for community interaction with police are routinized and
institutionalized can break down the insularity of police social norms at the top
and bottom of its hierarchy.").
295. Waldeck, supra note 17, at 1267-68.
296. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 14, at 327.
That there is demonstrably effective citizen participation in
community policing in cities such as Chicago suggests that
experimentalist institutions can serve two complementary
functions. On the one hand, they act as organizational emolli-
ents, making hierarchies more fluid internally and more open
to the outside. On the other, they validate local knowledge as a
form of expertise by demonstrating its utility, thus fostering
participation (and the learning it occasions) by those usually
held incapable of it.
Id. at 328. See also supra notes 210-20 and accompanying text for an example of
the pragmatic and democratizing effects of police involving the community in
problem solving.
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whether new decisions should be made.
If the controversy surrounding the way that statistics are
gathered teaches us anything, it is that accuracy and completeness
can only be gauged by the purpose of the data, which is value laden,
requiring the input of a diverse group of outsiders. By defining the
racial profiling 'problem' as a numerical disparity, only the race of
those stopped would be collected and data collection would become a
litmus test. The consent decrees recognize that many more complex
factors are at work. As discussed above, the way stops are conducted,
the way police talk, body language, cultural differences, whether
force is used, and the number of people watching all affect perception
about whether a stop is unjust, and those perceptions prove critical
to the ways that groups define the problem. 7 Thus, even for sound
data gathering, outside groups will be needed to supply that kind of
information about perceptions. Police observations about a stop are
one-sided and may not capture the full problem. 298 Day-to-day
observation may help interpret data, as in the Maltz project in Chica-
go, and community concerns may help to improve the quality of the
data and uncover new problems.m Participation may also suggest
new ways of collecting data and suggest new sources of information.
Second, outside expertise may be needed. Many police depart-
ments, unsure of what the law or the public requires, and facing alle-
297. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
298. Maltz et al., supra note 224, at 21 (describing how the public's observa-
tions and the social context of incidents are critical in designing crime prevention
strategies:
For example, the sex, age, identifying features, and clothing
worn by an assailant may be described down to the color of his
shoelaces, but the geographical and social contexts of the
incident-such as the community's perception of
dangerousness of the incident's location... and other environ-
mental factors (e.g., the type of street lighting; the amount of
traffic on the street; the location of bars, parks, abandoned
buildings, etc.)-are usually not captured by the incident
reporting system....").
299. Richard R.W. Brooks, Fear and Fairness in the City: Criminal
Enforcement and Perceptions of Fairness in Minority Communities, 73 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 1219, 1224 (2000) ("[E]xpanded service-oriented patrols and heightened
community involvement are plausibly more consistent with the desires of
minorities in high-crime neighborhoods than a policy of unleashing special
tactical units (e.g., gangs, guns or drugs) with limited guidance.").
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gations of racial profiling, have turned first to the community to de-
cide how to address the problem. They have held meetings and open
discussions on the problem.3° Outsiders also may help open up these
discussions and permit a more experimental approach. In Philadel-
phia, legal groups used their unique perspective to question policies
and to revise legal standards that the department had relied on.
Furthermore, community groups, as in Chicago, may provide the da-
ta itself as well as political support. Other police departments facing
similar problems may be interested in cooperating, as may other gov-
ernment institutions. In addition, researchers and information sys-
tems experts may prove helpful. The role of the press also proves im-
portant as many lawsuits and investigations into racial profiling be-
gan through press investigations and studies.3 °'
Police have found outside participation necessary because
solving a problem requires building new relationships and enlisting
the support of others. Collaboration with key actors in Philadelphia
provided a coalition of support for the changes the police began to
make and helped them respond to anger over past wrongs. Political
legitimacy flowed from the participation of individual neighborhood
police watch groups in Chicago. Part of the racial profiling problem is
perception of inappropriate behavior, and police must open up dia-
logue with outsiders if they are to understand and allay that percep-
tion and to gauge improvement.
Trust is particularly critical where police are accused of ra-
300. See, e.g., Patricia Davis, Chief Says Arlington Fights Racial Profiling,
Wash. Post, Feb. 11, 2000, at B9 (describing how Arlington County, Virginia's
police chief responded to complaints about racial profiling by confronting the
issue in a series of group discussions, resulting in a departmental pledge to reject
tactics based on race, which in turn would be used to generate further discussion
among residents); Stefano Esposito, At Hearing: Expand Collection of Racial
Profiling Data, News Trib. (Tacoma), June 1, 2000, at B1 (describing a Tacoma,
Washington community meeting where citizens complained that collecting data
about stops was not enough, and that concrete action was required and more
comprehensive data should be kept).
301. Mia Penta, Seattle Police Face $100 Million Claim, Oregonian (Port-
land), Aug. 31, 2000, at D2 (describing how a Seattle Times study showing dra-
matic disparity in traffic stops helped spark a one hundred million-dollar private
lawsuit over racial profiling and promised reforms from the City). See also Jeff
Brazil & Steve Berry, Color of Driver is Key to Stops in 1-95 Videos, Orlando Sen-
tinel Trib., Aug. 23, 1992, at Al (presenting a study reviewing videotapes of police
stops, showing dramatic racial disparity. The article ultimately led to an NAACP
lawsuit.).
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cial discrimination."0 2 As the Terry Court stated, "in many communi-
ties, field interrogations are a major source of friction between the
police and minority groups." 3 Race and police stops raise deep poli-
tical issues that require political dialogue. For example, Boston police
in the early 1990s used a racially charged profile when investigating
a murder, causing a rift between police and the community.3' They
have made great strides since then to involve the community in all
decisions, making special efforts to build relationships with a Ten-
Point Coalition of key community leaders. °5 In 1995, crisis loomed
again when a white Assistant Attorney General, Paul McLaughlin,
was shot, apparently because of his work to combat gangs.0 6 A new
murder investigation began with the use of a sparse, racially charged
302. Trust itself is an elusive concept. For a summary of literature discussing
the definition of trust in the context of policing, see Luna, supra note 225, at
1158-59 n.205. Luna summarizes the literature with the following definition:
Trust is: (1) an expectation of (2) appropriate (3) future (4)
behavior of another actor (5) in the face of risk (6) based on
perceived benevolent motivations of that actor.
Id. Thus the notion of trust is linked to the burgeoning literature on legitimacy of
government action, another source of spirited debate both in legal philosophy and
the social sciences.
303. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14 n.11 (1968).
304. In 1989, police investigating the murder of Carol Stuart created a
scandal when they 'blanketed' the predominantly black Mission Hill neighbor-
hood in response to a description of a black assailant provided by her husband,
Charles Hill, who was later identified as the perpetrator. Berrien & Winship,
supra note 240, at 26.
305. For example, Berrien and Winship note:
Key decision-makers in the Boston Police Department now
consult Reverend Rivers and other members of the Ten-Point
Coalition prior to any major police action in their
neighborhood. This preemptive action has three benefits. First,
the key community members feel that they are being included
in major decisions and that their needs are being considered by
law enforcement officials. In addition, clergy representatives
have first-hand knowledge of the situations on the street that
may lead law enforcement officials to redirect their approach or
change their tactics. Finally, regular conversations with each
other solidify relationships and build trust between the two
groups.
Id. at 29.
306. Id.
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suspect description: "black male, about 14 or 15 years old, 5 foot 7,
wearing a hooded sweatshirt and baggy jeans."3 °7 However, because of
their new partnership, "Boston law enforcement officials and Ten-
Point Coalition ministers used their response to the McLaughlin
murder to solidify and publicly display their new-found coopera-
tion."3 8 The situation was handled sensitively by all sides and has
only deepened cooperation by solidifying the degree to which police
and the community rely on one another to solve problems.3 9
Cooperation can gradually foster trust of advocates and
community groups. If the public is involved and understands why de-
cisions are being made, the discussion can move beyond divisiveness
to issues of how to reform training, allocation of resources, or patrol
methods. Being involved in data collection may help allay a percep-
tion of discriminatory policing. For example, in the Maltz study, word
of mouth would sometimes amplify one incident into a perception of a
crime wave, so that collaboration reduced community fears. 30 Trust
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Berrien and Winship suggest that police departments cooperating with
the community can "[cihannel the power of a catalytic event." Id. at 30.
The tactics and investigative approach of Boston's law enforce-
ment officials during this tense period showed marked differen-
ces .... Both clergy and police representatives were very
sensitive to the delicate implications of a racially charged case.
Police Commissioner Paul F. Evans immediately made a state-
ment to address community fears .... The commissioner spoke
on a radio station with a largely black audience soon after the
murder, to emphasize the limited value of the vague assailant
description, and to say that an effective investigation depended
on cooperation between the police and the community. The
commissioner also joined the ministers at the Ten-Point
Coalition's press conference in an additional illustration of
police cooperation, rather than antagonism, with the African-
American community. Thus, both the ministers and law
enforcement officials responded in a way that emphasized the
extent of their partnership, made the cooperation public,
showed the community that they worked together and that
each was respected by the other. They also used media
attention, which was readily available, to show that the
precedent had changed in police-community interaction ....
Id.
310. Maltz et al., supra note 224, at 13.
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moves in two directions, so cooperation also may help police trust the
community. Individual officers may abandon stereotypes once they
get to know and work with community members and become more
familiar with a neighborhood.311
Inviting participation seems natural where policing is no
longer seen as specialized work, but instead a social service that has
become part of an interlocking web of services. Police regularly
cooperate with schools, social services, domestic violence advocates,
legal groups, and others.312 In the past, police have violently and
311. Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the
Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 956, 1010 (1999).
If, however, as social science data suggest, police behavior may
result from various types of "cues" and negative perceptions
that such cues trigger, then the best place to begin changing
police officers' behavior is by changing their experience with
communities and individuals of color. Exposing officers to these
communities in less confrontational ways may begin to broaden
officers' perception of individuals within these neighborhoods.
Id. (footnote omitted). Where police employ unconscious stereotypes, community
contact may prove especially important. Cf Sheri Lynn Johnson, Unconscious
Racism and the Criminal Law, 73 Cornell L. Rev. 1016 (1988).
312. "An interagency approach, permitting the application of a varied menu
of sanctions and incentives, can greatly increase the effectiveness of the strategy."
David M. Kennedy, Pulling Levers: Chronic Offenders, High-Crime Settings, and
a Theory of Prevention, 31 Val. U. L. Rev. 449, 451 (1997). All of the examples of
problem-oriented policing involve multiple service providers. For one example,
see Berrien & Winship, supra note 240, at 29.
Boston Police, Boston Probation, Department of Youth
Services, clergy members, city Street and Youth Workers, Mass
Bay Transit Authority Police, the School Department, and
School Police meet weekly to share information on important
developments on the street. For example, several disturbing
incidents of sexual assault and harassment have occurred
recently on the city's public transportation system. MBTA
police and city youth workers as well as clergy brought up the
importance of addressing these incidents at the weekly Bloods
and Crips Initiative meetings. A task force on sexual
harassment and assault was established in order to address
these issues effectively. School presentations on the subject are
planned in the future.
Another objective of this collaboration is to exhibit
strong, supportive, and unified authority to the targeted youth.
This is achieved through the participation of multiple agencies
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bitterly resented civilian involvement in work that they feel only
police officers can understand.3 3 However, police have increasingly
found such participation useful and have granted broader access to
outsiders in ways that are now starting to occur with racial profiling,
often using information systems to facilitate communication.314 In
turn, advocacy groups and experts are finding police increasingly
receptive to what they have to offer, and have begun to cooperate by
providing services and helping to reform police practices.
This move to wider participation and joint problem-solving
reflects a shift in the structure of local government. Public-private
partnerships, created to address perceived failings in social services,
increasingly replace traditional city government bureaucracies.315 As
and clergy representatives in all of the initiative's activities:
school visits and presentations, home visits to youth suspected
of gang involvement, regular street patrols, and a strong
presence in popular "hang-out" areas during peak hours. The
collaborative approach serves to notify youth of alternative
options and brings them into contact with a network of
resources designed to serve their specific needs.
Id.
313. In particular, police have resisted creating civilian review boards. Mark
Iris, Police Discipline in Chicago: Arbitration or Arbitrary?, 89 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 215, 219 (1998).
314. See, e.g., David Michael Ryfe, Information Systems in the San Diego
Region, 36 Cal. W. L. Rev. 367, 369 (2000) (describing San Diego's network of
information shared between government services).
In response to the new political realities, local government
agencies have instituted forums to share information and re-
sources among themselves; established new and innovative
links with non-profit agencies, foundations, and community-
based organizations; capitalized on new information technolo-
gies; and developed sets of social indicators to make their data
more publicly available and understandable.
Id. Information systems are being developed to link social workers to police and
prosecutors databases, in order to inform them of child abuse complaints when
placing children in parent's homes. See Jane Brady, Drop in Crime Rate Bypasses
Child Victims, 15 Crim. Just. 10, 12 (2000) (describing Delaware's prevention and
intervention strategies to decrease the number of child victims, including the
linking of information systems among government branches).
315. Martha Minow describes an explosion in new kinds of partnerships that
combine business, government, and the community. These emerged, in part, out
of desperation as social services funding has been cut. Hence, funding for non-
profits is increasingly dependent on government funding, or on collaboration with
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more community groups provide services in cooperation with govern-
ment and others, they blur the lines between the government and
community.316 Structural reform remedies can benefit from these new
partnerships that are developed precisely because neither community
groups nor government think that they can solve the problems alone.
Some groups have done innovative work to change the nature of the
services delivered, combining social services and providing health,
housing and legal help under one roof.317 While blending private and
public can mean an abdication of government responsibility, part-
nership need not take that form. To the contrary, the idea of govern-
ment as separate from the community implies hierarchy or isolation;
community partnership can make government more accountable.318
Community policing suggests ways that community members can
directly participate in police decisions, allowing them to share in the
responsibility for decisions made while police retain accountability.
businesses. Martha Minow, Partners, Not Rivals?: Redrawing the Lines Between
Public and Private, Non-Profit and Profit, and Secular and Religious, 80 B.U. L.
Rev. 1061 (2000).
316. Deserved criticism has focused on privatization, business improvement
districts, and government abandonment of civic responsibilities to the private
sector. Nick Beermann, Legal Mechanisms of Public-Private Partnerships: Pro-
moting Economic Development or Benefiting Corporate Welfare?, 23 Seattle U. L.
Rev. 175 (1999); Richard Briffault, A Government for Our Time? Business Im-
provement Districts and Urban Governance, 99 Colum. L. Rev 365 (1999). See also
Richard Briffault, The Rise of Sublocal Structures in Urban Governance, 82 Minn.
L. Rev. 503 (1997); Robert C. Ellickson, New Institutions for Old Neighborhoods,
48 Duke L.J. 75 (1998).
317. One example is The Partnership for the Homeless in New York City. For
a description of their structure and services, see The Partnership for the
Homeless, at http/www.partnershipforhomeless.org (last visited Dec. 6, 2001).
318. In contrast, the idea that government exists separately presupposes
unaccountable, command-and-control governance, and public involvement can
mean transparency and more democratic government. Professor Jody Freeman
argues that private-public interdependence is pervasive and can resolve the
legitimacy crisis in administration. Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public
Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543 (2000). It is also hard to argue that policing is
necessarily a public institution when most security professionals are private. As
such, policing has been privatized. See David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46
UCLA L. Rev. 1165 (1999).
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IV. NEW ROLES AND RELATIONSHIPS THROUGH
WORKING PARTNERSHIP
The model described poses many challenges that require
longstanding commitment of police and outside groups, and deep
changes in the ways that these groups work with clients, community,
and each other. Police must first be willing to collect incredibly com-
prehensive data about their work. They must then be willing to make
that data public and the focus of problem solving efforts. Finally, and
most critically, they must invite outside partners to participate in
designing remedies and to tackle the issues that new data reveals.
There is some reason to have faith, though, that after the initial
invitation to participate, groups can overcome mutual distrust,
especially once collaboration begins, and when all sides start to
develop common goals.
One objection might be that long-term collaboration appears
especially difficult around the volatile issue of race; after all,
"strained relations between the police and minority communities
have historically been among the most well-documented and difficult
urban problems to solve." 19 With these laws, lawsuits, and settle-
ments, police are already being forced to reckon with race and to
cooperate with outsiders. Further, the relationships and alliances
that result from this approach make it particularly well suited to
addressing controversial problems like race in policing. The racial
profiling debate has already begun to shift to the stage where the
question is not whether racial profiling exists, but rather what is a
practicable solution. Mixing issues of the use of force with race, as in
the consent decrees, will defuse the volatility of race. Regardless, all
of these issues are linked.320
319. Benjamin B. Tucker, How Do We Reduce Crime and Preserve Human
Decency? The Role of Leadership in Policing for a Democratic Society, 28 Fordham
Urb. L.J. 601, 602 (2000).
320. Crime mapping involves race if police ignore problems in minority
neighborhoods, but adopt the rhetoric of response to crime and the allocation of
police resources. Mapping could be used to help respond to racial profiling in
those cases where police make stops that impact minorities-stops that are
perceived as unfair because they are unreasonable and do not effectively combat
crime. A comprehensive approach to information sharing might allow the
community to create maps featuring the breakdown of stops by race, force
complaints, crime rates, police resource allocation, and neighborhood conditions
and demographics.
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Police once refused to discuss or respond to domestic violence.
Beginning in the 1980s, a few initial lawsuits led to reform. These
started with a few landmark decisions and consent decrees, then
branched out to include more widespread experimentation and
institutional change, so that today many police departments have
domestic violence projects that work in cooperation with victim's
advocacy groups, domestic violence shelters, and legal groups.2 1 In
ten years time, racial profiling programs in police departments may
be as prevalent as domestic violence programs are today.
Political complexities of cooperation across institutional
borders run in several directions. Police run the risk of being thought
soft on crime or capitulating to pressure by 'special interest' or 'legal'
groups. The role of the police chief proves especially critical, in set-
ting the tone of cooperation and willingness to engage the commun-
ity; Chief Timoney in Philadelphia made collaboration possible by
reaching out to community groups.
3
2
Community groups also take on a big risk by working with
police. Martha Minow voices a fear that through such partnerships,
community groups may lose their distinctiveness. 23 Groups may be
seen by some of their members as untrustworthy collaborators with
the police. Further, they may actually become co-opted by police, lose
touch with community concerns, or simply become overwhelmed with
police work and have fewer resources to help people with individual
problems. Moreover, groups may be less willing to take radical
stands against police for fear of alienating their new partners and
jeopardizing their newfound access.
On the other hand, through partnerships, community groups
can make themselves heard, enabling them to change the way they
321. See Joan Zorza, The Criminal Law of Misdemeanor Domestic Violence,
1970-1990, 83 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 46, 54-60 (1992) (describing how initial
lawsuits in Oakland, Ca., and New York City, Scott v. Hart and Bruno v. Codd,
respectively, forced police departments nationwide to revamp their domestic vio-
lence policies, and analyzing reform efforts in the years since). See also Stephen
J. Schulhofer, The Feminist Challenge in Criminal Law, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2151,
2159 (1995) (describing early reform efforts).
322. Tucker, supra note 319, at 606. "[Plerhaps the most important driving
force behind effective change and the improvement of management,
administration, and operations in policing has been the leadership of more
progressive police administrators who understood the importance and value of
exploring new crime-prevention and crime-fighting strategies." Id.
323. Minow, supra note 315, at 1084.
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are treated by police. This new influence may be empowering, so that
people will be willing to get involved and come forward with prob-
lems, knowing that there is redress. Hopefully, community groups
will be able to maintain separate grassroots identities. Partnerships
with police may enable these groups to stay truer to their
constituency. By contrast, a reliance on litigation-although
emotionally satisfying-preserves an adversarial stance and requires
a heavy dependence on outside legal help that is far less likely to re-
sult in the needed relief.
324
While there will likely be some institutions and actors pre-
pared to advocate police reform, the relationship between these
groups and the community at large will also determine the legitima-
cy of reform. The community may not have well organized groups or
groups mobilized around the issue of racial profiling. Or community
groups may have a history of antagonism and infighting.
Many have asked who is the relevant community to work
with police. The answer to that question, of course, depends on the
definition of community, if such a thing can be defined. 325 At mini-
mum, a community includes people who share an interest and are
capable of cooperating to secure that interest. Police may begin, as in
Boston, by seeking out key leaders to work with, even if they risk
326
alienating less prominent, and maybe more representative, groups.
This task may be more difficult if a community is diffuse. The com-
munity may not depend on geography in the sense of living in the
same neighborhood. For example, a state highway patrol affects a
'community' of transient drivers, to whom it is not directly accounta-
ble as many of then do not live in the state. Even such a diffuse com-
munity can be reached, though. The New Jersey consent decree has
attempted to reach those stopped by using hotlines and posting
324. See supra note 70 for evidence that many victims do not want to be
part of litigation, but may become politicized and seek long-term community-
based support.
325. Livingston, supra note 17, at 577 ("Academics have warned that the
concept of 'community' in community policing is imprecise at best, and even
idealized."). See, e.g., Jerome E. McElroy et al., Community Policing: The CPOP
in New York 3-4 (1993) ("Virtually all commentators agree that the concept of
'community' as used in the rhetoric of community policing is imprecise, perhaps
interchangeable with the concepts of neighborhood, district, or beat, and largely
uninformed by a century of sociological usage and study.").
326. See supra note 305 and accompanying text.
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information at highway rest stops. 327 In addition, statewide advocacy
groups could be included in monitoring.
No community can exist where information about policing is
not made public. In contrast, police can create community by sharing
information and inviting participation. Once people have aware-
ness of what police are doing and are given a stake in making deci-
sions, groups of people will get involved and organized. In other con-
texts, initial outrage and lawsuits have led to collaborative efforts
that created a 'community' of citizens involved in police reform and
constructive efforts to assist police in their work. Groups may be less
antagonistic once a common project is defined through open policing.
Litigation, on the other hand, may foster distrust between legal
121groups and organizers.
Collaborative relationships have been formed out of a desire
to improve policing. Maltz emphasizes that formerly hostile commun-
ity groups and police began to trust each other and appreciate each
other's usefulness once they began to cooperate. m This trust comes
with openness, with less police secrecy, and the sharing of informa-
tion.331 As such, "trust can be stimulated by citizen-government colla-
boration on the basic rules of law enforcement accompanied by a
monitoring system worthy of trust." 2 In turn, rebuilding trust with
the community brings broader benefits to police departments, inclu-
ding: better compliance with laws; more willingness to cooperate with
327. "The State shall publicize the State Police mailing address, internet
address, and toll-free telephone number at state-operated rest stops located on
limited access highways." New Jersey Decree, supra note 37, 59.
328. In a concrete way, release of data has created debate over how police do
their work. See supra notes 237-39. And in a theoretical sense, community can be
defined as a set of actors in dialogue. For example, Habermas believes that
"communication community" is created through rational dialogue with others and
a diversity of voices. Jurgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis (1975). His view
posits a kind of institutionalized and rationalized deliberation that does not seem
far removed from the kind of political movement and reaction that has
characterized police reform. For the view that discourse should not be a preferred
mode of decision making, see Frederick Schauer, Discourse and Its Discontents,
72 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1309 (1997).
329. See Rose, supra note 69, at 665.
330. Maltz et al., supra note 224, at xii.
331. Luna, supra note 225, at 1163 ("A solid basis for trust begins with a
willingness to share information.").
332. Id. at 1164.
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police, share information and report crimes; and greater belief in the
legitimacy of government.33
Lawyers and legal institutions can also play a role in
facilitating partnership by requiring that data be made public and by
including community groups structurally in remedies. To do so,
lawyers must abandon their exclusive focus on litigation and must
engage the community and other groups to help shape more creative
remedies.3 Indeed, a growing community of lawyers is committing
itself to such an approach, perhaps because of legal obstacles, but
more likely because class action litigation is impersonal, time
consuming, expensive, and may not provide the sort of assistance
that victims of misconduct and their families often require. 33 These
lawyers find it especially effective to dedicate resources towards work
with clients as part of a larger progressive movement to remedy
police misconduct, rather than to pursue repeated § 1983 Suits. 336
333. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 21, at 169-78 (describing the costs that ine-
quality places on law enforcement, causing distrust and unwillingness to cooper-
ate with law enforcement, and encouraging crime); David Cole, What's Crimino-
logy Got to Do With It?, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1605, 1619-23 (1996) (citing increasing
minority distrust in the legitimacy of law enforcement that may lead to disobey-
ing the law); Tom R. Tyler, Citizen Discontent With Legal Procedures: A Social
Science Perspective on Civil Procedure Reform, 45 Am. J. Comp. L. 871, 891
(1997) (arguing that trust leads to compliance).
334. See Rose, supra note 69, at 660-62 (describing the shortcomings of the
litigation centered approach to racial profiling). Rose compares this approach to
that of "regnant lawyering"; "the characteristics of regnant lawyering are:
focusing on litigation; seeing 'community education' as diffuse, marginal, and
uncritical work; seeing 'organizing' as sporadic, supplemental mobilization; and
viewing lawyers as preeminent problem-solvers and clients as fact-givers." Id. at
660. Gerald Lopez introduced the idea of rebellious versus regnant lawyering.
Gerald P. Lopez, Reconceiving Civil Rights Practice: Seven Weeks in the Life of a
Rebellious Collaboration, 77 Geo. L.J. 1603, 1608 (1989); Gerald P. Lopez,
Rebellious Lawyering, One Chicano's Vision of Progressive Law Practice 23-24,
37-38 (1992).
335. See Rose, supra note 69, at 643-47, 649-52 (describing the work of the
National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights and the Committee Against Anti-
Asian Violence (CAAV), both of which combine legal work with advocacy,
organizing, public education, and non-legal work to help empower victims of
police brutality). By using a variety of strategies, they maintain the ability to
problem solve and respond to clients' individualized needs. Interestingly, Hyun
Lee, an organizer with CAAV, noted that litigation, while sometimes productive,
can give victims a "false sense of security and justice." Id. at 651.
336. Id.
2001]
146 COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [33:41
Lawyers could also provide a supportive role for community groups.
Behind all of the success stories in police reform lie well-organized
community efforts, including new approaches in Philadelphia and
Chicago, passage of state laws, and the impetus for consent
decrees."' The Chicago story, in particular, shows how reform efforts
can tap the local knowledge of organized residents. Lawyers could
help facilitate participation in police problem solving.
Prosecutors can also play a critical role in assisting these ef-
forts. m Lawyers representing cities or police departments may
reconsider aggressive defenses that may operate at cross-purposes
with the department's own goals of maintaining connections with the
community. Unwillingness to comply with discovery or attacks on the
character of victims of police misconduct may alienate the commu-
nity and prevent settlements that could satisfy all sides.339
Courts can take on a role in helping to encourage collabora-
tion between police and outside groups. In considering remedies,
courts will hopefully find them less intrusive when the community,
not the court, monitors the decree.' 0 This program is decentralized,
but the police departments' progress can be compared, and could be
benchmarked by a government agency.31 In fact, government agen-
cies have already become more involved in assisting local police re-
337. In particular, the Pittsburgh decree followed a lawsuit by civil rights
groups. See Miller, supra note 164, at 192. Similarly, all of the consent decrees
have been influenced by pressure from community groups, including lawsuits and
efforts to intervene. See supra notes 201-04.
338. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Prosecuting Violence/Reconstructing Communi-
ty, 52 Stan. L. Rev 809, 827-29 (2000) (exploring the possibilities of "prosecution-
fostered community under the guide of mercy" especially in the context of racial
violence).
339. For example, New York City Corporation Counsel lawyers have proved
notoriously unwilling to cooperate with discovery requests in police litigation. See
supra note 124. And in a class action alleging racial profiling, the court rejected
out of hand detailed arguments the city made attacking the reputations, moral
character, and even the intelligence of victims of allegedly suspicionless stops.
Daniels v. City of New York, 198 F.R.D. 409, 418-19 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (describing
defendants' allegations that named plaintiffs were mentally incompetent, had
outstanding warrants for public consumption of alcohol, and were generally of
questionable moral character).
340. For a discussion of the role that courts can play in encouraging partici-
pation and experimentation in remedies, see supra note 182. See also Dorf &
Sabel, supra note 14 at 463-64; Sturm, supra note 14, at 556-64.
341. See supra note 269 (discussing benchmarking).
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form under state laws, and they can do more than provide needed fi-
nancial assistance. Hopefully, they can also dedicate resources and
expertise towards encouraging stronger remedies, by evaluating and
benchmarking police efforts at reform, sharing expertise with depart-
ments, and fostering ties between the community and police.
Through these remedies, new connections can be made, so
that "[1]awyers, community organizers, survivors of police brutality,
families of victims of police brutality, students, members of street or-
ganizations, and others ... recognize each other as collaborators in a
joint struggle." 2
V. CONCLUSION
The racial profiling problem as defined in Equal Protection
law runs aground on questions of how much disparity should be
tolerated and how to limit police discretion. Conceiving law as only a
negative limit on police decision-making underestimates the role that
law can play in assisting with police reform. Traditionally, problem-
oriented policing advocates argued that cities should pass laws to ex-
pand police discretion to solve problems on their beats and address
'quality of life' issues, but that otherwise, lawyers should leave police
to find solutions on their own.3 However, discretion of any kind is
empty if uninformed, and when unguided, it is prone to abuse. The
evolution of racial profiling remedies presents a radically different
and more powerful role for law to define police reform. Legal reme-
dies create the framework for information gathering, informed prob-
lem solving, and finally, partnership involving sets of interested out-
side actors.
Hopefully, this discussion, together with descriptions of parti-
cipatory police problem solving, makes the proposal concrete. Reme-
342. Rose, supra note 69, at 665.
343. See Livingston, supra note 17, at 651 (discussing the new 'street laws'
directed at enhancing police discretion and ability to respond to quality of life
problems with only small civil penalties). Livingston recognizes that the check on
police discretion is not in law. Rather, "the management of police discretion in a
community policing framework is about the exchange of information between
neighborhoods and the police. The very reciprocity between police and
communities that is deemed essential to effective community policing is thus also
critical to ensuring that discretion is adequately constrained." Id. at 653. Law,
however, can have a role in facilitating that information exchange, rather than
simply granting empty discretion.
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dies already implemented have changed the way police use informa-
tion, creating some of the right incentives for problem solving to be-
gin. Harnessing this information will allow police to institutionalize
problem-oriented policing and require more formal analysis and in-
formation sharing than past informal community policing arrange-
ments. Racial profiling remedies already in place, and experiments in
Philadelphia and Chicago, suggest that problem-oriented policing can
be information-driven and formal. Further, these efforts imply that
remedying racial profiling is not just a problem for the police. Taking
the next step, and designing the remedy around partnership requires
openness and reaching out to groups that must themselves realize
they can play a helpful role. Collaboration may develop naturally ov-
er time, as police and participating groups share a common interest
in solving the problems they face.
By creating partnership, these remedies create new bonds be-
tween police, the community, reformers, and other government insti-
tutions. They reveal the narrowness of current racial profiling the-
ory. Not only is the legal understanding of police action limited to nu-
merical disparity and individual motivation, but the focus is only on
police and not on outside actors. These remedies extend structural
reform beyond institutional reform, to shaping relationships across
institutions and in the community context. By doing so, not only will
they better remedy racial profiling, but they allow police to move be-
yond constraints of traditional policing to acquire new allies and ana-
lytical techniques. Uncovering structural constraints that lie beneath
the surface of the racial profiling problem helps police evolve along
with lawyers, advocates, and the community. By bringing together
concerned actors, and structuring relationships around information
gathering and problem solving, these remedies draw on new syner-
gies, changing the composition of law enforcement. Through this re-
medial approach, police may turn a crisis of modern policing into a
source of renewed legitimacy and trust.
